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ABSTRACT 
THE FIRST SPANISH AMBASSADOR TO THE SUBLIME PORTE: 
JUAN DE BOULIGNY AND HIS EARLY ACTIVITIES IN ISTANBUL BASED 
ON HIS DIARY 
 
Çiçek Ünal, Ayşe 
MA, Department of History 
Supervisor: Asisst. Prof. Kahraman Şakul 
January 2015, 118 pages 
 
The purpose of this study is to identify the relationship between Spain and the Ottoman 
Empire in the eighteenth century, based on the diary of the first Spanish ambassador, 
Juan de Bouligny. He was appointed by the Spanish court to negotiate Peace and Trade 
Agreements and he stayed for nearly three years (May, 1779–September 1782) in 
Constantinople. This fully comprehensive diary allows us to see the agreement process 
through the lens of Spanish plenipotentiary. The questions this study addresses are: (1) 
in which conjuncture was the agreement signed between these two great powers, (2) 
what was the function of this agreement, (3) which procedures were conducted 
throughout the agreement process, and (4) which networks and operations of the 
Spanish plenipotentiary took place in Constantinople. With the endeavours of diligent 
plenipotentiary, the agreement process reached a conclusion, however; the newly 
changed conjuncture did not allow it to be practiced. The French invasion in Egypt 
and un-going wars in Europe deteriorated the relations between Spain and the Ottoman 
Empire. The scope of this study does not include the aftermath of the agreement, as 
the study mainly focuses on investigating the diary and the agreement process. I used 
an inductive method regarding Bouligny's statements and notes, and I have revealed a 
complete and proper picture of the relationship between the two countries. The story 
arc was supported and completed by secondary sources with the aim of positioning the 
agreement in Ottoman diplomacy and the international relations of that era. I have 
examined the peculiarities of the diary by looking at the negotiations with foreign 
countries in a comparative perspective. This study will shed light on Bouligny’s life, 
and his actions in Constantinople as well as his mission as an envoy. This thesis will 
contribute to diplomatic studies in international relations in history.  
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ÖZ 
BABIÂLİ’DE İLK İSPANYOL ELÇİSİ: JUAN DE BOULİGNY VE ONUN              
GÜNLÜĞÜ ÜZERİNDEN BABIÂLİ’DEKİ FAALİYETLERİ 
 
Çiçek Ünal, Ayşe 
MA, Tarih Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Kahraman Şakul 
Ocak 2015, 118 sayfa 
 
Bu çalışmanın amacı ilk İspanyol elçisi Juan de Bouligny’nin günlüğü üzerinden 
XVIII. Yüzyıl İspanya-Osmanlı ilişkilerini incelemektir. İspanya devleti tarafından 
Barış ve Ticaret anlaşması yapmak üzere görevlendirilen Bouligny İstanbul’da 
yaklaşık üç yıl kalmıştır. Onun İstanbul’da bulunduğu süreçte kaleme aldığı günlüğü 
süreci İspanyol elçinin perspektifinden görmemizi sağlayacaktır. Bu çalışmada ele 
alınan problematikler şunlardır: İspanya-Osmanlı devleti arasındaki anlaşma nasıl bir 
konjonktürde yapılmıştır? Bu anlaşma süreci nasıl yürütülmüştür? İspanyol elçinin 
İstanbul’da bulunduğu bu süreçte faaliyetleri nelerdir ve diğer elçilerle arasında nasıl 
bir network vardır? İspanyol elçinin gayreti ve çabasıyla anlaşma süreci başarıyla 
nihayete ermiştir ancak bu anlaşmanın kısa sürede uygulanması pek mümkün 
olmamıştır. Fransız ihtilali ile tamamen değişen uluslararası konjonktür, ardından 
Mısır’ın Fransız deniz kuvvetleri tarafından işgal edilmesi Osmanlı-İspanya 
ilişkilerinin zedelenmesine neden olmuştur. Ancak bu çalışma günlük merkezinde 
sadece anlaşma sürecini incelediğinden anlaşma sonrası süreç çalışmanın kapsamına 
dahil edilmemiştir. Çalışmada, Bouligny’nin notları ve anlatıları üzerinden bütünleyici 
bir yöntem kullanılarak o dönem Osmanlı-İspyanya ilişkilerinin tam ve doğru bir 
resmini çizmeye çalışılmıştır. Anlaşmanın Osmanlı diplomasisi ve uluslar arası 
ilişkiler açısından fonksiyonunun anlaşılması amacıyla ilişkiler ağı ikincil kaynaklarla 
tamamlanmış ve tashih edilmiştir. İletişim ağı analizi yapılarak İspanyol elçinin diğer 
elçilerle görüşmeleri incelenmiştir. Ayrıca günlükte anlatılanların hususî yahut genel 
özellikler taşıyıp taşımadığını görebilmek için Osmanlı devletinin diğer Avrupa 
devletleri ile anlaşma süreçlerine karşılaştırmalı bir perspektifle bakılmıştır. Bu 
çalışma ilk İspanyol elçisi ve onun günlüğü üzerine Türkiye’de yapılan ilk çalışmadır. 
Bu nedenle tezin bu alandaki boşluğu doldurması amaçlanmaktadır.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
“Eğerçe maslahatın o kadar ehemmiyeti yok                                                                
ise de bu vukuat ol vaktin ahval-i                                                                                
cariyesini bildireceğinden bazı mertebe tafsiline                                                      
mübaderet olunmak münasip görülmüştür.” 1 
 
In the eighteenth century Mediterranean powers, Spain and the Ottoman 
Empire reached a compromise by signing a Peace and Trade Agreement after a long 
period fraught with numerous wars and quarrels. This agreement was a turning point 
in the history of Ottoman-Spanish relations. One wonders what kind of motives and 
international conjuncture lead these term opponents to such a compromise. Who were 
the main architects of this agreement? 
This thesis attempts to answer these questions relying on mainly the diary of 
Juan de Bouligny, the first Spanish plenipotentiary sent to Istanbul. He was one of the 
most important figures who played a crucial role in reaching the Agreement between 
the two powers. His diary provides the reader with invaluable data about the peace 
process and negotiations. Bouligny started to pen his diary when the process begun 
and continued to write until the Agreement was brokered successfully. His diary not 
only does provide the precious accounts about the process leading to the agreement, 
but also sheds a new light on the political atmosphere of that particular era in both 
Ottoman Empire and Spain. Throughout the process Bouligny immersed himself in 
numerous diplomatic negotiations with Ottoman statesmen owing to which he had a 
chance to make keen observations about the Ottoman bureaucracy and the socio-
political life in Ottoman Empire. His observations are so valuable in understanding the 
complicated nature of the diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and Spain.  
The diary forms the basis for the present study, though our study is not 
restricted to the accounts provided by the diary. Many documents and reports, 
available in the Spanish and Ottoman archives related to the period under discussion, 
were used to delineate the social-political atmosphere of the period in which the 
agreement was procured. It was not an easy task though, because it required a 
painstaking research to be able to sort out documents related to the period and the 
                                                 
1Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, Cevdet Tarihi, v.I, p. 256 
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agreement among many other Ottoman archival materials which have been un-
catalogued so far.  
Though the diary has a great significance for the period in question, there has 
been no particular study about it in English or Turkish so far; neither do we have any 
study about its author.  This thesis attempts to fill this gap and to draw a complete 
picture about the author and his text in its particular context by relying on the data 
gleaned from the primary and secondary Turkish and Spanish archival documents and 
other sources, this might be seen as one of the main contributions of this thesis. One 
can say that Spain is terra incognita for Turkish historians. It is hoped that this study 
will encourage students who are interested in history of Spain to conduct further 
research. This thesis also provides a general bibliography as a starting point for those 
interested in the matter. 
On 18 June 2013, my adventure began. It had been nearly two hundred and 
twenty five years since the Spanish plenipotentiary, Juan de Bouligny, had departed 
from this world. I arrived at Barcelona; the city that saw Bouligny off, from its harbour 
on 5 December 1778. I endeavoured to trace his path and discover his story, which 
would enable us to perceive the once existing complex networks among various cities 
and countries of that era.  
I did some background research before this journey. I had been prepared for 
my journey a long time as I took Spanish classes, including several practice and 
speaking courses, as well I read much on this topic, researched the culture and the 
history of Spain, found information about the Spanish archives and libraries, and I 
consulted professors about this study. I contacted many foreign professors by e-mail, 
and I applied for scholarship. It is sufficient to say my short journey took a long time. 
However, I have to admit this precious experience encouraged me for further studies 
with a broader interdisciplinary perspective. I discovered the treasure of documents 
about the Ottoman-Spain relations in the archives and libraries awaiting scholars. I had 
spent much of my time in the Archivo Histórico Nacional de Madrid (AHN) and 
libraries that provide a comfortable working environment and endless sources for 
readers, as well as the Biblioteca Tomás Navarro Tomás affiliated to CSIC (Consejo 
Superior de Investigaciones Científicas), and the Biblioteca Nacional, and Real 
Academia de la Historia. In my thesis, I chose to focus on one source, the diary of Juan 
de Bouligny to be able to comprehend it in detail, yet I attained many dispatches of 
Bouligny to use in my dissertation.  
3 
 
 I examined the relations between the two powers and the peace negotiations 
mentioned in this diary, also the memories, operations, and the perspective of the 
plenipotentiary. In the first chapter, I aimed to draw the frame of my thesis by 
explaining historical facts experienced in Spain during the era concerned. One can see 
the scarcity of sources written in Turkish. It is also not possible to attain sources written 
in English or Spanish in Turkey. Thanks to my investigation in Spain, I have created 
my own archive including documents, books, articles and some dissertations on the 
social and political history of Spain in the eighteenth century. Some of the books I 
used in this part are: Vicente Palacio Atard, Espana y el Mar en el Siglo de Carlos III, 
G.P. Stanley, La Espana de los Borbones, Joseph Perez, Historia de Espana, 
C.Fernandez Duro, España en el exterior. Compendio histórico [siglos XIII-XIX], 
Antonio Dominguez Ortiz, Sociedad y Estado en el siglo XVIII Espanol, Juan 
Hernandez Franco, La Gestion Politica y el Pensamiento Reformista de Conde de 
Floridablanca, Manuel Rivero Rodriguez, Diplomacia y Relaciones Exteriores en la 
Edad Moderna, 1453-1794, Mawdsley Hargreaves, Eighteenth Century Spain 1700-
1788.  
After the depiction of the historical conjuncture increasing the inclination of 
the Spanish court to attempt to cooperate with the Ottoman Empire, I aimed to link the 
facts I found to the topic. In other words, I especially chose the historical facts that had 
great impact on the agreement process in compliance with the revised approach to 
diplomacy. In this new approach, it is necessary to link the interior policy of a power 
to its exterior affairs. During the historical processes of the eighteenth century, the 
changing of the dynasty in Spain, the prolonged economic, commercial and colonial 
wars, and the transformation of the system by reforms, opponents’ rebellions, and 
plans to expand the trade hegemony were the topics and the conflicts with which the 
country dealt. Understanding the pillars of the Spanish policy and the conjuncture 
facilitates seeing the importance and the position of the agreement between the two 
powers. 
Carlos III, the king of Naples who ascended the throne of Spain sent Juan de 
Bouligny with the mission of offering the Ottomans an extension of the treaty signed 
between Naples and the Ottomans in 1740. The appointment of Bouligny who was not 
from the ruling class is discussed in the following part. I introduced Bouligny 
according to data I collected on him.  The limited sources used in this part are as 
follows: Fontaine Martin, A History of Bouligny Family and Allied Families, Didier 
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I examined the content of the diary with additional explanations related to the 
notes of Bouligny in order to complete the whole picture. I preferred to give brief 
information about Ottoman bureaucracy, as well as prominent characters such as 
Cezayirli Kaptan Hasan Paşa and the historical events in Constantinople. I used the 
method of text analysis to read the letters in detail. To eliminate the subjectivity of the 
main source it was required to check the information by cross-referencing other 
sources. I used some documents located in the Archivo Histórico Nacional de Madrid 
(AHN). The documents in the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives (BOA) let me 
compare two distinctive perceptions. I need to admit I did not see any contradiction 
between the diary and these documents.  
In order to reach precise understanding and complete a thorough examination 
of the peculiarities of the relationship between Spain and the Ottoman Empire, it was 
necessary for this study to compare the process with those of other European countries. 
I compared the process with that of Poland, Prussia, Naples, and Sweden. The sources 
I referred to are: Kemal Beydilli, Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar, Fatih Yeşil, 
Aydınlanma çağında bir Osmanlı kâtibi Ebubekir Râtib Efendi (1750-1799), Hacer 
Topaktaş, “Dersaadet’te Son Leh Elçisi: Franciszek Piotr Potocki’nin Elçiliği 
Ekseninde Osmanlı-Leh Diplomatik İlişkileri ve Uluslararası Boyutu (1788-1793)”, 
Ed. Sture Theolin, İmparatorluğun meşalesi: XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı 
İmparatorluğu’nun genel görünümü ve Ignatius Mouradgea d’Ohsson = The Torch of 
the Empire: Ignatius Mouradgea d’Ohsson and the tableau general of the Ottoman 
Empire in the Eighteenth Century”. We can see the same complaints in all examples 
regarding the incident such as on the suspension of negotiations, the problem of 
presenting valuable gifts to the bureaucrats to convince them, and long negotiations 
for the interests of the countries.  
1.1. Literature Review 
In this study, Ottoman diplomacy is not examined under a separate title. Thus 
it would be useful to review the studies on the eighteenth century Ottoman diplomacy 
to understand the framework within which negotiations of Bouligny took place. In this 
part, I aim to delineate the diplomatic system of that period by discussing the 
fundamental questions about the era. 
The common view accepted by Hurewitz, Anderson, and Naff is the argument 
based on the Holy Law (şeri’a) according to which the Ottoman Empire remained 
theoretically at war with the infidel world. With a belief in permanent war with 
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European nation states, the Ottomans cannot of course have been expected to have a 
positive attitude toward diplomacy. J. C. Hurewitz, in his article “Ottoman Diplomacy 
and the European States System”, tries to answer the essential question of the Ottoman 
diplomacy: “unilateralism”.  He alleges that the Ottomans unilateral diplomacy was 
based on the following reasons:  
No sultan at the time ever made such a request; nor was there any 
compelling reason for him to do so.  European unilateralism in fact, 
must have seemed to the Imperial Ottoman Government 
acknowledgement of its superiority. The commercial motive was 
absent. Islamic tradition reinforced unilateralism. In the late 
eighteenth century, the Empire had lost its strength in comparison to 
the European powers and had to establish resident embassies as part 
of its reform attempts.2 
 
Thomas Naff, in “Reform and Conduct in Ottoman Diplomacy in the Reign of 
Selim III”, similarly argues that western ideas gradually began to overcome the 
barriers of Muslim prejudice against all things Christian and the evolution towards the 
modern nation-state of Turkey had begun during the reign of Selim III. Anderson in 
The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450–1919 repeated that there were several reasons 
for the Ottomans’ lack of interest in establishing bilateral diplomatic relations with 
Europe. First of all, it controlled a large territory and the greatest military resources in 
the Mediterranean region. Also, it had an ‘unshakable sense of superiority’ to the entire 
Christian world. Nuri Yurdusev criticizes the prevalent view simplifying the topic 
from different aspects. His critique of Anderson is plausible: “In his analysis, one does 
not find any discussion of those terms in Islamic law, what is meant by Islamic 
religious conservatism and what the historical record could tell us about the existence 
or absence of ‘diplomatic’ relations and regular contacts between the Ottoman Empire 
and Europe.” In his book Ottoman Diplomacy Conventional or Unconventional? 
claims that in fact, when the actual historical record is taken into account, it is clear 
that the Ottoman Empire was not a theocracy based on holy law. The kanun/yasa of 
the Ottoman sultan was significant in the sphere of diplomacy. He also emphasizes the 
Ottoman pragmatism in the interpretation of Islamic perceptions in accordance with 
the interests of the court. This policyis evident in, ahdname to guarantees the security 
and freedom of non-Muslim Ottoman subjects as well.  
                                                 
2 J.C. Hurewitz, “Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System”, p. 146 
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The Peace and Trade Agreement between Spain and the Ottoman Empire is 
one of the most important examples of the Ottomans’ pragmatic policy. Reis’ül-küttab 
[hereafter, Reis Efendi] asked the Spanish plenipotentiary for the advantages of the 
treaty offered not only for economy but also for political benefits. One can observe 
that the diplomatic usages of the Sublime Porte and its procedures caused the 
dissatisfaction of the foreign envoys. For Cevdet Paşa, the Sublime Porte focused on 
the imminent war with Russia so the Porte gave priority to the precautions and political 
alliances on the eve of a possible struggle instead of peace and trade agreement with 
any countries. Spanish envoy had addressed the commercial benefits of the agreement 
but the Porte considered that it would be reasonable to postpone the conduct of the 
negotiations for an indefinite time. Indeed, Spain would have been more important to 
the Ottomans if its naval forces had achieved to take over the control of Gibraltar from 
the Great Britain who had occupied the spot since the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713. In that 
case, The Ottoman side would be more willing to sign any treaty ensuring Spanish 
assistance and preventing Russian influence in the Mediterranean. 
Cevdet Paşa examines the negotiation process between the Porte and Spanish 
envoy in detail. He explains the reason why he gave considerable space for these 
negotiations in his work: “the aim is to depict the circumstances at that era; even if the 
affairs at the agreement process were not significant”. The gist of Cevdet’s elaborate 
history is to distinguish the peculiarities of the Ottoman diplomacy on the example of 
Ottoman- Spanish negotiations. Cevdet Paşa also argued the paradigm that the 
Ottomans adopted of the hyporicitical diplomacy, selling the mouth of a diplomat or 
uttering vague words in diplomatic language. One can see that this paradigm was 
effective in the period studied. 
Hüseyin Serdar Tabakoğlu mostly refers Tarih-i Cevdet in his thesis. 
Tabakoğlu also considered the archival documents used by Cevdet Paşa. His thesis is 
really important as it was the first modern study on the topic based on the Ottoman 
archives. The perspective of the foreign envoy, notwithstanding another contribution 
of my thesis is the discussion of the Spanish political background of the treaty. This 
enables us to see the underlying reasons initiating the attempt to sign the agreement 
with the Ottoman Empire.  
Kemal Beydilli, the pioneer studying the Ottoman diplomacy of late eighteenth 
century, lays out the mindset of the Sublime Porte in his work, “Dış Politika ve Siyasi 
Ahlak.” Ottoman real-politics was based on ambiguous statements, noncommittal 
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stance, and delaying tactics. These are the usual Ottoman tactics that Bouligny also 
complains about throughout his memoirs. Following Cevdet Paşa, Beydilli also 
attributes the Ottoman pragmatic policy to the vulnerability and debility of the Empire 
at that period. Thus, the Ottoman diplomacy inevitably adapted to the European state 
system based on balance of power through signing alliances. It would contribute to 
continuity and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. 
Yasemin Gönen in his thesis, “The Integration of the Ottoman Empire into the 
European State System during the Reign of Sultan Selim III”, analyses this process 
within the framework of European diplomacy. She discusses three main concepts; 
European state system, international law and balance of power in explaining certain 
historical events. Gönen remarks that in the XVIII. century, the Ottomans could not 
remain outside the European state system and balance of power. Thus, during the reign 
of Selim III, the Ottomans resorted to all tools of the state system: permanent 
diplomacy, alliance, and international law. Also, the law of neutrality began to develop 
and the Ottoman Empire for the first time, declared its neutrality at the end of the 
XVIII. century. She also discusses the concept of Eastern Question, one of the 
controversial issues in the Ottoman diplomacy. She asserts that the term was invented 
after the first partitioning of Polish-Lithuania Commonwealth in 1772, Küçük 
Kaynarca in 1774, and of Venice by France in 1790. According to her, this was not so 
much an eastern or western question as the question of expansionism at the expense of 
the weakest states. The Ottoman Empire became one of these weakest countries after 
the great losses in wars after 1683. Kahraman Şakul also underlines the controversy 
about the usage of the term, Eastern Question. Some historians see the question as 
going back to the 14th century or second siege of Vienna in 1683. Şakul, discusses the 
dimension of this term used as a code to cover a number of questions: Romanian 
Principalities, the Serbian Revolt, and French Invasion of Eygpt. He assesses that the 
historians attempt to explain the entire history of relations between Europe and the 
Ottoman Empire by using this term. 
Rıfaat Abou-el- Haj underlines the role of the military disaster in Zenta 
signalling an end to Ottoman hopes for a forcible recovery of territories lost to the 
Allies. In his article, “Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz” he underlines that war rather 
than compromise had been its chosen and preferred instrument of international 
intercourse with Europe. However, military reversals unfolded the necessity to 
develop formal apparatus for diplomatic communication and the corps of trained 
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personnel a requisite for the negotiations. The agreement analysed in this thesis sets 
an example which shows us the indispensability of compromises against an 
archenemy, Russia and the functions of the bureaucratic system. He clarifies the 
principle of “uti possidetis” on the Karlowitz case. The Ottoman side negotiated in 
pursuant of this principle without expectation and restriction. This idea would be 
conducted by the Ottoman bureaucrats throughout the eighteenth century. Fatih Yeşil, 
in his book namely Avrupa’ya Mensûb Olan Mizân-ı Umûr-ı Hariciyye Beyânındadır, 
remarks that the scope of the policy based on status quo would be drawn by the power 
of military forces. However, the decreasing military power would not extend the scope 
so the role of the diplomacy became more crucial. 
The corps of diplomacy was examined by Itzkowitz in his article, “Eighteenth 
Century Ottoman Realities.” He argues that one of the eighteenth century realities was 
the creation of a new kind of top-level Ottoman staff. He coned this transformation as 
‘Efendi-turned Paşa’ –a term that became popular in the literature. In this system, Reis 
Efendis were promoted to Paşas and even served as provincial governors unlike in 
previous centuries. He gives a long list of the bureaucrats to support his argument. 
Rami Mehmet and Mehmet Ragıp Paşa were the professional bureaucrats who served 
as Grand Vizier. The main discussion in his article is the views of Lybyer and Gibb 
and Bowen who viewed the Ottoman administrative system in a simplistic way and 
depicted it as a combination of ‘the Ruling Institution’ and ‘the Moslem Institution’. 
Itzkowitz asserts that they present no new supporting evidence from Ottoman sources 
and base their thesis on ambassadorial and consular reports, memoirs, and travel 
accounts. For him, the Ottoman system was rested on at least three pillars 
corresponding to the three main career lines: kalemiye, seyfiye and ilmiye. His 
delineation is based on the career lines rather than religion.  
The anonymous pamphlet, “Avrupa’ya Mensûb Olan Mizân-ı Umûr-ı 
Hariciyye Beyânındadır” analysed by Fatih Yeşil presents us the mentality of the pro-
peace bureaucrats. Yeşil remarks that this pamphlet was most likely written by 
someone among the supporters of peace in the war with Russia after Abdulhamid I 
ascended to the throne.  The objective of the writer was to inform the Sultan and high 
state officials on the determination of the mediator country or countries in the 
negotiations with Russia. The writer succeeds to open the discussion of international 
relations based on the theory of balance of power in Europe at that time. In this system, 
religion is not a criterion to war making or peace making. Instead benefits of the each 
10 
 
country determine the structure of the foreign relations. This system also raises the 
importance of the mediator country. Indeed, the Ottoman diplomacy had appreciated 
the role of mediator country yet disadvantageous consequences of the wars compelled 
the Ottoman side to take a strategic decision. In accordance with his goal, the writer 
evaluates the situation of European countries and he suggests that France and Holland 
would be mediator countries as their authority in diplomacy were appreciable. For him, 
the Ottomans had to be cautious about neutral countries like Prussia and Austria 
against Russia. Yeşil’s argument is that the Ottoman diplomacy had Islamic and 
imperial features in theory, but it actually developed a new approach in keeping with 
Machiavelist ideology in practice.    
Virginia Aksan also points out the intense diplomatic activity of the Sublime 
Porte in the XVIII. century and calls this century, the century of diplomacy. She 
utilizes a number of surviving embassy reports and travel books from the period. Most 
of them are available in Turkish libraries and archives but there might be undiscovered 
documents waiting for historians’ research as in the case of the Spanish 
plenipotentiary’s diary.  These reports would expand the dimension of diplomatic 
studies and contributes to observe uncovered networks among the ambassadors. One 
of the main arguments in Aksan’s article, “Ottoman Political Writing” is the change in 
the Ottoman political language in favour of peace. She refers to the work of Ahmed 
Resmi, Hulasatü’l-I’tibar, which is a harsh criticism of the war. He was the first 
Turkish ambassador to travel to Prussia in 1763. Aksan focused on the concepts of 
devlet, memleket and taife, used by Ahmed Resmi and asserts that he was interested 
in convincing his reader of the necessity and benefits of peace. He criticizes the 
Ottoman decision to go to war with Russia. Ahmed Resmi’s comments were based on 
the experiences and the pains of wars. Besides that Aksan refers to two samples: 
“Avrupa’ya Mensûb Olan Mizân-ı Umûr-ı Hariciyye Beyânındadır”, and Koca 
Sekbanbaşı’s work, Hulasatü’l-Kelam fi Reddi’l-Avam. Aksan clarifies the common 
points in the Ottoman-Islamic context for the legitimacy for peace, fixed and 
defensible boundaries, and European style discipline and training. The reformation of 
fiscal-military-administrative is broadly analyzed by Niyazi Berkes, in The 
Development of Secularism. He asserts that great defeats in wars and economic 
corruptions became the stimulus for the rise of the new attitude, fixed and defensible 
boundaries, and European style discipline and training. The reformation of fiscal-
military-administrative is broadly analyzed by Niyazi Berkes, in The Development of 
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Secularism. He asserts that great defeats in wars and economic corruptions became the 
stimulus for the rise of the new attitude.  
The increasing importance of diplomacy in this century is discussed by many 
historians. The quality and the quantity of the studies on this era is analyzed by 
Mehmet Alaaddin Yalçınkaya, in his informative article, “Kuruluştan Tanzimata 
Osmanlı Diplomasi Tarihi Literatürü”. This introductory work enables us to 
comprehend the whole picture of the literature and to realize the gap in this field. 
Yalçınkaya underscores qualitative and quantitative increase of the works on the 
Ottoman diplomacy. He lists numerous sources, archival documents, manuscripts, 
diaries, seyahatnames, and the foreign accounts dealing with international relations in 
the XVIII. century. There are various accounts which belong to Austrian, Russian, 
French ambassadors. One can easily realize the absence of the diary of the Spanish 
plenipotentiary and the secondary sources on the Ottoman-Spanish relations. One can 
assume that this less studying would be advantegous for the historian who plans to 
study on this subject but I should admit that the scarcity of the sources requires to be 
patient to seek tirelessly. 
Another common view in the literature is that struggles and wars had been in 
the foreground of Ottoman-European relations until the XIX.century. Economic and 
commercial relations between the Ottomans and the European countries come only 
after. The Ottoman archival documents like Name-i Humayun Defterleri, Salnâme-yi 
Nezaret-i Hariciye, Düvel-i Ecnebiye, and Bâb-ı Asâfi Kalemi are the sources which 
can be used to comprehend these relations. Yalçınkaya points out that Istanbul became 
one of the prominent centres for Europeans after these close relations. Istanbul has 
been in a strategic position for European markets and balance of power.  Hence, the 
task of the ambassadors in Istanbul was really hard. They had to be well-informed 
about the socio-political history of the Ottoman Empire. Some foreign officials had 
works on the Ottoman history. A British official, James Dallaway wrote a book entitled 
Constantinople, Ancient and Modern. The book of Swedish dragoman Ignatius 
Mouradgea d’Ohsson, Tableau Général de l’Empire Othoman presents us information 
on the Ottoman Empre. They were expected to protect current interests and to gain 
more concessions of their own countries. It was also important to be in foreign 
networks and to communicate with other ambassadors. The Spanish plenipotentiary is 
an example to see the connection among these envoys. Bouligny had no difficulty to 
understand the complicated and delicate process in the negotiations. He was really 
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aware of the possible preventions of the other ambassadors. Eventhough he was so 
cautious he could not avoid the interventions and preventions of some ambassadors. 
Indeed, trade concession was the underlying reason which caused competition among 
envoys.  
Fatma Müge Göçek examines the relations between the Ottomans and the 
rising West in his book, East encounters west: France and the Ottoman Empire in the 
Eighteenth Century on the basis of the account of Çelebi Mehmet Efendi. He asserts 
that this embassy account, the first document written by an Ottoman official with the 
aim of observing and understanding the West, was the "first window opening to the 
West." Her analysis throughout the eighteenth century tries to document rising 
Western influence in Ottoman society. Western innovations in military, navigational, 
and commercial techniques consolidated the trading capacity so that the Ottoman land 
became markets for European goods. While the goal of the European countries was to 
sustain trade privileges, the Ottomans tried to procure allies by granting them. Göçek 
claims that these privileges given to the West became tools for political negotiation 
yet the use of trade concession as an Ottoman political weapon started working against 
the Ottomans in the eighteenth century. Maurits H. Van Den Boogert’s argument 
supports this assessment. He draws our attention to the dramatic increase in the number 
of foreign powers that applied for commercial privileges for their subjects. In 1718 the 
Habsburg Emperor was granted capitulations, and Sweden followed in 1737. Then, 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies obtained its own ahdname. Also in 1740 France acquired 
considerable extensions of its privileges with the renewal of its capitulations on a 
permanent basis. In 1747 the subjects of Tuscany were accorded trade privileges in the 
Levant, while Denmark got capitulations in 1746. Fifteen years later Prussia was 
granted an ahdname. Russia entered the system in 1774. This chain was completed by 
Spain in 1782. The Spanish plenipotentiary endeavoured to be equally advantageous 
in the Ottoman territories. His attempts studied in this thesis enabled to gain the same 
concessions like the other European countries.  
Trade concessions boosted commercial activities throughout the 
Mediterranean coasts. In contrast to the Mediterranean, the Black Sea was closed to 
free trade. Beydilli discusses the opening the Black Sea to merchant vessels in his 
article, “Karadeniz’in Kapalılığı Karşısında Avrupa Küçük Devletleri ve Miri Ticaret 
Teşebbüsü”. He points out that although ahidnames had customarily granted the right 
to trade in the Black Sea as well, this article was not put in effect due to prevention of 
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the Ottoman side. Beydilli attempts to answer the question why the Sublime Porte 
ensured the right to trade throughout the Black sea while prevented to trade activities 
in that region. For him, the Sublime Porte willingly restrained due to the fact that 
Russia could gradually gain the control of this trade route and strenghten its economic 
and political power. Trading Russian vessels via Bosporus might cause scandals and 
stir the tension in Istanbul with the rumour that the Russians transport the food of the 
citizens in Istanbul. Russia could achieve to gain concessions to trade in the Black Sea 
after the longlasted struggles throughout the eighteenth century. Russia also 
cooperated with some European countries such as Spain, Holland, and Sweden in order 
to have an extensive commercial network from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.  
Another disputed issue between Russia and the Sublime Porte in the XVIII. 
century was the right of protection of the Orthodox Christians living in the Ottoman 
territory. This controversial argument is analyzed by Roderic Davison in his article, 
“Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility”. He uses the method of textual criticism with 
broad interpretation of the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. The origin of the discussion was 
based on the statement of Austrian diplomat, Thugut (1774) who had not seen a copy 
of the original treaty. He describes the treaty as “the Russian Skill and Turkish 
imbecility”. This catchy phrase has been used by Hammer, Sorel and many other 
historians since then. Davison seeks for the root of the story by looking the original 
copies of the treaty written in Russian, Turkish and Italian. He compares the statements 
in 7th and 14th articles. He asserts that neither article seven nor article fourteen affords 
any basis for a judgement that Russia had a general right of making representations or 
of protection or of intervention on part of the Greek-Orthodox subjects of the Sublime 
Porte. Russia did receive under the treaty, some specific rights to act within the 
Ottoman Empire on behalf of Christians. The rights were three: to build one Russo-
Greek church in Istanbul, to make diplomatic representations about that one church 
and those who served it, and to make similar representations about the Christians of 
Moldavia and Wallachia. According to Davison, real Ottoman stupidity was to have 
gone to war over the Polish question and, once irrevocably at war, to have been 
defeated in the field. 
These resent studies are really promising for the future of the diplomacy 
studies. Revisiting the questions and problems of the field, using distinctive methods, 
comparing original documents written in different languages, extending the scope of 
the field, and changing approaches to subjects contribute to enhance this disciple. The 
14 
 
dissertation entitled “An Ottoman Global Moment: War of Second Coalition in the 
Levant” written by Kahraman Şakul provides us to see the place of the Ottoman 
Empire within European equilibrium. He states that his study aims to employ a 
comparative approach in order to place the Ottoman Empire in the greater context of 
the changing world as captured in the title of this work. The dissertation of Hacer 
Topaktaş, another example, examines the unquestioned characteristic of the 
historiography of the Ottoman diplomacy. She objects the demarcation of the Ottoman 
diplomacy as classical period and the permanent diplomacy, she rather suggests to 
determine a transition period. Using diplomacy as a tool is the common point for both 
era and commercial benefits also had been an effect on international relations. She 
exemplifies that the first diplomatic relations were established with Venetians to 
enhance trade capacities of both sides. However, especially after the seventeenth 
century strategical and geographical conjuncture compelled the Sublime Porte to 
conduct “octopus diplomacy” to deal with complicated issues. In the light of all this 
information, I tried to contribute to the field with my thesis presenting archival 
documents, comparative method and broad perspective.   
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CHAPTER II: THE BACKGROUND OF THE SPANISH 
PLENIPOTENTIARY, JUAN DE BOULIGNY AND HIS MISSION IN 
CONSTANTINOPLE 
 
 
2.1 Spain in the Eighteenth Century 
There had been an excessively sharp demarcation line drawn between the 
internal and the external affairs of the state in the early twentieth century 
historiography. This dichotomist approach caused an artificial division preventing the 
understanding of the close connections between foreign policy or diplomacy and the 
government of the state, and has apparently lost much of its explanatory capacity. 
Recently, the conventional view has been challenged and studies opposed to long-
standing practices have suggested the re-thinking and re-reading of diplomacy based 
on the integration of foreign and internal affairs.3 In accordance with this purpose, the 
story of Spain in the eighteenth century will be presented by linking it to external 
dynamics. This perspective will stimulate new and in-depth research on the reasons 
stimulating the compromise between Spain and the Ottomans.   
For Spain the eighteenth century began with a change of dynasty, under the 
will of Carlos II, the grandson of Louis XIV of France who ascended the Spanish 
throne as Felipe V. The advent of a Bourbon monarchy in Spain was a milestone for 
new and more effective patterns of governance, but in short-term it enveloped the 
country in a disastrous War of Succession, which lasted thirteen years and drew in all 
great powers. The Habsburg dynasty did not accept the Borbouns’ control on the 
throne and allied with the Holy Roman Empire, Great Britain, the Dutch 
Republic, Portugal, and the Duchy of Savoy to preserve the Spanish throne for the 
Habsburg candidate, Archduke Charles.4 The alliance was composed of almost all 
European countries that were interested in gaining the control of Spanish possessions. 
For Great Britain, this was actualized with the Treaty of Utrecht that ceded control of 
Gibraltar, the geopolitical centre of the Mediterranean trade, to secure its withdrawal 
                                                 
3 Daniel Frigo, Politics and Diplomacy in Early Modern Italy, p. 5 
 
4 G.P. Stanley, La España de los Borbones, p. 9 
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from the war in 1713.5 Herewith, Britain amplified its domination over the 
Mediterranean and secured its control over strategic regions.6 As it will be seen in the 
following parts, Spain worked on new strategies to be able to compensate this 
devastating loss in the XVIII century.  
In the aftermath of the Succession War, Felipe V strove to give Spain its 
position back in Europe and he achieved, for the first time since the times of the 
Romans, to unite and centralize the administration over most of the country.7 There 
has been an inconclusive debate about this transformation. Joseph Perez criticizes the 
idea of a radical change by the Bourbons:  
We have tendency to exaggerate the innovation aspect of the Bourbons 
and the influence of French ideas, but it should be emphasized that 
Spain had begun to change in the last quarter of the seventeenth 
century.8 
 
While we acknowledge that Spain had the potential domestic tendency to 
transform itself, the main catalyst for change must be identified with the Bourbon 
dynasty. The newly founded government, for its own sake, began to annihilate the 
heritage of the Habsburgs, which were mostly affected by France. The views of G. 
Payne Stanley rest on the assumption that the political and economic influence of 
France evolved over the years into a relationship of exploitation.9 As well, the 
Bourbons dynasty in Spain had been critically impeached for pursuing a policy 
compatible to the interests of France.10 As it was noted above, there was extremely 
radical foregoing discussion on the issue, but the reasons convinced Spain to ally 
intensively with France derived from the political conjuncture.11 
                                                 
5 C.Fernandez Duro, España en el Exterior: Compendio Histórico [siglos XIII-XIX], p. 79 
 
6 Vicente Palacio Atard, España y el Mar en el Siglo de Carlos III, p. 390 
 
7 G.P. Stanley, p. 14 
 
8 Joseph Perez, Historia de España, p. 311 
 
9 J.Perez, Entender Historia de España, p. 174 
 
10 John Lynch, Historia de España, p. 343-344 
 
11 The treaties among France, Spain and Napoli called “Los Pactos Families” were signed in 1733, 1743 
and 1761 in order to ensure the assistance from the Bourbons against the expansion and the hegemony 
of Great Britain over the Levant trade and American colonies. Alejandro Cantillo, Tratados Convenios 
y Declaraciones de Paz y de Comercio Desde el Ano de 1700 Hasta el Dia, p. 468 
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During the XVIII. century, prolonged economic, commercial and colonial wars 
compelled Spain to adapt to the new epoch, concerning the mercantile policy and 
modern reforms mostly under the guidance of France. Though neither the ongoing 
reform projects pursued by primarily Felipe (1700-1746) then Fernando VI (1746-59) 
can be ignored, the reign of Carlos III (1759-1788) was regarded as a milestone and 
the most prosperous and illustrated one for the modern history of Spain.12  
Carlos III, governed the Sicilians between 1733 and 1759, and he did so with 
his council of minister who accompanied the monarch also in Spain. The initial phase 
of the reforms started in the early years of the reign, with the revival of the economic 
and financial reforms implemented. It can be seen that the social and economic reforms 
were carried out entirely. The government took direct action to improve the 
administrative apparatus, education, agriculture and trade to strengthen the state by all 
means.13 However, this cannot be seen as a complete success due to the opposition of 
privileged groups, the guilds, the primogenitures, the Spanish Inquisition, and other 
institutions, which intended to hamper the reforms and the endeavours to progress. The 
new dynasty could not transform the society and economy of Spain.14 Aristocrats had 
been entrenched with their lordship and prosperities. Due to the tumultuous socio-
political conditions, the food production and supply decreased, concomitantly the 
prices upsurged instantly. This chaotic situation caused the Jesuits, a religious group’s 
rebellion against the regime, but they were expelled in 1767.15 The government 
concerned about the mercantile activities from the beginning of the century and 
accelerated administrative and financial reforms to be able to ameliorate the ongoing 
deterioration of the country. For this purpose, Spain endeavoured to accomplish its 
objective which was particular to expand its trade network and hegemony in the 
Mediterranean and in other regions, by giving special emphasis on diplomacy. Spain 
was not the only country which discovered the usefulness of the diplomacy in that 
regard in the eighteenth century. 16As the recent studies suggested, the eighteenth 
                                                 
12 Antonio Dominguez Ortiz, Sociedad y Estado en el siglo XVIII Espanol, p. 299 
 
13 Vicente Rogriguez Casado, La Politica y Los Politicos en el Reinado de Carlos III, p. 204, G.Payne 
Stanley, p. 20 
 
14 John Lynch, p. 343 
 
15 Vicent Llombart, Campomanes Economista y Politico de Carlos III, p. 358 
 
16 J.Perez, p. 174 
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century saw the emergence of diplomacy in a modern sense, which served 
predominantly for the raison d'état through the agency of the newly formed diplomatic 
corps.17 Therefore, Spain’s increasing emphasis on the diplomacy should be seen in 
this broader frame and in the light of new developments in the Europe in eighteenth 
century. In that regard, Manuel Rivero Rodriguez, calls the eighteenth century an era 
of diplomatic revolution referring to Salvador Mañer, Emer de Vattel, Voltaire and 
David Hume who focused on the importance of foreign policy in the frame of 
realism.18 For Spain, it required as a systematic and multi-level administrative system 
to adjust Spain to international diplomacy. The institution which played a crucial role 
during this process was the Secretary of State. The ministry directed all 
correspondence of foreign affairs, nomination of Ministers, and treaties of the Crown 
Princes and foreign countries.19 This ministry, transformed the system in the century, 
and became more prominent under the administration of Conde de Floridablanca.  
Floridablanca was very adept at reading the international situation, and at 
furnishing the dynasty with theoretical analyses and concrete proposals on foreign 
policy matters, while taking careful cognizance of the advantages and disadvantages 
to the Kingdom. It was considered that a more extensive and organized administration 
system would facilitate to attain its aims in the international arena. “With the 
nomination of Floridablanca, Spain’s foreign policy was evolved into the more 
proactive diplomacy.”20 He had the tendency to establish firm diplomatic relations 
with the European powers to broker both “political and economic cooperation” and 
alliances against Great Britain. “The principal elements led to the political polarization 
between the Bourbons and Britain in the eighteenth century was prolonged economic, 
commercial struggles and colonialist war.”21 There is enough evidence to warrant a 
tentative hypothesis that the hostility and the competition between the Bourbons and 
the Great Britain determined the direction of the Spanish foreign policy to a great 
                                                 
17Juan Hernandez Franco, La Gestion Politica y el Pensamiento Reformista de Conde de Floridablanca, 
p. 184 
  
18 Manuel Rivero Rodriguez, Diplomacia y Relaciones Exteriores en la Edad Moderna, 1453-1794,p. 
165 
 
19 Ibid, pp. 162-163 
 
20 J.H. Franco, p. 184 
 
21 M. R.Rodriguez, p. 368 
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extent. Spain pursued a strategy aiming to create coalitions with Russia, Prussia, 
Portugal, France, North Africa, and the Ottoman Empire particularly after the Seven 
Year War indicating naval supremacy and colonialism of Great Britain.   
The American Revolutionary War (1775–1783) exacerbated the already tense 
relationship between the Bourbons and Britain. “Spain, no less than France, wanted 
revenge for what was for them the shameful Treaty of Paris of 1763, and it appeared 
that both governments were, in principle, of a like mind to aid the rebel colonists in 
some way.”22 In 1779, Britain, with the intention of cutting off Spanish mediation in 
the Anglo-American conflict, pressured Spain to establish a coalition of two forces. 
Nevertheless, as it did not overlap Spanish interests, Senor Catholic Majesty 
threatened that this would cause a declaration of a war towards the archenemy, Britain. 
In late June 1779, the Spanish government decided to ban trade in various British 
goods. Concurrently, Spain kept a close eye on the interactions of its adversaries 
concerning pragmatically their own profits. The initial solidarity between Britain and 
Russia put pressure on Spain to direct its attention to take advantage of the situation. 
In 1777, Spain had already negotiated with Russia to isolate it from the British 
influence. The cooperation with the gradually powerful country, Russia, expanded not 
only to the Baltics but also obtained concession from the Ottomans to navigate freely 
in the Black Sea, which was important also for the Mediterranean trade. The blockage 
of Gibraltar played a crucial role for the Levant trade, in 1779 where the agreement 
process accelerated with Russia.23 Meanwhile, Spain realized the importance of the 
agreement signed with Portugal on the eve of the war with Great Britain and diplomatic 
relations were established with Prussia.24  
In pursuance of its aims, Spain encouraged new trade routes, and trading 
companies, and opened new ports with other countries. The relative normalization of 
diplomatic relations and the policy of promoting consuls conducted by the government 
favoured the Spanish consular expansion. “In just half a century, the number of the 
                                                 
22 Mawdsley Hargreaves, Eighteenth Century Spain 1700-1788, p. 128 
 
23 Pedro Voltes Bou, "Rusia, Turquia y La Politica de Floridablanca en 1779", pp. 65-69 
 
24 M. Hargreaves, p. 127, J.H. Franco, p. 130, The Treaty of Pardo was signed between Spain and 
Portugal on 1761, The Treaty of Guaranty and Commerce was signed in 1778, Alejandro Cantillo, p. 
467 
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Spanish consuls definitely had increased eightfold.”25 It can be reasonable to say Spain 
underwent an increasingly major transformation in the century, in order to manage to 
compete with Great Britain. Spain underwent the reforms in the administration and 
bureaucratic system, organizations of social and economic life, and the agricultural 
and industrial investments and more-centralized government aware of indispensability 
of interdependency of internal and external affairs. Well-educated and organized 
bureaucrats of the centralized government conducted a more active diplomacy 
contributing to not only politically significant alliances but also to the augmentation 
of the commercial capacity of the country.  This policy served its purpose and the 
foreign trade of Spain, and increased significantly after 1778.26 This conjuncture of the 
ongoing conflicts in the American colonies with the blockage of Gibraltar compelled 
Spain to form alliances with other countries to gain political support and increase the 
capacity of foreign trade. 
2.2    The Mission of Juan de Bouligny in Constantinople  
Spain and the Ottoman Empire were surprisingly parallel in their historical 
developments. The frame of events and internal developments are very similar in both 
countries. Arguably, both countries have entered a new era starting from the middle of 
the XV. Century and reached the height of their power after the conquests of 
Constantinople (1453) and Granada (1492), respectively.27 These two powers, 
expanding concurrently into other continents, struggled for the domination of the 
Mediterranean for centuries. In the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, Spain gained victory 
mostly by the assistance of the Holy League and consolidated its power.28 The 
sixteenth century was the era of manifest belligerence between the two countries. 
                                                 
25 “En 1760, España contaba ya con 12 consulados con remuneración, cuatro de ellos en Francia 
(Marsella, El Havre, Burdeos y Nantes) dos en Portugal (Lisboa y Tavira), además de los de Londres, 
Holanda, Niza, Genova, Venecia y el de Elseneur, en Dinamarca. Diez años más tarde, Capmany 
contabilizó 22 consulados españoles frente a los 36 de Inglaterra y los 27 de Venecia. Bajo los 
ministerios de Grimaldi, del que dependió la cartera de Estado entre 1763 y 1776, y de José Moñino, 
conde de Floridablanca (1777-1792), las oficinas consulares se multiplicaron conforme se amplió el 
horizonte de las relaciones diplomáticas españolas.” J.P. Nadals, “Los Consules Espanoles del Siglo 
XVIII”, p. 213 
 
26 G.P. Stanley, p. 51 
 
27 Helena Sánchez Ortega, “Las Relaciones Hispánico-Turcas en el Siglo XVIII”, p. 171 
  
28 See for the comparative study of two countries in terms of administrative, institutional and financial 
system: Faruk Bal, “Osmanlı Devleti - İspanya iktisadi ilişkileri (16.-18. yüzyıllar)”, Doktora Tezi, 
Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü İktisat Anabilim Dalı İktisat Tarihi Bilim Dalı, 2011 
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Especially, after the Ottoman conquest of Algiers, this region became the battle ground 
between Spain and the Regencies.29 Throughout the XVI-XVIII centuries the two 
antagonists, the Ottoman Empire, then Turkey, and Spain viewed each other with 
suspicion and refrained from establishing diplomatic relations at large, except sporadic 
and circumstantial approximation.30 
No doubt political conditions have had great impact on the attitude and 
memories of the societies. This running battle between the two powers created a long-
lasting perception of hostility. In the common perception of Spain the Ottomans were 
the archenemy for centuries: 
This barbarous nation is from obscure origin... How many cities, 
islands, and provinces under the Christian domains were ravaged? If the 
hand of God does not protect us, that in a short time, it will occupy the 
rest of the Christian world.31 
 
It can be seen in the above quote that this tendency began to be challenged over 
time, particularly in the XVIII. century, when the countries’ political and economic 
capacities had decreased. Needless to say, the written evidence help evaluate the 
general change in public opinion. For instance, the visit of Ahmet Vasıf, the Ottoman 
envoy who presented gifts to Carlos III after the ratification of the treaty, caused 
tremendous excitement in the society.32 Necati Kutlu found a short poem regarding the 
greeting of the envoy by the Spaniards among historical documents. The content of 
this short poem leads one to see the influence of the treaty that ensured the satisfaction 
with the government. The Sultan was called the Great Lord of the Orient, and the envoy 
was called the messenger bringing peace.  
  Del Gran Senor de Oriente                   Nos trajiste la paz 
  Suceso tal no cuenta                             Mensajero a la España 
                                                 
29 İdris Bostan, Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği, p. 121 
 
30 H.S. Ortega, p. 151 
 
31 The original version of the statement is “esta bárbara nación de oscuro origen...¿Cuantas ciudades, 
cuantas islas, cuantas provincias arrebató a los dominios cristianos? si la mano de de Dios no nos 
protege, que, en breve tiempo, se va a ocupar lo que resta del mundo cristiano.”  Erasmo indicated in 
his work, Utilissima consultatio de bello turcis inferendo, H.S.Ortega, p. 172 It should be indicated here 
that Spain was no exception in terms of the prejudices against the Ottomans and Muslims in that period.  
 
32 See for the narration of Vasıf Efendi.  Ahmet Vasıf, İspanya Sefaretnamesi, Ali Emirî Efendi (Millet 
Ktb.) 818, Melek Öksüz, “Türk-İspanya İlişkileri Çerçevesinde Osmanlı-İspanya İlişkileri”, Yüksek 
Lisans Tezi, KATÜ, 1998, Faik Reşit Unat, Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri, Ankara: TTK Yay, , 
1988, Ethan L Menchinger, “The Sefaretname of Ahmet Vasıf Efendi to Spain”, History Studies, 
Volume 2 / 3 2010, Hüner Tuncer, Osmanlı Diplomasisi ve Sefaretnameler, Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 
1998 
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  La más antigua historia                        De tierra tan extraña33 
  
During this century, the mentality of “Holy War” was outmoded, and the 
ostensible disappearance of religious hostility facilitated the compromise with 
Muslims.34 Mikel de Espalza analyzes Verdadero Caracter de Mahoma y de Su 
Religion: Justa Idea de Esto Falso Profeta, sin Alabarle con Exceso ni Deprimirle con 
Odio to reveal the interrelations between socio-political affairs and the theological 
mentality in the eighteenth century.35 Even though the theological vision of Manuel 
Traggia regarding Mohammad, al-Quran, and the Turks or the Mediterranean Muslims 
includes long-standing prejudices, it was generally original and new. He emphasizes 
that there was certainly an impact of the very important mutation of the Spanish 
Mediterranean policy confronted by Muslim countries, especially the Turkish-
Maghreb. He refers to the concrete example of the P. Traggia, and the manifestation 
of its consequences. The transition from antagonism to cooperation, in 1782, is not 
clear-cut, so it is required to have a systematic and coherent account for this long 
process in the XVIII. century.36 
In secondary sources, this period is viewed as “normalization” in a positive 
sense; “normalization of the relationship between Spain and the Islamic potentials.”37 
During the second half of the XVIII. century, successive Spanish governments whose 
interests were motivated by various causes sought the normalization of the 
relationships with Muslim countries and replaced aggression to Islam with a more 
                                                 
33 This literature called “Corrido” denotes folk songs that narrate the significant issues. Mehmet Necati 
Kutlu, “İspanyol Belgelerine Göre İspanya Nezdinde Görevlendirilen İlk Osmanlı Elçisi Ahmet Vasıf 
Efendi”, p. 108 
34 Ortiz, p.302 Aristazabal, the member of the delegation who presented the gifts of Carlos III, wrote in 
his voyages notes “Viaje a Constantinopla”, this was the first Spanish navy anchored the port of 
Constantinople from the Holy Wars. “We could not come here even for peace.” Eloy Martin Corrales, 
“İspanya Osmanlı İlişkileri, 18. ve 19. yy”, İspanya-Türkiye: 16. Yüzyıldan 21. Yüzyıla Rekabet ve 
Dostluk, p. 236 
  
35 It may be translated to English as “True Character of Muhammad and His Religion: Fair Idea of This 
False Prophet, without Praise or Excessively Depress Hatred.”  Manuel Traggia was born in Zaragosa, 
in 1755.  He was a theologian, preacher, historian, journalist, and guerrilla in the war against France. 
Mikel Espalza, “Guerras y Paces Hispano-Turcas. Algunos Repercusiones Teologicas en la Obra de 
Manuel Traggia”, p. 13 
 
36 Pablo Hernández Sau, “De la Infidelidad a la Amistad: Las Relaciones Hispano-Otomanas en el siglo 
XVIII”, p. 92 
 
37 L. García, Hernando de Larramendi, España, el Mediterráneo y el Mundo Arabo Musulmán, pp. 20-
21, “El perfume de la amistad. Correspondencia diplomática en archivos españoles (siglos XIII-XVI)”, 
pp.  83-90 
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positive attitude.38 Atard points out the secular aspect of the Spanish foreign policy, 
which induced to disperse historical-religious prejudices that had made the Muslims 
natural enemies of Spain. Following, this led to leave traditional prejudices towards 
the Turkish enemies, and as in the Moroccan case, Spain tried to befriend the Turks.39 
The fundamental assumption made here is that the perception of Spain, which was 
independent of religious authority, played an important role in the transformation of 
relations.  
When Bouligny came to Istanbul, he spent his first night in the guest house of 
the church. He asked the priest of the church to pray the God for his success, and 
assured him that the treaty would provide with favourable conditions for the Catholic 
pilgrims. In addition to that, when the treaty was declared in Spain to the public, it was 
stressed that one of the main objectives of this treaty, and cooperation with a Muslim 
state was to seek an opportunity to proselytize the Catholic religion among the 
Ottoman Muslim groups. By doing so, one can say that, the Spanish politicians aimed 
to legitimize the treaty in the eyes of people. It also shows that religion played an 
important role in public diplomacy of Spain in that time.40 
It seems reasonable to take into account the influence of international 
equilibrium. Conde de Aranda concisely clarifies the condition in his declaration as: 
“We will negotiate with them as England and Portugal had done, for raison d'Etat, for 
our interests. We permit the God of each religion, as we are not in the centuries of 
Crusades.”41 
As noted, public opinion had great impact on foreign policy, and the 
international conditions, as well. According to Palacio Atard, this was the rationalism 
                                                 
38Javier Sabater Galindo,” El Tratado de Paz Hispano-Argelino de 1786",  p. 57 
 
39 V. P. Atard, p. 400 
 
40 “...oid oid oid, como de parte del rey nuestro señor saber a todos que el deseo que ha tenido siempre 
Senor  Magestad de procurar a sus amados vasallos todas las felicidades, ventajas y conveniencias 
posibles le hicieron mirar como  importantes y necessarias a la seguridad de sus personas en los paises 
de la dominacion Mahometana, al ejercicio y propagacion de la religion catolica en ellos, y a la 
extensiondel comercio, la libre Navegacion del Mediterraneo y la facilidad de traficar como otras 
naciones.” Articulos of Paz y Comercio, pp. 25-26 
 
41 Original versión: “Negociaremos con ellos como si fueron ingleses o portugueses, por la razón de 
Estado, y los justos motivos de nuestros intereses, pues estos son motivos consentidos, y permitimos la 
religión de cada Dios, pues ya no estamos en los ignorantes siglos de las Cruzadas.” Nadal, Diplomacia 
y Comercio, p. 512 
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of the criteria of the international policy of Spain.42 During the 18th century it was seen 
there was a change in the international situation. European countries intensified their 
relationships by sending permanent ambassadors. “Spain recognized the significance 
of the integration to European equilibrium (equilibrio europeo).”43 Above all, as the 
Bourbon dynasty had deep ties with the Ottomans, Spain was indirectly integrated into 
the French policy as a consequence of the ruling of the same dynasty. It should be 
indicated here that this change did not occur abruptly at the beginning of the century. 
During the reign of Felipe V, Spain planned to offer an agreement to the Ottomans, 
however public opinion and moral reflections demonstrated that cultural and political 
ambience was not suitable to change the ongoing-ancient attitude towards the 
Ottomans and the Muslim countries despite the fact that the antagonism towards the 
Turks was just a memory.44 Nevertheless, the conditions in Spain accelerated the 
process during the 1760s and the attempt to compromise with the Muslims 
actualized.45 
Carlos III, the monarch of Naples who ascended to the throne after Fernando 
VI (1746-1759) arrived to Madrid on 9 December 1759. The period of the Kingdom 
of Carlos III witnessed a major transformation in Spain's relations with Muslims, and 
the process, which is the subject of this study, began.46 It must be taken into account 
that this conjuncture initially contributes to the comprehension and the interpretation 
of facts. When Carlos III ascended to the throne, France and England had fought one 
another for over four years, and they had been trying to achieve the acquisition of 
Spain during the ongoing war. France offered Spain a new family alliance and 
promised, in return, assistance to re-conquer Gibraltar, whereas Great Britain promised 
                                                 
42 J.H. Franco, p. 272 
 
43H.S. Ortega, p. 152 
 
44 H.S. Ortega, p. 153 
 
45 This was not the first attempt to cooperate with the Ottomans. In 1625, the reign of Naples charged 
Givani Montelbano to negotiate with the Ottomans on behalf of Spain. After, the Ottoman envoy Ahmet 
Çavuş was appointed to notify the throne of the sultan, Mehmet IV in 1649. A.H.N. Legajo Estado 2879, 
Mariano Arribas Palau, La Documentacion del Archivo Historico Nacional Relativa a Turquia.” 
C.I.E.P.O, p. 53,  F.Reşit Unat, Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri, p. VIII, XIII, See for the study 
based on the Spanish archives about the Ottoman envoy: Manuel Espada Burgos, “Andanzas Madrilenas 
de un Embajador Turco”, Madrid: Tirada Aparte de Los Anales del Instituto de Estudios Madrilenos, 
Tomo XI, 1966 
 
46 Nadal, p. 512 
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the prevention of the attacks of the Anglo-American pirates. Spain reconciled with 
Portugal, traditional ally of England, after the Treaty of Limites was signed in 1750. 
Great Britain did not ratify the treaty of Pardo. Carlos III realized the hazards of the 
neutrality of supporting the interests of Spanish colonies. In 1761, Spain and France 
compromised to sign the Third Pacte de Famille.47 In this tumultuous atmosphere, 
Carlos III, the new monarch of Spain, offered the Ottomans to extend the treaty signed 
between Naples and the Ottomans. Guillermo Ludolf conducted this inconclusive 
attempt. He began to negotiate on behalf of Spain, in 1760. He could not convince 
Ottoman bureaucrats to sign a treaty with Spain. In his report, it was requested to 
incorporate Spain into the treaty signed with Naples during the reign of Carlos III.48 
The negotiations were conducted for a while, yet this offer was to be an impasse after 
the death of Sadrazam Ragıp Paşa in 1763.49 When this process is compared to the one 
conducted by Juan de Bouligny in 1783, it does not seem surprising that an agreement 
was not reached, as it required much effort.50 This comparison leads one to think that 
Carlos III only attempted to extend the scope of the agreement, and he did not aim to 
follow a new path under fragile circumstances. In 1770 and 1771, the French court 
hinted Carlos III that the ambassador in Turkey would provide the means of granting 
the treaty, but this statement was not confirmed by any results.51  
According to secondary sources, the agreement process during the 18th century, 
is illustrated as was in 1760, especially at the beginning of the enthronement of Carlos 
III, however the document located in the Ottoman archives regarding the relations, 
indicates Spain offered cooperation through the medium of a French ambassador and 
a Hungarian aristocrat, Francis II Rákóczi during the reign of Ahmed III (1703-1730). 
                                                 
47 Diego Alarcía, “Guerra y Regalismo a Comienzos del Reinado de Carlos III: El Final del Ministerio 
Wall”, pp. 1057-1060  
 
48“ ...Devlet-i Aliyyenin dostu Sicilyateyn kralı İspanya kralı olup ol canibe azimet lazimesinde kendi 
kralzadesin Sicilyateyn krallığına nasb edip Devlet-i Aliyyede kendi yerine dostluğa kabul eylediği ve 
kendiler dahi dost-ı kadim Devlet-i Aliyye iken İspanya devletini Devlet-i Aliyye ile dostluk ve sulh u 
salah dahi ister ise kabul ederiz deyu tahrir ve inayet buyurulmağla...” BOA, HAT, 9/322 
 
49 Hüseyin Serdar Tabakoğlu, “XVII. Yüzyıl Osmanlı-İspanya İlişkileri”, p. 20 
 
50 Juan de Bouligny delineates the harsh conditions of the negotiation process in his diary, it will be 
evaluated in the following chapter.    
 
51 Manuel Conrotte,  p. 511 
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The document does not include an exact date but it may lead one to assume that the 
negotiations date back to the beginning of the century.52  
The motivations that reinvigorated Spain to initiate close relations with the 
Ottoman Empire were Spain’s political interests and the Ottoman Empire’s 
commercial convenience.53 It can be seen that the schema of economic policy during 
the period of Carlos III was concerned with the richness of the subjects and the strength 
of the Monarchy.  Since, at that time, Spain had already started to conduct a 
mercantilist policy, and the government was primarily concerned with rationalizing 
the administration of the state's economy without depending exclusively on the metal 
of colonial America.54 Llombart summarizes the economic policy as such; “mas 
mercado mas Estado” (more market stronger state.)55 Historians evaluate the case 
generally in a similar vein: 
The system of Europe has changed: commerce enters all, or almost all, 
treaties as “raison d’état” wrote the Abbot Coyer in the mid-1700s, and 
Bougainville observed that ` the balance of trade has become the balance 
of power.56 
 
Although the power of the Ottoman Turks was beginning to wane, they still 
controlled the eastern Mediterranean, and the Spanish government had been persuaded 
that it was desirable to establish trade relations with this important commercial area.57 
As aforementioned, Spain sustained trade commodities from Muslims countries over 
centuries via European countries, however Spain sought to solve jurisdictional 
questions of commerce and navigation by signing an agreement and establishing a 
direct trade route.58 The pursued principal object was to secure active economic 
                                                 
52 “Sen ki Vezirim Devlet-i Aliyye ile İspanya devleti dostluk murad ettiklerini Rakofçizade ve Frence 
elçisi haber vermişler bu husus bir hoş mülahaza olunup Devlet-i Aliyyeye hayırlı ise mezkurlar 
İspanya’ya yazıp elçileri gelmek üzere mektup gönderilsin.” BOA. A.E. III. Ahmed 224/21617.    
Needless to say that, the assessment requires to be proved by the other sources as it is not accurate to 
assert a claim based on only one archival document.   
 
53 J.H. Franco, p. 272 
 
54 Mikel Espalza, p. 12 
 
55 Vicent Llombart, Campomanes Economista y Politico de Carlos III, p. 356 
 
56 Daniel Frigo, p. 22 
 
57 Fontaine Martin, p. 120 
 
58 Jose Maria Sanchez Diana, “Relaciones Diplomaticas Entre Rusia y España en el siglo XVIII 1780-
1783”, p. 603 
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exchanges with the Ottomans, not to forget, dominating North Africa completely, Asia 
Minor, and the Balkans.59 
Spain continued to follow closely the internal and external developments in the 
Ottoman Empire, as can be seen obviously in the Gaceta de Madrid especially during 
the last quarter of the century: 
News about the Battle of Turkish troops and Russian troops in Dniester 
with these latest victories. Numerous volunteers asking to join the 
Ottoman army. April 19 is arrested Patriarch of the Greeks, he was 
accused of treason. The Patriarch of the Greek is released (11 July 
1769).60 
Russia and Turkey remain at war. The Ottoman Janissary army revolt 
against the Grand Vizier (6 October 1770).61 
The news about the victory of Russian troops against the Ottoman army 
on the banks of the Danube (9 October 1770)62  
The plague extended in the Ottoman Empire. Cardinal Palavicini 
published an edict prohibiting entry of boats from Levant without 
quarantine in the Adriatic Sea (11 September).63 
 
As stated above, Spain devoted close attention to the Ottomans, especially its 
relations with European countries. The new policy adopted by Spain when the helm 
was in the hands of Floridablanca, supported the integrity of the Ottoman Empire to 
limit the ambitions of other countries. Nevertheless, this would not contribute to the 
integrity of the Ottomans and he fairly comprehended the geopolitical role of Turkey 
as a bulwark against the Russian expansion in the south.64 18th century witnessed long-
lasting wars between the Ottomans and Russia and the defeats made the crisis more 
critical particularly in the last quarter of the century. Spain thought the moment 
opportune to intervene once more in the Crimean imbroglio to attempt to secure some 
concessions from the Ottoman Empire. From the perspective of Spain there was no 
doubt that Russia triumphed over Turkey and that the Turkish Sultan was forced to 
                                                 
59 Nadal, pp. 540-541 
 
60 Gaceta de Madrid núm. 28, de 11.07.1769, páginas 217 a 218. PDF (Reference BOE-A-1769-355) 
http://www.boe.es/buscar/gazeta.php?accion=Mas&id_busqueda=590fbca21f4ffb011fae487b6191150
9-440-40 
 
61 G.M. núm. 45, de 06.11.1770, páginas 376 a 377, PDF (Reference BOE-A-1770-621) 
 
62 G.M. núm. 41, de 09.10.1770, página 346. PDF (Reference BOE-A-1770-567) 
 
63 G.M. 37, de 11/09/1778, páginas 383 a 384. PDF (Reference BOE-A-1778-432) Needless to say that 
these are some examples but there is a lot of news concerning the situation in the Ottoman Empire.  
 
64 P.V. Bou, "Rusia, Turquia y La Politica de Floridablanca en 1779", p. 91 
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establish an alliance with European countries. The fundamental assumption made here 
is that the impulse for the increasing concessions stemmed from the inevitability 
against Russian attacks as stated: “As a devastated consequence of Kucuk Kaynarca, 
the Ottoman Empire provided trade concessions to the European countries in its 
territory to ensure their neutrality in the Russian issue.”65  
France and the Italian republics, then Holland, Denmark, Sweden, England and 
Hamburg had signed treaties of friendship and trade with the Moroccans and Turks, to 
open the doors of markets and so that their ships could sail without risk of piracy. 
While the major parts of the European countries reached agreements contributing to 
commerce and free navigations with the Ottomans, Spain was still in a kind of 
permanent state of latent war against traditional Muslim enemies. “After The Treaty 
of Küçük Kaynarca, other winds blowing in the Turkish capital, Floridablanca wanted 
to use them to eliminate the inherent and permanent hostility.”66 Spain temporized the 
gain of concession so it would be an appropriate time to sign a treaty with the Ottomans 
who were occupied with the political struggles and Russian threats debilitating the 
power of the Empire.67 Even though Spain looked for the convenient time for the 
agreement, the envoy was frustrated that the persuasion of the Ottoman side took such 
a long time and the negotiation process lasted approximately three years. This example 
helps us claim Ottoman diplomacy was based on more complicated and intricate 
principles. However, it can be reasonable to say that the possibility of an impending 
war between the Ottomans and Russians contributed to accelerate the process so as to 
ensure the neutrality of Spain.68  “With Spain entering in alliance with Sweden against 
Russia, the cooperation of the countries controlling the Straits of Sunt (Baltic), 
Gibraltar (Mediterranean) and the Black Sea could close to Russia the seaways into 
the Mediterranean.”69 
 
 
                                                 
65 E.Martinez Ruiz, Politica Interior y Exterior de Los Borbones,  p. 325 
 
66 V. P. Atard, pp. 393-399 
 
67 Bou, p. 94 
 
68 F.Hernandez, p. 276 
 
69 Kemal Beydilli, “İspanya”,  p. 167 
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 2.3 The Life of Juan de Bouligny70 
Carlos III deployed Juan Bouligny as an extraordinary envoy to conduct 
negotiations of the treaty in Constantinople on 30 June 1778. The question arises as 
why Bouligny was chosen for this mission of historical importance. The information 
regarding the first Spanish plenipotentiary is notably scarce and contradictory, even 
while considering his birthplace and origins according to historical sources. It is stated 
in many sources that he had been born in Alicante in 1726 into a French family; his 
father was a well-known French merchant.71 On the contrary, historian Emilio 
Garrigues, a prominent historian of the Ottoman-Spanish relations, challenges this 
information and claims his father was from Marseille.72 Conrotte, one of the 
distinguished historians on this subject, also rejects the common assumption about his 
French origins and, rather, contends that his Spanish origins were significant in his 
appointment as an envoy to the Sublime Porte: “One of the reasons why a Spanish 
person was nominated as an envoy was that Floridablanca aimed to provide a basis for 
national prestige and obviate French influence.” The discussion on the ethnic origins 
of the envoy underscores the nationalist perspective. It can be expedient to refrain from 
a retrospective approach for the sake of argument. What is required instead is to 
evaluate the fact concerning the historical conjuncture. Bouligny, whether or not of 
French-origin, occupied with trade in Seville, Alicante, and Madrid and this would 
rather be more effective in his appointment.73   
He was distinguished in commerce, and in 1753 he established permanent 
contact with the consul, Agustin Sanchez Cabello to start commercial operations with 
the coasts of the French Atlantic74. The years around 1760 were recollected in the 
family memoirs, as marking the period when the family firm under the management 
                                                 
70 Juan Bouligny began calling himself Juan de Bouligny, in order to emphasize his noble birth, a matter 
of little importance in his earlier career as a businessman, but an important consideration for a European 
diplomat in the eighteenth century. Fontaine Martin, A History of Bouligny Family and Allied Families, 
p. 120 
 
71 Didier Ozanam, “Juan de Bouligny”, p. 292, Menendez Pidal, Historia de España, p. 423, Jesus 
Pradells Nadal, Diplomacia y Comercio La expansion consular espanola en el siglo XVIII, p. 541, 
Vicente Segui Roma, “Los Comerciales en Alicante”, p. 107 
 
72 Emilio Garrugues, Un Desliz Diplomatico La Pas Hispano-Turca, p. 110 
 
73 M.Pidal, p. 423 
 
74 J.P. Nadal, p. 541 
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of Joseph and Juan Bouligny reached peak point in terms of wealth and prosperity as 
the leading firm in Alicante. In these years alone the family did one-seventh of the 
city's business.75 In February, 1757, Bouligny was elected as deputy of Spanish Trade 
in Alicante, for which he moved to Madrid to manage the creation of a consul for his 
own city, however the simplicity of its management did not prevent him from 
contacting courtiers of political circles.76 He married Elena Viviana Marconie, whose 
father was French official consular in Madrid. After his retirement, he decided to return 
to Madrid and apply for a governmental position in 1776. As an employment seeker, 
Juan Bouligny mapped out a careful, patient strategy. In developing and pursuing this 
strategy he had the aid of his wife Elena.77 Before the end of the year 1776, it is likely 
that Juan had already established contacts with the Conde de Floridablanca, 
culminating in his appointment to Constantinople. The stated mission of the embassy 
was to explore the possibilities of establishing diplomatic and commercial relations 
with the Ottoman Empire.78 
He was appointed to Constantinople on an important secret mission to establish 
diplomatic and trade relations between Spain and the Ottoman Empire. On 5 December 
1778, he set sail with his entourage from the harbour of Barcelona. His second son, 
Jose had accompanied him to Constantinople and acted as his secretary.79 Bouligny 
endured many troubles. He had difficulty in fulfilling his duty successfully, and finally 
succeeded to convince the Ottoman side to sign a treaty, and then he was appointed as 
the plenipotentiary of Spain in Constantinople.80 His wife Elena and his four other 
children joined him in 1784, and the negotiations reached a conclusion. However, they 
arrived in Istanbul at a particularly turbulent moment in the history of Ottoman-
Russian relations. Thus, Elena decided to return to Spain taking their children Maria 
Antonia, Elena, Juan, and Dionisio with her to escape the problematic atmosphere. 
After they returned to Spain, Bouligny’s prestige as an envoy facilitated the diplomatic 
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76 V.S. Roma, p. 107 
 
77 F. Martin, p. 120 
 
78 V.S. Roma, p. 108 
 
79 F. Martin, p. 121 
 
80 As the peace process will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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careers of his children. His eldest son, Juan pursued a diplomatic career, first in the 
Spanish legation at Parma and later in Naples. As well, Dionisio was able to enter the 
royal Walloon Guards as cadet.81 Jose gained experience with his father in 
Constantinople, and he became plenipotentiary after Bouligny successfully completed 
his assignment as Spain's first ambassador in Constantinople for approximately ten 
years. 
Even though the final results were successful in terms of diplomacy and trade 
for Spain, as it will be discussed in the following pages, the nomination of Juan de 
Bouligny, as a person who was not noble and without any reputation, by Floridablanca 
for such a delicate position is a controversial issue among historians. It is considered 
that Floridablanca was not well-informed about the diplomatic procedure conducted 
by the Ottoman Empire, and this is why he nominated a merchant for such a crucial 
role. Garrigues, the pioneer of the discussion, criticizes his appointment. He argues 
that such a significant mission would require the nomination of a noble with 
experience and reputation in the official service rather than a merchant. He emphasizes 
the inefficiency of the decision as stated below: 
It is really a silly error to appoint a merchant to the Ottoman Empire 
while the European powers especially accentuate their prestige by 
means of royal ambassadors, this is also the reason of the suspensions 
over the course of the negotiations.82 
 
Chakib Benafri, Nadal, and Roma evaluate the question in the same vein as 
Garrigues. Vicente Atard suggests that it was a reasonable decision considering that 
no skilled Spanish diplomat was found who desired to travel to Constantinople with 
such a difficult mission.83 It was clear to almost all those who wrote on the subject that 
Garrigues had great influence on the literature with his negative assumption: “un desliz 
diplomatica”.84 It should be indicated that there have been many criticisms of his view. 
                                                 
81 F. Martin, p. 121 
 
82 E. Garrigues, p. 111 
 
83 V.P. Atard, p. 400,  Benafri, “There was no other option for Floridablanca so the nobles disdain to 
travel to Constantinople for such a mission.” p. 218 
 
84 Chakib Benafri, “Las Relaciones Entre España, El Imperio Otomano Y Las Regencias Berberiscas 
En El Siglo XVIII (1759-1792)”, p. 217,  J.S. Nadal: “Floridablanca sent the envoy, unsuitable for the 
diplomatic and administrative mission” p. 541, V.S. Roma: “He is a cosmopolitan in formation and 
outstripped in the negotiations but not experimented in diplomacy and administration.” P.108, Juan 
Hernandez Franco refers to Garrigues, Floridablanca made a mistake in nominating an unexperienced 
merchant for the mission which required nobility and high social status so as to leave a good impression 
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For instance, Conrotte puts forward the claim that his profession was one of the 
important factors for the appointment. As a merchant, he spent a long time in the Orient 
and learnt perfectly the Turkish language as well as the political and social customs of 
the Ottomans.85 Nevertheless, this assessment needs qualification since it is not 
supported by neither the sources nor the diary of Bouligny.  
From a different point of view, the sole reason for Bouligny’s appointment to 
the post was his profession according to Pidal who asserts that his case was not unique 
example, for Gardoqui who was nominated as the Spanish representative in the United 
States after the Independence War also a merchant.86 Looking into Spanish 
ambassadors concurrently nominated along with Bouligny to the European countries 
provides insight on the issue. Jose Nicolas de Azara in Rome, Bernardo Del Campo in 
London, and Fernan Nunez in Lisbon and Paris all had undoubted bureaucratic 
qualities and political patronage.87 In comparison to Bouligny, in the Ottoman Empire, 
the quality of the ambassadors differentiated in terms of their nobility and diplomatic 
experiences. This comparison can prompt the speculation that Spain obviously acted 
in a different manner regarding its distinctive priorities in the region. It would suffice 
to say, it seems reasonable to admit all assessments above are justifiable in their own 
right but the question requires taking into consideration the conjuncture and initiative 
motives. 
Throughout the 18th century, there was a growing tendency for the government 
to strengthen the ties with the countries in the Levant. On the basis of the evidence 
currently available, it seems fair to suggest Floridablanca, the minister, increasingly 
strove to enhance the commercial capacity of the country, and aimed to take advantage 
of the experienced merchant. On logical grounds, it seems sensible to send a merchant 
to sign a peace and trade agreement principally based on commercial reciprocity. 
However, the process became more complicated with the unskilled conducts of the 
inexperienced envoy. Bouligny, despite his disadvantages and the opposition of other 
ambassadors, was able to conduct his mission by 1793. 
                                                 
on the Sublime Porte, see J. H. Franco, La Gestion Politica y el Pensamiento Reformista de Conde de 
Floridablanca, p. 274 
85 Manuel Conrotte, p. 102 
 
86 M. Pidal, p. 423 
 
87 V.P.Atard, pp. 201-212 
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On 19 January 1793, Bouligny decided to deliver the task to his son, at the age 
of sixty-seven after having received a corresponding license.88 He settled permanently 
in Madrid in 1793. Juan Bouligny did not exercise any other mission until his death on 
9 January, 1798.89 Gaceta de Madrid published a message of condolences as follows:  
Juan de Bouligny died, at the age of 71, having served earnestly and 
confidently to Lord Majesty on several commissions and carried them 
out with integrity, zeal, and the purpose of the common good of the 
nation. Bouligny deserved the honor of getting a commission in 1778 
and signed the peace with the court of Constantinople. He endeavoured 
for so happy success ensuring the interests of both nations. Lord 
Majesty decorated him with the character of envoy extraordinary and 
minister plenipotentiary of the same court whose ministers and Divan 
always distinguished him with appreciation and high regard for his 
integrity, truth and good faith in their dealings and actions and having 
been licensed to this court, Majesty awarded honours with his council 
of state and expressions of his goodness and mercy.90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
88 D.Ozanam, p. 293 
 
89 V.S. Roma, p. 108 
 
90 Gaceta de Madrid núm. 10, de 02/02/1798, páginas 109 a 111. It is also avalaible online: 
http://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE/1798/010/A00109-00111.pdf  
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CHAPTER III: THE EYEWITNESS OF THE PEACE: THE DIARY 
OF JUAN DE BOULIGNY 
 
 
The diary sheds light on the negotiation process from the start through the eyes 
of the man in charge. Juan de Bouligny notes his mission, and the conversations he 
had with Ottoman bureaucrats, as well as connections, contacts with the other 
ambassadors, visits, his considerations, and his impressions throughout the process. In 
short, the diary is a witness to the acts and deeds of the Spanish plenipotentiary in 
Constantinople. It may be useful to describe the diary for a better understanding of the 
source material before beginning our examination from a broader perspective. 
 
3.1The Characteristics of the Correspondence of Juan de Bouligny   
  
                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The diary of the first plenipotentiary, Juan de Bouligny, carried the title “Diario 
mis Operaciones desde el dia de mi arivo a Constantinopla que fui a las 4 horas de la 
tarde del dia 30 Abril 1779 (The Diary of my Activities from the day of my arrival in 
Constantinople on 30th April 1779)”. This diary is located in the Archivo Historico 
Nacional de Madrid (A.H.N.) in Spain. The correspondence is categorized as Legajo 
2912, in the section of Estado in which the documents of Consejo de Estado (Secretary 
Figure 3.1 The Title of Bouligny's Diary 
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of State) are preserved. The correspondence is written in the eighteenth-century 
Spanish in terms of alphabet, script and punctuations, yet the envoy attached the copies 
of the petitions in French language submitted to the Sublime Porte. These letters were 
written in French “since the dragomans of the Empire do not know Spanish”.91 The 
Diary includes only one short passage in Italian dated November 23, 1779 sent to 
Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa regarding a request for making an appointment with him.92 
This multilingualism would be advantageous for Bouligny in his contacts with the 
European ambassadors. As mentioned before Conrotte claims that the major factor in 
his appointment was his experience in the Orient as well as his knowledge of the 
Turkish language and customs. However this claim is not supported by the memoirs 
itself which neither includes any statement in Turkish nor bears any hint side about his 
knowledge of Turkish. 
The diary is well-organized, and the hand-writing is legible. As well, each 
passage has separate dates so as to facilitate tracing the story of the plenipotentiary. 
However, the narration is intense, implicative and includes various persons and facts. 
It is hard to follow the traces of Bouligny’s main arguments and feelings because of 
this intensity. However, as the negotiations dragged on for three years, the text is full 
of repetitive notes and references, all about the diplomatic process. 
The diary begins with the date of the arrival of Bouligny on 30 April 1779 and 
ends with the conclusion of the negotiations on 14 September 1782. The diary covers 
a period of three years and five months, and consists of a totality of three hundred 
handwritten pages. Bouligny noted down events daily in May just after his arrival, and 
weekly in June, July, and August. Later on, it start to change depending on to the pace 
of the process. For instance, after he received the news that the Imperial Council would 
assemble to discuss a treaty offer in November 1780, he, once again, started to write 
daily.93 Occasionally, Bouligny preferred to write quite briefly and merely 
informative, since he had considered that the negotiations would be short and 
                                                 
91 “Mis siguientes cartas  escritas en idioma frances por no entender los dragomanes el Español (10-13 
May 1779)” Juan de Bouligny, Diario mis Operaciones desde el día de mi arivo a Constantinopla que 
fui a las 4 horas de la tarde del día 30 Abril 1779, A.H.N. Legajo Estado 2912, p. 5 
 
92 Boulingy, p. 54  
 
93 Bouligny, pp. 137-148 
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straightforward. Nonetheless, his mission would become wearisome. His fatigue is 
visible in the most frequent note “There is no answer yet”.94   
One of the significant questions relates to the goal of Juan de Bouligny in 
keeping a diary. It may be feasible to speculate that the aim and the audience of the 
work relying on the content and manner of his notes. As previously mentioned, the 
plenipotentiary entered his notes on daily or weekly basis so as to enable the reader to 
follow his activities on a timeline. It seems plausible to think that Bouligny wanted to 
provide his government with the minute details of his conducts in Constantinople by 
keeping a diary. Presumably, it would have been difficult to report the entire process 
in a single final report to be submitted upon returning to Spain. He was not a member 
of the ruling class, which presumably made him worried about his future career 
because of protraction of the negotiations with the Ottoman bureaucrats: “…the Court 
having sent me to this object, it was my duty to overcome the difficulties, lest my court 
accuse me of inaptitude.” 95      
Interestingly enough, the diary includes few personal reflections on certain 
incidents such as 1782 fires in Istanbul. He is also informative about the official 
appointments and factional rivalries in the Ottoman court. Also, it contains only a 
number of comments about undesirable delays in the diplomatic process.96 In a simple 
manner, Bouligny noted down everything, from his arrival to the time the treaty was 
signed, his settlement, and his contacts with the other ambassadors, the letters sent, 
and the presents given. This is a further evidence for the claim that Bouligny must have 
recorded everything to prove that he fulfilled perfectly the task assigned to him. The 
diary addresses his government, not the public. As a matter of fact, it does not present 
interesting comments or criticisms as would travel books of Spanish travellers such as, 
Aristazabal, Jose Moreno, and Gravina.97     
                                                 
94 “El dia 30 Abril 1780 no tuve respuesta ni el dia 1 de Mayo tampoco, 2 Mayo no teniendo respuesta.” 
p. 107 “No hay resolucion.” (10 December 1780) p.  151 “No hay respuesta.”(11 May 1781) p. 195   
 
95 Habiéndose enviado la Corte a este objeto, era de mi dever el venzer las dificultades, porque si a 
cada una, que pueda ocurrir, me parece y diese parte, con razón me tendria en mi Corte por un inepto. 
(14 December 1780), pp. 156-157 
 
96 Even though there is some information on the events in the Ottoman bureaucracy or the developments 
in the country,  the diary centered on the acts of Bouligny.  
 
97 Ricardo González Castrillo, “El Viajede Gabriel de Ariztizábal a Constantinopla en 1784”,  
Universidad de Compultense de Madrid, Facultad de Filolojía, Seccíon de Semíticas, Opción Árabe e 
Islam, Junio,1994, Federico Gravina, Viaje a Constantinopla, Ed.Jose Sanchez Molledo, Miraguano 
Ediciones, Madrid, 2001, Jose, Moreno, Viaje a Constantinopla en el año de 1784, Madrid 
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Bouligny sent letters aiming to inform Spanish government about the process. 
I used some of them in this study to compare the information transferred with the real 
situation in Constantinople. After the negotiation came to conclusion, Bouligny was 
appointed as a Spanish ambassador in Constantinople. His letter turned to detailed 
reports entitled “Noticias de Constantinople”.98  Studying his numerous reports on the 
Ottoman Empire, between 1783 and 1793, require further research and efforts.  
 
3.2 The Operations of the Plenipotentiary in Constantinople 
In this chapter, I will expand upon the acts of Juan de Bouligny starting from 
the time of his arrival to Constantinople until the negotiations with the Sublime Porte, 
based on his diary but with contributions from secondary sources, archives and other 
personal accounts. The Spanish plenipotentiary arrived at the coast of Constantinople 
at four o’clock in the evening on 30 April 1779 and consulted merchants from 
Hamburg about the procedure to pass through the Turkish customs. Did he declare his 
mission at the beginning or did he travel incognito? These are the questions that this 
chapter addresses. The best way to answer this question is to present an overview of 
the discussions from the secondary sources, and to assess the acts of the envoy as 
noted. Bouligny did not arrive at Constantinople with the accreditation of the 
plenipotentiary but instead as a simple merchant and a Franciscan agent.99  Bouligny 
found it expedient to travel to Constantinople incognito, until the proper moment 
where he revealed his status as the representative of the Spanish crown.100 In 1778, the 
Assembly of Madrid appointed the merchant, Bouligny, to negotiate with the 
Ottomans. He would pretend to go to Constantinople on commercial business, this way 
he would be able to contact discretely the authorities that had impact on the Ottoman 
bureaucracy.101 Aiming to disguise his diplomatic mission, the envoy extraordinary, 
                                                 
 
98  
 
99V.S. Roma, p. 108, J.H.Franco, p. 274 
 
100Fontaine Martin, p. 120 
 
101J.P.Nadal, Diplomacia and Comercio, p. 541 
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Bouligny, claimed he was on a commercial expedition.102 The fundamental 
assumption made here is that Bouligny kept his mission secret at the beginning. In 
other words, it was clear to all those who wrote on the topic that Bouligny behaved 
prudently by obscuring his intention. These assumptions are based on Bouligny’s 
contacts with the merchants of Hamburg (Ahrens and Compa) when he reached 
Turkish customs and his conversations with the President of Santa Casa, Juan de 
Rivera.  
However, the most recent study103 on the issue points that Bouligny had 
received the mission of an official plenipotentiary rather than a secret agent. His 
credentials included the signing of any agreement, peace treaty for the good of both 
powers with the ministers of the Ottoman court. But he went to Italy first only to hide 
his diplomatic status from the people whom would not agree to these negotiations. 
There is enough evidence to put forward the hypothesis that Bouligny did not conceal 
the aim of his travels for a relatively short period. On 6 May 1779 –after five days- he 
visited Ludolf to discuss the issue:104  
I went to lunch to the house of the Neapolitan ambassador, Senor Ludolf 
with whom I discussed the issue and he offered me his dragoman 
Monsieur Chabert, to whom I could confide in completely.105   
 
Immediately upon his arrival, Bouligny delivered the letters of Floridablanca 
to the president of the Hospicio in Constantinople, P. Juan Rivera, the proctor of the 
holy land, and Conde Finochetti. Floridablanca ordered the Spanish administrator of 
the Hospicio106 to initiate discussions on the possibilities of a peace agreement to 
                                                 
102Miguel Angel Ochoa Brun, Embajadas y Embajadores en la Historia de España, p. 399. It is 
necessary to add that European envoys sometimes prefered to change their name and profession to 
conceal their mission at the beginning of their travel. For instance, Prussian envoy Fabian Havde Rexin 
in Constantinople departed from Berlin as if he would purchase horses. However, he was to gather 
information about the Ottoman Empire, and evaluate the inclination of Ottoman bureucrats to any 
alliance with Prussia. Kemal Beydilli, Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar: XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı-Prusya 
Münâsebetleri, pp. 27-28. 
 
103The study of Manuel Conrette puts forward the last analyses in 2006. 
 
104The intimacy began with this meeting between two envoys will continue throughout the negotiation 
process even some interruptions. 
 
105“Fui a comer casa el Senor Ludolf Ministro de Napoles con quien conferencié sobre el asumpto y me 
ofrecio su Dragoman en quien podia poner toda mi confianza.”(6 May 1779), Bouligny, p. 4 
 
106Translated by Spanish dictionary orphanage, children's home, poorhouse. 
http://www.spanishdict.com/translate/hospicio  
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secure the transport of the pilgrims.107 The Hospicio was located adjacent to the church 
of Santa Maria Draperis, which was led by Spanish Franciscans and protected by the 
French ambassador.108 This Hospicio facilitated the settlement of the Spanish 
plenipotentiary in Constantinople and guided Bouligny until his official attempts could 
start. Bouligny stayed there for a while and asked the President about the Empire and 
the other ambassadors to be able to act in accordance with the regulations. As an 
adviser, the president informed the plenipotentiary about procedure and he exhorted 
him to realize the role of Kapudan-ı Derya Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa, Reis Efendi and 
Grand Vizier in diplomatic negotiations: 
He has informed me on the influence of Hasan Paşa, on Reis Efendi, on 
the character of Grand Vizier and the Great Lord. He has told me Hasan 
Paşa is in the favour of the Great Lord and this causes zeal which is the 
reason of his appointments for dangerous expeditions.109  
 
In accordance with this information, Bouligny gave the priority to the 
negotiations with Reis Efendi and Hasan Paşa, referring to them more than a hundred 
times. It was evident that cultivating good relations with these officials was the key to 
the treaty, as their letters to Bouligny and positions carried great weight in the imperial 
court. Kapudan-ı Derya Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa was not in Constantinople at the 
time of Bouligny’s arrival. The plenipotentiary contacted the Reisülküttap 
Abdurrezzak Bahir Efendi through official channels. He addressed the letters to him 
that laid out the principal objects of the Spanish court. Bouligny was informed by the 
Neapolitan ambassador, Ludolf about the official procedures step by step. Bouligny 
apprehended the salient role of the dragomans; he deemed his dragoman, Monsieur 
Chabert, suitable for this essential task. He recruited Chabert on May 10, 1779 as the 
mediator between the envoy and the Empire throughout the negotiation process.110 
                                                 
107Gravina, p. 59 We are not informed about the content of these letters as Bouligny did not add the 
letters delivered to Juan Rivera and Conde Finochetti, thus it may be accepted as an opinion of Gravina 
based on his contacts. 
 
108The Church was the third largest church in Pera. See for history of the church: Yıldız Salman, “Santa 
Maria Draperis Kilisesi”, pp. 45-46, Gravina, p. 37 
 
109Aviendome informado de la influencia de Hazan Bey, de la del Reys Efendi, del caracter del Gran 
Vizier y de el del Gran Senor, diferentes me han contextado en que hazan Bey esta en el favor del Gran 
Senor y que esto causa algunos zelos por cuyo motivo le encargan expediciones algo peligrosas. 
Bouligny, p. 3 
 
110Boulingy, p. 5 
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After a short period, Bouligny addressed the first letter presenting his primary 
objectives to the Ottoman dragoman, Nicolaki Caraggia111 as follows: 
Having been informed by you of the norms of the Sublime Porte which 
did not allow Ministers’ visiting or dealing with a foreigner without the 
permission of the Sovereign. That inquiry was also necessary to have 
knowledge of the subject, I have the honor to transmit a memoir 
addressed to His Excellency, the Reis Efendi, in which the subject of 
my commission is explained. Sir, I kindly request you to give the 
petition to the same minister, adding my kindest respects, and also 
demand the Sublime Porte to accept my petition about "shaking hands" 
to cooperate in an agreement so that each side of the agreement could 
benefit from the advantages of it. Indeed, my Lord, I’m well aware of 
the fact that all process need your kindly approval to go in effect. Hence, 
I kindly request from you, Sir to complete necessary procedures to 
reach a successful conclusion. I always present my gratitude, and hope 
to have the honor to receive a confirmation by you.  
Signed, Jean de Bouligny112 
 
The Ottoman negotiator was the Reisülküttap, the chief of the scribal service. 
He was the head of the bureau that was traditionally responsible for correspondences 
with foreign sovereigns and for the registration of treaties and concessions to foreign 
powers. Thus, he became increasingly occupied with matters of such kind. According 
to Findley, the diplomatic business of the declining empire grew in volume and 
seriousness.113 The scribal service underwent a fundamental transformation in 
corporate organization and status. After the establishment of the institution of the 
Sublime Porte in 1654, the men of the pen were divided from the centre and 
commenced to bureaucratize. In this quintessentially important phase in the 
                                                 
111Nicola Caraggia, the dragoman of the Suplime Porte post probably comes from one of the most 
prominent families providing dragomans to the Porte, Karadja.  
See  Edited By G. J. H. van Gelder, Ed de Moor, Eastward Bound: Dutch Ventures and Adventures in 
the Middle East, Orientations ; 2, Editions Rodopi (January 1, 1994), pp. 130-159, p. 141 for the list of 
well-known dragoman families in that century.  
 
112M’ayant été raporte de votre part que L’usage de la Sublime Porte ne permetait pas a ces Ministres 
de recevoir chez eux traiter avec un étranger franc sans la permision de leur  souverain, et que de il falait 
ausi en sçavoir le sujet, J’ay dont L’honneur de vous envoyer icyinclus une Memoire adressé  mémoire 
adressé à Son Excellence le Reys Efendi dans la quelle est  expliqué le sujet de ma commission. Je vous 
prie donc Monsieur  d‘avoir la bonté de le remetre au même Ministre, y joignant mes tres humble respect 
et le prier de vouloir  bien y doner les mains a cooperar dans une affaire dont la conclusion ne peut être 
avantageux pour les deux puissances et comme j’n’ignore pas Monsieur, que tout doit passer par votre 
canal je vous prie de ne pas negliger vos bons ofices, desquels restant infiniment obligé, j’en conserveray 
une parfaite reconnaissance et en attendant de pouvoir avoir l’honneur de vous le confirmer de bouche 
j’ay colluy. 
Signé, Jean de Bouligny (May 13th, 1779) Bouligny, p. 6 
 
113Carter Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire, p. 56  
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transformation of the central bureaucracy, Reisülküttap had an advantage over the 
others in that the premises of his office expanded he became more prominent than 
Kethuda and Çavuşbaşı. Sultan Mehmed IV presented Grand Vizier Derviş Mehmed 
Paşa with separate establishment known as the Bâbıali. Aksan points out that the first 
consequence of that move was the separation of the public government of the grand 
vizier and his staff from the sultan’s private government and the second was the 
bureaucratization of the chancery branch of the Ottoman administration with this 
separation of the powers.114   
By the end of the 18th century, more than one hundred officials were only 
affiliated to Reisülküttap and the scribal office conducted all foreign affairs. Itzkowitz 
conceptualizes this development with the phrase ‘effendi-turned Paşa.’ Many Reis 
Efendis were promoted to the rank of Paşa and appointed provincial governors as well 
as Grand Viziers in the eighteenth century.  
The really ambitious eighteenth century Ottoman bureaucrat who had 
his heart set on the greatest advancement possible, which would mean 
becoming the Reis Efendi and then perhaps a provincial governor, or 
better still, Grand Vizier, would do well as a starter to secure for himself 
a haceganship under the Reis Efendi. Of the twenty-six men who held 
the office of Reisülküttap from 1697 to 1771, at least sixteen were from 
the central administration.115 
 
Given that Reisülküttap was responsible for all foreign affairs, it does not seem 
astonishing that foreign representatives mistook him for Foreign Minister.  For the 
most part, Reisülküttap had the highest position among the officials with whom foreign 
representatives could negotiate. D’Ohsson defined his position by stating, “The 
Secretary of State Chancellor was at the same time foreign minister”.116  
By sending the first letter, Bouligny initiated the negotiation process and he 
was to expect any response. After a while, he was informed by Chabert that he was 
expected to write an official letter encapsulating the policies and intentions of Spain. 
These convincing clarifications presented economic and political interests of 
respective countries as follows: 
The notes on the effects of Spain for Turkey: cochineal, vermilion seed, 
indigo, saffron, dye bath, sugar, sheets of all grades, fabrics of silk of 
                                                 
114Virginia Aksan, Ahmed Resmi Efendi (1700-1783), pp. 12-13 
 
115Norman Itzkowitz, “Eighteenth Century Ottoman Realities”, p. 88 
 
116“ Tout à la fois ministre des affaires étrangères, secrétaire d'Etat chancelier”. Aksan, pp. 27-28 
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Spain and the Indies, gold and silver gilding, piaster, doubloons and 
later, the other effects in accordance with the time.  
The notes on the effects of Turkey for Spain: cottons, fur of goat, 
mohair, the chevron wool, ammoniac salt, opium, gum tragacanth, 
scarmonee and other fruits and the products of this Empire. 
By the peace between the Ottomans and Spain, a great benefit should 
result for the whole of Turkey, the effects for Spain is offered directly 
by the producer and therefore more cheaply. It will be better 
establishing conduct with the Spaniards by the negotiations. This must 
raise the price of products because brokers raise the price of the thing 
more than it is worth. 117 
 
 Bouligny believed, from the Ottoman point of view, these political and 
commercial interests would attract a great deal of attention and induce the acceptance 
of the treaty offer. Bouligny made reference particularly to the first article118 of the 
agreement signed between the King of the Two Sicilies and the Sublime Porte in 1740, 
aiming to ensure its fulfillment. This article confirms and guarantees the expansion of 
the implication of the treaty for the newly conquered regions and their subjects by the 
King of Two Sicilia and the Ottoman Empire. Bouligny indicates that the king of the 
Two Sicilies, Carlos III ascended to the throne of Spain so that the agreement would 
involve the subjects of Spain. The king of Spain sent the letter testifying to and aiming 
to extend the established friendship. In case of procrastinating in the reception and the 
recognition of the envoy, it would be understood that the Ottoman court did not have 
the same sentiment of amity. Unless the Ottomans opened negotiations, the agreement 
                                                 
117Notte des effects d'Espagne propres pour la Turquie cochenille, graine de vermillon, indigo, safran, 
boix de teinture, sucre, drapts de toutes les qualités, etofes de soye, d'Espagne et des Indes, dorure en or 
et argent, piastres, doblons, et bien d'autres effects que dans la suite du temps pourrait convenir.  
Effects de la Turquie propres pour L'espagne, cottons, en poil et file blanc et rouge, soye, fil de chevre, 
teftick, ou laine de chevron, sel armoniack, opium, gomme adragant,  scarmonee et autres a fruits du 
produit de cet Empire. 
Par la paix entre L’Empire d’Espagne et  L’Empire Ottoman doit resulter un grand profit a toute la 
Turquie puisque pour lors receiront les effets d'Espagne de la première main et par conséquent à meilleur 
compte et par l'establisement des Negociants Espagnols ici il doit augmenter le prix des produits car 
plus d'achepteurs il y a de la chose plus elle vaut. Bouligny, p. 8 
 
118“Devlet-i Aliyye-i ebed miknetim ile Sicilyateyn kralı beyninde inşaallahu teâlâ tasdiknâmesi 
vurûdundan sonra sâ‘ir dost olan Fransa ve İngiltere ve Flemenk ve ba‘dehû İsveç devletleri misüllü 
hâlet ile sulh u salâh akd olunmuştur. Binaenaleyh Devlet-i Aliyye’me tabi‘ memâlik ve eyalât ve ülkât 
ve cezîrelerin re‘âya ve ahâlileri ile kral-ı müşarunileyhe tabi‘ olan zîr u bâlâ-yı Sicilyateyn'nin 
hükümetleri ve mülhakatları olan arazi ve cezîreleri ve kezâlik Toskana'nın şehirleri ve kostalları ve 
arazi ve cezîreleri ve bundan sonra vaktiyle tarafına tabi‘ olan memâlik ve hükümâtın re‘âyaları 
beyninde işbu sulh u salâh mura‘at olunub ve emr-i ticarete dahi sâ‘ir düvele müsâ‘ade olunduğu üzere 
berren ve bahren cevaz virilüp ve emti‘alarının füruhtu ve fırtına ve avârız-ı sâireden mutazarrır olan 
sefayinin tamiri ve kefâf-ı nefisleri için iktiza eden nesnenin akçeleriyle iştira‘sı tarafından câiz oluna.” 
BOA, HAT, 04/Ra/1153, 1428/ 58461. 
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would not be practiced in which case Spain would be dishonoured; this would be a 
disgrace provoking the resentment of Spain. Bouligny did not refrain from using this 
language of intimidation; the Sublime Porte could assure the friendship of Spain, for 
the latter could become the enemy as well in the case of non-agreement. 119  
There is much evidence in the letter to show that the style of writing, the 
language and the content of the letter is extraordinary. The envoy speculated about the 
consequences as if he received a pessimistic response. One can claim he aimed to leave 
a strong impression on the respondents. At the end, he deliberately used the term 
“becoming enemies”, implying the vulnerability of the Empire who had been 
embroiled in a long-term military struggle with its archenemies, Austria and Russia. 
Bouligny aimed to establish alliances against them. His intention was to oblige the 
Ottoman side to decide without haggling over the articles and to sign a treaty as soon 
as possible.  
On May 17th, Chabert visited him while Bouligny was impatiently planning to 
write a letter. As an experienced dragoman, he urged him about the procedure and 
advised him to wait for a while to be able to get information about the reaction of the 
court: “My interpreter informed me about the affairs in the court, only time was needed 
to address the matters.” 120 
One of the salient points in the diary is the delay of the first session in which 
the agreement draft would come up for discussion. Even though the Spanish 
plenipotentiary insisted on accelerating the procedure, the Ottoman side acted slowly 
to find out the intentions behind the offer. The Ottomans frequently sent the dragoman 
to seek responses, and the Ottoman Dragoman, during the meeting, warned Chabert 
not to ask for any response until three or four days had passed.121 Bouligny asked the 
dragoman about the postponement of the negotiations. The Dragoman replied that the 
reason for the delay was none other than the desire to conclude successfully; yet there 
were some procedures, which required time to observe properly. Bouligny complained 
about dilatory tactics, and underlined them in numerous places in his diary.122 Also, he 
                                                 
119Bouligny, pp. 9-10 
 
120Mi interprete me informó del estado de las cosas solo tuve tiempo de apuntar la materia. Bouligny, 
p. 10 
 
121Bouligny, p. 17 
 
122Bouligny, p. 30 
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addressed the issue in his letters to the Spanish court as, “Time is too valuable to be 
lost but it [process] has taken so long.”123 One may assume that as a person responsible 
for the process, he aimed to manifest his enthusiasm by emphasizing his attempts, 
though they had hitherto remained unfruitful.   
Upon not receiving any response to his letters, he asked to be informed clearly 
by the Sublime Porte without any delay, he began to criticize harshly the procedure as 
follows:  
There is no news, just sentences advancing patience and all will be 
perfect, nothing more.124 
As I see, Reis Efendi’s response is delayed, I have spoken firmly to 
make him understand that the behaviour of the Sublime Porte is worse 
than childish. It must be understood that deceiving someone is just 
deceiving oneself. Spain will never allow any power to interrupt the 
negotiation process.125 
Three years passed, the Sublime Porte usually wasted time with 
suggestions, on the contrary to the decorum and dignity of both 
potencies.126 
 
In reply to these audacious declarations, the Ottoman bureaucrats responded in 
pursuance of Ottoman foreign policies. In September, 1780 Bouligny got in touch with 
some friends of Reis Efendi to understand the Ottoman concerns so that he would be 
able to convince him to sign the treaty. They wished to sign a treaty, which 
demonstrated that the Ottomans did not have any enmity against Spain. However, the 
Ottomans could not be obliged to explain the reasons for a likely rejection of a treaty 
with Spain. All this would be accepted as a formal rejection and Bouligny would have 
to return to his country empty-handed. 127 
After some time, Bouligny was informed that the Sublime Porte wanted to 
compromise so Reis Efendi was appointed to supervise the negotiation. Reis Efendi 
clarified the reason of the postponement; he simply did not have time to inquire about 
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124Bouligny, p. 116 
 
125“las respuestas del Reiis Efendi tiran a continuar las largas, le ja jablado con firmeza a fin que le 
hagan entender que el proceder de la Puerta, es peor que el de los niños, que al paso que entienden 
engañar se engañan ellos mismo, y que esto se reduzca a si o no, que no esperan que otras Potencias se 
mesclen del negocio, ni el que la España lo permita”. Bouligny, p. 189 
 
126Que son pasados ya tres años que la S.P me lleva entreteniendo pasandome en palabas cosa bien 
contraria al decoro y dignidad de ambas poterncias. Bouligny, p. 286 
 
127Bouligny, p. 119 
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Bouligny. This, for him, required arranging an agreement draft. He remarked that they 
should agree on a schedule for further negotiations. Needless to say the reason for the 
delay was the Porte’s desire to scrutinize the issue carefully in accordance with the 
balance of diplomacy in Europe.128 
Bouligny was in despair over the conclusion of the agreement as it is stated in 
his diary and he emphasized the difficulties he confronted during the process.129 He is 
careful to point out that every ambassador had to undergo the very same daunting 
procedure; thus, this was not a discrimination against Spain.130 One should conclude 
that the process should last three-year long was not contrary to the norm. There is 
enough evidence to support this claim. For instance, one can observe the same during 
the negotiations with the Polish envoy, Potocki. When he complained about the 
postponement of the signing ceremony, the Porte responded that the agreement process 
with the Swedish envoy had lasted more than two years. Potocki strove approximately 
two years to conclude the negotiations.131 In 1755, the Swedish envoy, Rexin had 
arrived in Constantinople with the aim of offering a peace and trade treaty. Although 
the Sublime Porte did not turn down the offer, it postponed negotiations indefinitely. 
For Rexin, there was no other choice than to return to his country.132 İsmâil Ferruh 
Efendi, the second Ottoman permanent ambassador in London, met with the 
Portuguese envoy, Almieda, to negotiate a treaty ensuring concessions to Portuguese 
merchants. He resorted to the good old Ottoman tactics;133 he delayed the issue forever 
without open rejection. This tactics was almost the gist of the contemporary Ottoman 
diplomacy. In this sense, diplomacy was the weapon of the weak.  
For proper functioning of the negotiation process with foreign representatives 
and the dragomans of the Sublime Porte had important functions. “One of the features 
that distinguished the embassies in Istanbul from all other embassies in the Western 
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130H.S. Ortega, p. 159 
 
131Hacer, Topaktaş, “Dersaadet’te Son Leh Elçisi: Franciszek Piotr Potocki’nin Elçiliği Ekseninde 
Osmanlı-Leh Diplomatik İlişkileri ve Uluslararası Boyutu (1788-1793)”, p. 209 
 
132 Kemal Beydilli, Büyük Friedrich ve Osmanlılar, p. 32 
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capitals was the institution of “dragomans” via whom all transactions with the Sublime 
Porte were carried on; therefore the ambassador had to depend on them for the most 
essential work ”134 The appointment of this crucial job was really problematic. “All 
embassies in Constantinople faced the never-ending problem of finding dragomans 
who would be ‘competent, trustworthy and brave enough’ to risk the consequences of 
transmitting unpalatable messages to the Sultan.”135 Despite all obstacles, Bouligny 
had to deal with the inabilities of his dragomans who functioned as the eyes of the 
envoy in the Sublime Porte. The first dragoman, Chabert’s negligent attitudes caused 
some postponements as it can be seen in the following passage: 
My dragoman came, whose mysterious style in explaining I have not 
been satisfied with.  He said to me the persons he had talked with a few 
days ago were Beylikçi and Tezkireci Efendis. I warned him to convey 
directly what he learned and not to obscure even the slightest thing. 
What I have been so dissatisfied with is that I am the director of this 
mission, I have charged him only to convey correctly what he heard in 
the Sublime Porte. I have to be informed about the news and 
governmental reports so that I can act accordingly.136    
I have written this letter to Ludolf: Senor, I have attached my orders, 
which I had informed M. Chabert by the letter written on 13 March, 
1780. I suppose that he did not put them into practice. You have ordered 
him to support me but he also brushes your orders aside. He may 
terminate his task not to damage my work with his reckless acts.137  
 
Bouligny considered it was necessary to employ someone experienced and 
diligent to mediate. He proposed Talamas, the dragoman of the Hospicio, to take an 
active role in the negotiation on October, 13. Talamas rejected on account that the 
Hospicio was protected by the French ambassador and he was concerned about 
Ottoman spies.138 However, he hinted that he would contribute covertly by conveying 
some messages from the Sublime Porte.139 The case in point demonstrated the 
indispensability of an appointment of an ingenious and resourceful dragoman, Cosimo 
                                                 
134Alexander H. De Groot, “The Dragomans of the Embassies in Istanbul 1785-1834”, Ed. J. H. van 
Gelder,Ed de Moor, Eastward Bound: Dutch Ventures and Adventures in the Middle East, p. 130 
 
135Roland Ruth, Interpreters as Diplomats: A Diplomatic History of the Role of Interpreters in World 
Politics (Perspectives on Translation),  p. 48 
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Comidas de Carbognano, of Armenian origin, who had worked with ambassadors.140 
Bouligny briefly introduced him in his account. He was twenty-five years old, 
knowledgeable in three languages (Turkish, Italian and Latin) and his grandfather was 
decapitated by the Ottomans.141 After Carbognano left his mission, Bouligny deemed 
Talamas more suitable and experienced for conducting this notable negotiation at the 
end. This way, he tried to compensate the delay of the negotiation; the other strategy 
he used was the same as other envoys: presenting gifts to the Ottoman bureaucrats in 
order to get support from the officials.142  
In that century, presenting gifts had a significant place in diplomatic relations. 
The quality and quantity of gifts indicated the status of the countries.143 Foreign envoys 
generally expended their properties to be able to contact the only legal authority they 
could reach, which was Reis Efendi. Presenting gifts was accepted as an Ottoman 
tradition, demonstrating the ambition of the bureaucrats. Naff alleges that the tradition 
aimed to conceal bribery.144 The first Russian envoy, Tolstoy, emphasized Ottomans’ 
excessive addiction to fur which played a convincing role in the relationship and 
negotiation process.145 
Shortly after Bouligny wrote the letters on the political and economic interest 
of both countries, his dragoman conveyed that the Sublime Porte asked him to prepare 
a gift list. Bouligny immediately replied that it would be possible to present gifts, 
approximately forty-two pieces, by the time he received a positive response concerning 
                                                 
140He was also the first dragoman who as a first time penned a book on the Turkish philology namely 
Primi Principi Della Gramatica Turca, ad udo dei missionari apostolici di Constantinople. Antonio 
Jurado Aceituno, “Bir Filolog Olarak Dragoman”, pp. 217-233 Apart from the dragomans, Neapolitan 
chancellor, Marini contributed by comunicating some bureaucrats.  
 
141Bouligny, p. 258 
 
142Saadet Öner, “İsveç Devlet Arşivinde Mahfuz İ.M.D’Ohsson Evrakı Tasnifi ve Tahlili” p. 5 
 
143See Suraiya Faroqhi, Negotiating a Festivity in the 18th century: “İbrahim Paşa and the Marquis de 
Bonnac” in Essays in honour of Ekmeleddin  İhsanoğlu, Volume 1: Societies, cultures, sciences: a 
collection of articles, compiled by Mustafa Kaçar and Zeynep Durukal (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2006), pp. 
279-294, for the discussion between Nevşehirli İbrahim Paşa and French Ambassador, Marquis de 
Bonnac on the determination of the gifts which would be presented to Ahmed III in the circumcision 
feast of his sons. She analyses this micro event by making general observations about the diplomatic 
relations and presenting gift. 
 
144Hacer, Topaktaş, “Dersaadet’te Son Leh Elçisi: Franciszek Piotr Potocki’nin Elçiliği Ekseninde 
Osmanlı-Leh Diplomatik İlişkileri ve Uluslararası Boyutu (1788-1793)” p. 83, 150 
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the signing of the treaty.146 At the first section with Reis Efendi, he was asked to give 
gifts to the servants in the residence, as was the custom. Bouligny realized the 
significant role of gifts and he gave some gifts to Tezkereci and Amedî Efendis aiming 
to ensure their support.147     
According to Bouligny, the support of Captain Paşa (Cezayirli Hasan Paşa) 
who was the most influential character among the Ottoman bureaucrats was required. 
The navy was rebuilt under the leadership of one of the few Ottoman heroes to emerge 
out from the battle of Cheshme, Hasan Paşa. He was appointed as Kapudan-ı Derya in 
1774 and remained nearly fifteen years in the office during the reign of Abdulhamid 
I.148 Captain Paşa’s prestige in the eyes of the Sultan and his influence on the 
administration staff had attracted the attention of historians. The relevant literature lays 
emphasis on his influence over Sultan Abdulhamid I as follow: “Abdulhamid I had 
been pleased with Hasan Paşa by consulting him on essential issues. His reference also 
had importance to contact some people.”149   
Uzunçarşılı points out that there was a power struggle between Hasan Paşa and 
Halil Hamid Paşa, that ended with the discharging of the Grand Vizier being accused 
of plotting against Abdulhamid I.150 This event strengthened the position of Hasan 
Paşa in the court.151 Hasan Paşa was not willing to be grand vizier, as a matter of fact 
that he was practically acting upon real authority by controlling the appointed viziers. 
However, the defeat of Özü (Ochakiv) in 1788 fell him from favour as the Sultan lost 
confidence in him.152  
                                                 
146“des la signature de la paix vous pouvais compter sur les environs quarante deux bourses que suivant 
que vous m'avez témoigne.seront nécessaires pour les présents que d'usage se font ici lors d'un Pareill 
événement.” Bouligny, p. 10 
 
147“I assured them to give eight presents to Tezkereci Efendi and four presents to Amedi Efendi.” 
Boulingy, p. 47 He had to ask for additional budget on December,5 1779. Bouligny, p. 55 
 
148Castrillo, p. 100, Stanford Shaw, Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 
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Hasan Paşa was the second most mentioned name after Reis Efendi who was 
mentioned more than a hundred times in the diary. It seems reasonable to say that the 
Spanish envoy attached a considerable degree of importance to Hasan Paşa whom he 
called Captain Paşa. He assumed that Hasan Paşa favoured an agreement with Spain.153 
At the moment of his arrival, Captain Paşa was not present in Constantinople, but he 
returned on October 13th. Bouligny requested an appointment immediately so as to 
explain his mission to this man of consequence. Bouligny was very hopeful about the 
outcome of the meeting since Captain Paşa had assured him that he would cooperate 
to bring the process to a successful end.154 The dragoman, Chabert was of the same 
opinion as Bouligny, considering the great influence of Captain Paşa over the Ottoman 
bureaucrats. The dragoman had sought for his participation in the negotiations. It 
seems very interesting that Bouligny rated several individuals in his diary based on 
their efficiency in the decision-making process, e.g. Captain Paşa: 35%, Reis 40%, Baʸ 
15%155 and the Dragoman 20%. 
Even though Bouligny had mostly focused on the peace process, he did not 
forget to note some information about the situations and the events that had a great 
effect on the process.156 Especially, he noted the appointments of Sadrazams, Reis 
Efendis or Beylikçi, determinant figures in decision-making and in the progress of the 
negotiations.157 Throughout his mission in Constantinople, he witnessed frequent 
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154Bouligny, p. 55 
 
155Unfortunately I could not indentify “Baʸ” due to the illegible letters.   
 
156This information covers very little proportion of the diary in comparison to the letters he sent after 
his appointment as a first ambbasador. The letters written by Bouligny turned into a chronic for the 
Ottoman history after 1782. H.S.Ortega, p. 162   
 
Almost all the documents are entitled as above. These letters are located in the Archivo National de 
Madrid. Some of them are used in this study but the abundance of the letters requires further research.  
 
157 Sadrazam, Kalafat Mehmet Paşa was dismissed on August, 22,1779 Silahdar Karavezir Seyyid 
Mehmed Paşa was appointed in his stead. Abdurrezzak Bahir Efendi was removed on October, 12, 1780 
and Süleyman Feyzi Efendi took over only to be dismissed on November, 17, 1781. Bouligny, p. 40, 
124, 241  
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changes in the administration staff, and he was preoccupied with the factional rivalries 
in the Sublime Porte.158      
As understood from the diary, Bouligny was not only preoccupied with the 
instability and frequent promotions and demotions in bureaucracy, as an impediment 
to the process. Also, he emphasized the fires in Constantinople, most frequently 
threatening the social and economic order. The fires were other distracters in the 
process because of the urgencies calling for the political centre’s attention. The 
catastrophic dimensions of the fires occurred during the reign of Abdulhamid I, and 
this can be seen in the “Fire Pamphlet” (Hârîk Risâlesi written by Derviş Efendi-Zade 
derviş Mustafa Efendi 1782), a unique source written on the fires of that period. For 
the duration of April, 1779 to September 1782, approximately ten major fire events 
occurred. As foreign ambassadors and travellers showed great interest in recording the 
fires, it is not extraordinary that Bouligny took notice of three extensive fires:159  
On 4 August, 1779: The frequent fire incidents devastating wide areas 
in the city indicate dissatisfaction of the society against the court.160 
On 22 April, 1781: The fire in Constantinople, from eight in the 
morning until four in the evening, devastated more than 2100 houses, 
some of them had been very large.161 
On 10 July, 1782: There is a persistent fire so that I cannot find anyone 
to deliver my letter.162 
 
The fire was used as a symbol signifying the opposition of some people, and 
this overlaps with the practical interests of low-income people in certain ways. The 
plundering of the houses sustains the unemployed who can also easily find jobs after 
the fire in the reconstruction business.163  
                                                 
158Three Reis Efendis (Abdurrezzak Bahir, Süleyman Feyzi, Seyyid Mehmet Hayri) and five Grand 
Viziers (Kalafat Mehmet Paşa, Karavezir Seyyid Mehmed, İzzed Mehmed Paşa, Yeğen Seyyid 
Mehmet, Halil Hamid Paşa) were appointed within just three years.  
 
159Fikret Sarıcaoğlu, pp. 234-237 
 
160Bouligny, p. 39 
 
161Bouligny, p. 188 
 
162Bouligny, p. 286 The first fire occured in Aksaray, the latter one occured in Ahırkapısı and the third 
spread throughout the old city in Hicrî, 13 Şaban 1196. 
 
163Garrigues, p. 119, Gravina, p. 69 Gravina also describes the common features of the Ottoman houses 
and finds them vulnurable to fire. He makes the point that the unemployed was not always the suspect 
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Foreign members and the dragomans witnessed these fires but they did not 
really suffer from them, as they mostly preferred to live in distant neighbourhoods 
such as Pera located on a hill with the complete view of the old city. We can say that 
Bouligny was a part of this peculiar lifestyle, which was an isolated and boring one, 
and the representatives had assembled a meeting nearly once a week to exchange the 
information obtained.164 For Bouligny, this network with the Europeans gave him the 
chance to obtain information about Ottoman domestic and foreign policies. Aiming to 
understand the present situation, he frequently visited the ambassadors of the 
Neapolitan court and France.165 Bouligny kept in sight the relations between the 
Ottomans and Western countries, Russia, and French. He requested to participate in 
the private audience between Reis Efendi and the Russian envoy that came to present 
gifts upon the treaty of Aynalıkavak, signed on March 21, 1779.166 He noted some 
explanations about the relations between the Ottomans and Russia as follows: 
The very interesting information about the diplomatic interaction of 
Constantinople at this time: "it has spread that the Court of Russia has 
not approved the deal made in previous December which was to 
establish the General Consul, Lascarof, in Moldova and Valachia. 
French ambassador mediated the negotiations which did not accord to 
the Ottoman court. Then the Minister of Russia, refused to ratify due to 
dissatisfaction with the agreement and discharged Staquief and 
immediately after he appointed another person who is defined as a firm 
and resolute character. He would arrive within May.167 
 
Bouligny was concerned with the operations of the Polish envoys aiming to 
sign a treaty of peace and trade with the Ottomans. It was a secret that the Polish 
envoys, Boscamp, subsequently Dzieduszycki and Mayor D’ote had been endeavoring 
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165Me apliqué a tomar noticias relativas a la politica de este ministre. Bouligny, p. 51 
 
166Bouligny, p. 28 Crimean issue was temporaly solved with this treaty guarantying the recognition of 
legitimacy of Şahin Giray as a ruler of Crimea by the Ottomans. Virginia Aksan, Ahmet Resmi Efendi, 
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167Información muy interesante sobre la interacción diplomatica del Constantinopla de la epoca “ Se ha 
esparcido la vos, de que la Corte de Rusia no ha aprovado, la transaccion que este Enviado hizo en 
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en cuyo assumpto, promedió el Embaxador de Francia, haziendo adherir Staquief, a la transaccion no 
del todo conforme a los desdeos de su Corte, y haziendose cargo dicho Embaxador de escrivir al 
Ministro de Rusia, para que lo aprovasen el Ministro de Rusia le ha respondido nada satisfecho, y a su 
Enviado le ha concedido el retiro que pedia antes, concediendole una leve pension; y ha nombrado otro, 
que dizen ser de un caracter firme y resuelto, y que llegará a esta por todo Mayo.Bouligny, pp. 186-187. 
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to sign a treaty under the protection of Russia so as to enhance trade potentials of 
Prusia and Russia.168  
Not only did he observe Ottoman diplomacy through the lens of foreign 
representatives, but he also struggled to prevent negotiations with the Sublime Porte 
from any interruption from the European countries. According to the British 
ambassadorial reports and the account of priest Dallaway, Constantinople was one of 
the prominent diplomatic centres. The city had been a strategic position as a 
commercial market and in terms of the balance of power for the European countries. 
What the European powers had always expected from their diplomatic missionaries 
was the protection of their interests and the acquisition of new benefits.169 The network 
of foreign ambassadors in Constantinople was crucially important in terms of the 
protection of interests of respective countries. Most embassies sent their interpreters 
daily to the Sublime Porte to observe the course of events.170  
Kemal Beydilli underlines the relations of the foreign members in an example 
where Kont Beaujeu demanded protection from the Ottomans on behalf of Corsica and 
he confronted the interventions of many countries. The ambassador of Naples, 
Chevalier Majo, the ambassador of Holland, Calkoen, the Austrian ambassador 
Penckler and the ambassador from Venice informed their countries about this 
development which suddenly turned into an international issue.171 On some occasions, 
these interventions impeded the process as seen in the Swedish case.  In 1755, Rexin 
aimed to negotiate with the Sublime Porte, yet the activities of the Austrian and French 
ambassadors affected the negotiations, ensuring they would not be completed 
successfully.172 Another example is the story of Dutch extraordinary ambassador 
Cornelius Haga who was sent to Istanbul to negotiate the capitulations. Despite 
obvious opposition from the French, English and Venetian ambassadors, Haga was 
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able to achieve his goal.173 Since this case was known, the ambassadors were usually 
warned against the adversities and the interventions of other ambassadors. The envoy 
from Poland, Potocki, was warned to be very cautious, advised against confiding in 
anyone. He was to contact only the Swedish ambassador whose activities would be 
followed carefully.174 The British foreign secretary, Lord Grantham, in a dispatch, had 
instructed Robert Ainslie to act as a perfect friend to the Russian ambassador in 
Constantinople.175 One can say that the most fundamental stage in undertaking a 
mission in Constantinople was organizing a proper atmosphere in which the envoy was 
able to achieve his goal. 
Because of the above-mentioned reasons, Bouligny was careful against the 
interventions of the French and the Neapolitan ambassadors. He had to contend with 
the opposition of the ambassadors of other European powers.176  His dragoman had 
been tracking whether the French ambassador was informed about the latest 
developments on August, 3.177 After three months, Bouligny noted: 
On November 16, my dragoman told that he was informed by an 
anonymous witness about the activities of French ambassador. He 
wants to disrupt my plan and to make opposition to the negotiations. 
Now, I have realized that this was the reason of the postponement of 
the process.178  
 
One of the fundamental factors disrupting the negotiation process was the 
objection of the French ambassador, Saint-Priest, as understood from the diary and 
dispatches.179 The major contender was France who was anxious about the expansion 
of Spanish network of trade.180 By mid-century, the French were proud that they had 
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Bouligny, pp. 91-92 
 
54 
 
effectively conquered the market, with a share of over 65 % against a mere 15 %, 3 % 
and 16 % for the English, Dutch and Venetians, respectively.181 France interrupted the 
process with the aim of preserving its hegemony over Ottoman trade as Bouligny 
noted. France was not the only opponent, Naples also tried to curtail the independence 
of Spanish diplomacy as quoted below:182 
On March 18, 1780 I had meeting in the Neapolitan ambassador, 
Ludolf’s mansion. Then, he gave me a note which was dismissive. His 
attitude, his families’ and servants ‘behaviour, which I have never seen 
before, made me confused extremely. However, I have to be prudent 
not to cause any scandal.183 
 
Bouligny complains about the Neapolitan ambassador Ludolf who acted as if 
he were in charge of negotiating on behalf of Spain while his duty was simply to 
mediate between the two powers. Bouligny, aiming to strengthen his authority among 
these ambassadors, emphatically indicated his responsibility and said they could 
participate in the negotiations as much as he would let them. On the basis of the 
statements repeated in the diary, it can be alleged that Bouligny defended himself 
against any possibility of forthcoming complaints by the Spanish court: “I am the sole 
and legitimate person to deal with the cases regarding to the Court of Spain. That must 
be understood.”184 
Bouligny speaks openly without concealing his sentiments and considerations 
about this ambassador in the passage written on December 14, 1780. The aim of Ludolf 
was to scrutinize the activities of Bouligny; yet he did not have the slightest idea how 
to reach conclusion. Ludolf position was ready to praise the Sublime Porte. Ludolf had 
thought since the inception of his mission in Constantinople that Bouligny could not 
achieve to sign a treaty. Bouligny underlines his perseverance on this issue as follows: 
As it is my duty, I have to struggle against all difficulties I may confront 
with. If I cannot accomplish this, it will be seen as my inability or 
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183 “En la noche  de este dia estando en el palacio de Napoles. El Enviado al salir de quarto de la 
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94-95 
 
184je suis la persone unique et legitime pour traiter les affaires qui regardent la Cour de Espagne que 
c’est uniquement avec moi qu’elle doit s’entendre. Bouligny, p. 123 
 
55 
 
clumsiness by Spanish court -that I will not achieve any result. Nearly 
four months passed but still we have been waiting for incoming and 
outgoing letters. In this period, we have witnessed various questions 
obstructing the negotiation process. I am the person who is responsible 
for all issues. I had to be careful about Ludolf. Since December, I have 
consulted with him five times, however he did not give any idea to 
conclude a treaty with Spain.185 
 
On the one hand, Bouligny dealt with the interventions of the French and 
Neapolitan ambassadors, on the other, he did not refrain from cooperating with some 
foreign representatives having relations with the Sublime Porte. The first example is 
the Swedish dragoman, Muragia (Ignatius Mouradgea d’Ohsson) who reported that 
Sweden was not opposed to the negotiations in political and commercial aspects. 
Muragia was the son-in law of Kuleli who was of Armenian origins. He was well 
informed about all Ottoman bureaucrats and foreigners, especially the French.186 
Bouligny was in contact with him as it can be confirmed in the dispatches of 
d’Ohsson.187 Some documents located in the Ottoman archives prove that d’Ohsson 
was in the favour of a treaty between Spain and the Sublime Porte and that he mediated 
in the process.188 He aimed to get benefits by mediating between Spain and the 
Sublime Porte.  
                                                 
185“el que siempre quería saber de mi, sin darme en jamas la menor idea relativa al exito, que bien al 
contrario, siempre le vehia dispuesto a aplaudir las largas de este Ministerio, que siguiendo su dictament 
en jamas veriamos el fin, y que habiendmoe embiado la Corte a este objeto, era de mi dever el venzer 
las dificultades, porque si a cada una, que pueda ocurrir, me parece y diese parte, con razón me tendria 
en mi Corte por un inepto, y ademas resultaria el nunca concluir, porque entre van y vienen las cartas, 
pasan quatro meses, y en el intermedio ocurren novedades que hazen ineficazes las resoluciones, sobre 
lo que uno expone, que por tant siendo yo el encargado de la Negociacion es a mi a referile lo que halle 
apropiado que haya, pues soi el responsable de mis acciones, que no obtante ha observado que siempre  
le he tratado con la debida attention, que he estado con el mas de quince vezes desde noviembre: que 
nunca me ha dado menor idea”, Bouligny, pp. 156-157 
 
186Bouligny, pp. 111-112 
 
187Saadet Öner,  pp. 163-167, İmparatorluğun meşalesi: XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun 
Genel Görünümü ve Ignatius Mouradgea d’Ohsson = The Torch of the Empire: Ignatius Mouradgea 
d’Ohsson and the tableau general of the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century,  p. 29 
 
188“İsveç kralı büyük İspanya kralının devlet-i ebed-müddet ile ‘akd-i sulha murahhas gönderdiğini 
istimâ‘ ve el altından kendi maslahatgüzârına ne işler isen işle Devlet-i aliyyeyi İspanyalu ile ‘akd-i 
sulha tergîb eyle. Zira İspanyalu Âsitane-i devlet-i âşiyâneden sulh ümidini kat‘ eylediği halde beher 
hâl Moskovlu ile ‘akd ittifâk ider. Septe Boğazı ellerinde ve bî-nihâye sefâyine mâlik böyle bir devleti 
Moskovlu kendulere müttefik ittikleri halde iş pek müşkil olur dimiş olmağla İsveç maslahatgüzârı 
kendü tercümânı Muratcayı tercümânlık bahânesiyle murahhasın ma‘iyyetine terfîk itmişdi..” CH 
89/4420 (29/Z /1255) This document is dated 1255H.,(1840 Miladî),  but the content is related to the 
our study. In order to prevent misunderstanding, it can be said that document is registered incorrectly. 
http://katalog.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/osmanli/arsiv.aspx (Access date:09/09/2014) 
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The second example is the Russian ambassador who visited Bouligny with the 
aim of giving advices for trade in the Black Sea. The goods available in Spain were 
listed as high quality wine, olives, figs, almonds, silk garments, precious fabrics, etc. 
in the diary. Russia had capacity to export cannabis and Siberian iron. Bouligny asked 
for a report that concisely presented the objectives of Russia.189 There was no other 
note about this meeting but it seems plausible to correlate this event with the 
negotiations on the opening of the Black Sea to foreign shipping in 1803.  
The Black Sea region was experiencing economic growth, together with the 
right political conditions in place. These developments fortified the importance of 
transporting trade goods from the Russian Black Sea region to Italy, Spain, Portugal 
and southern France.190 After Russia granted some concessions in 1783, Sicily, 
Holland, Sweden and Spain also tried to obtain concessions in this region.191 Beydilli 
remarks the influence of Russia on the opening of the Black Sea to Spanish shipping. 
On the basis of the diary and Bouligny’s meeting in which he negotiated about 
reciprocal trade with the Russian ambassador, it does not seem unexpected that Russia 
would support feverishly Spain on this issue after approximately ten years.192 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
189Boulingy, p. 110 
 
190Elena Frangakis-Syrett, “Market Networks and Ottoman-European Commerce 1700-1825, Oriente 
Moderno, Nuova serie, Anno 25 (86), Nr. 1, The Ottomans And Trade(2006), pp. 109-128 
 
191Kemal Beydilli, “Karadeniz’in Kapalılığı Karşısında Avrupa Küçük Devletleri ve Miri Ticaret 
Teşebbüsü”, p. 689,704 
 
192Spain was able to get concession in 1803: “İspanya sefinelerinin bahr-ı mezkurda kain Rusya li 
manlarına amed-şüdlerine ruhsat ü cevaz verüp ancak haşmetli ispanya kralı dahi bil-mukabele 
memalik-i mahruseye Karakuruş götürmek üzere kendi tüccarlarına sipariş etmek ve götürecekleri 
Karakuruşlar ahar tarafa verilmeyip darphane-i amireye rayic-i vakt üzere tebdil ettirmeğe taife-yi 
tüccarı ibram ü ilzam edecekti.”Beydilli, ibid, p. 708 
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CHAPTER IV: BOULIGNY’S UPHILL TASK: THE NEGOTIATIONS 
ON THE INTERESTS OF TWO GREAT POWERS 
 
 
After the mid-seventeenth century, production decrease and economic 
recession increasingly exacerbated incomes of the Ottoman court, forcing it into a 
vicious circle caused by defeats in wars. Harsh conditions made it essential to increase 
importation from European countries to be able to sustain qualified ammunition for 
ongoing wars, especially in the mid-eighteenth century.193 After the 1740s, the 
Ottoman lands, gradually involved in the international market for commodities, 
became the destination for colonial goods coming from the New World.194 Ahdname, 
the document, which ensures some concessions of expedition, trade and residence in 
the Ottoman territory for some countries, groups and persons enabled this intense trade 
exchanges.195 
The eighteenth century witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of foreign 
powers that applied to the Sublime Porte for granting of commercial privileges 
(ahdname) for their subjects. In 1718 the Habsburg Emperor was granted capitulations, 
and Sweden followed in 1737. Three years later, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies 
obtained its own ahdname. Also in 1740, France acquired considerable extensions of 
privileges with the renewal of its capitulations. In 1747 the subjects of Tuscany were 
accorded trade privileges in the Levant, while Denmark got its own capitulations in 
1746. Fifteen years later, Prussia was granted an ahdname. Russia entered the system 
in 1774 after the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca.196 One may draw attention to the absence 
of Spain, one of the latest countries competing to extend their own trade capacities in 
Levant. Spanish plenipotentiary, Juan de Bouligny began to negotiate with the aim of 
obtaining privileges given to other European countries. 
                                                 
193Mehmet Genç, Devlet ve Ekonomi, pp. 218-219 
 
194McGowen, “The Age of the Ayans, 1699–1812”, p. 727 
 
195Mübahat Kütükoğlu, “Ahidnâme”, pp. 536-540, Sn. Inayatullah, “Amân”, Encyclopedia of Islam, v.I, 
p. 430 
 
196Maurits H. van den Boogert, The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System: Qadis Consuls and 
Beratlıs in the 18th century, p. 10 
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 Not only was the Ottoman side concerned with economic difficulties but also 
Ottoman trade privileges given to the West became tools of political negotiation. The 
Ottomans tried to procure allies by granting trade privileges.197 It seems reasonable 
that the bureaucrats realized the importance of an alliance against archenemies, Russia 
and Austria, and attempted to cooperate with Poland and Sweden. During that era, 
Poland was strategically in an important position as a buffer that divided Russia from 
Austria.198 Also, Sweden was an important ally against the common enemy Russia due 
to which reason the agreement was signed between two powers.199 The Ottomans were 
increasingly inclined to ally Prussia especially after the outbreak of the Ottoman-
Russian War.200  
 As seen in the aforementioned examples Russian threats facilitated the 
persuasion of the Ottoman side to make a deal with certain European powers. In 1770, 
one of the greatest Russian navies under the command of Kont Orlov began to move 
towards the Aegean Sea, passing through the Mediterranean. Britain, contemplating to 
enhance trade relations with Russia, provided military and logistical assistance. The 
Ottoman Empire had had no awareness until the French ambassador reported that the 
British navy assisted Russia so that it could arrive to the Ottoman marine shelf. After 
the discussions in the court, it was decided to take precautions, but this decision was 
practiced due to the fact that the Russian journey would last a long time.201 This 
negligence cost the Ottomans the destruction of a large proportion of its navy in 
Chesma on 5–7 July 1770. “The news of the worst military disaster ever suffered by 
the Ottomans arrived in Istanbul simultaneously with the news of the complete 
destruction of the Ottoman navy at Chesma.”202 
Ongoing Russian menace had compelled the Ottoman bureaucrats to begin 
negotiations with the Spanish plenipotentiary, as follows: 
                                                 
197Fatma Müge Göçek, East encounters west : France and the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth 
Century, p. 30 
 
198Hacer Topaktaş, p. 171 
 
199Fatih Yeşil, Aydınlanma Çağında Bir Osmanlı Kâtibi Ebubekir Râtib Efendi (1750-1799), p. 386 
 
200Beydilli, Büyük Friedrich, p. 97 
 
201Nimet Akdes Kurat, p. 26 
 
202 Aksan, Ottoman Wars, p. 154 
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Civan Polini, charged with signing a treaty with the Sublime Porte, has 
frequently asked for some explicit response to his proposal for nearly 
three years. For a long time it was preferred neither to refuse nor accept. 
This attitude made him pessimistic about the completion of this 
procedure. If the plenipotentiary returns to his country, the disappointed 
Spanish court may want to ally Russia against the Ottomans. Also, they 
may provide assistance to the Maltese and Genoese pirates. Another 
threat is that they may attack Muslim ships travelling to Egypt and 
Arabian Peninsula.203  
 
Juan de Bouligny, after meeting with the Russian ambassador, Bulgakov noted 
the point mentioned in the diary that the conflicts between the Sublime Porte and 
Russia had great importance in Ottomans-Spain relations.204 Then he dispatched a 
letter stating that he expected the signing a treaty, otherwise he would return to his 
country. Though Ottoman bureaucrats realized the inevitability of concluding an 
agreement with Spain, they pursued policy based on cautious diplomacy in the 
negotiation process in order not to provoke hostility; we will turn to this subject in the 
following. 
The Ottoman side intentionally extended the process to be able to increase the 
odds. Beydilli points out that the Ottoman diplomatic language reflected temporization 
based on ambiguous and deceptive statements that concealed the real purpose in the 
case of necessity. The interesting point is that the diplomats had to act in this manner 
with no qualms in order to conform to the established norms of contemporary 
European politics.205 This is corroborated with the evidence on the negotiations prior 
to the conclusion of the Treaty of Karlowitz.  “The Sultan’s representatives under the 
                                                 
203 Büyük İspanya kralı tarafından Devlet-i aliyyeye akd-i musâlaha için Dersaadete ib‘âs olunan Civan 
Polini nâm murahhas üç seneye bâliğ derbâr-ı adâlet-karârda ikâmet eylediği ve bu husûs için birkaç 
def‘a ricâlar Devlet-i ebed-müddet akd meclîs-i şûra birle her birinde mesfûrun ye’s ile  i‘âdesi bir türlü 
câiz olmadığına binâen hakimâne müdâfa‘a ve imrâr-ı evkâta sa‘i olmasını enseb idüğinini beyân 
eyledikleri ve murahhas-ı mersûm bir türlü mücâb olmayıb ya budur ki sulh imkânda olmayacağını bana 
kat‘î cevâb verirsiz yahûd Ragıp Paşa sadâretinde tesvîr  olunduğu üzere küçük İspanya şurûtu gibi 
‘ahd-i muhâdene râbıta-pezîr olur kelâmında ısrâr ve defa‘ât ile kapuya takârîr-i ‘adîde tisyâr edib 
mersûm me’yûsen gittiği takdirde la-muhale zül ve hakâreti İspanyolu mütehammil olmayub Moskovlu 
ve Nemçeli ile aleyhimize râbıta ittifâk edecekleri ve bundan fazla Malta ve Ceneviz korsanlarına i‘ânet 
ve beş on kıta sefîne terfîk ve Akdeniz sularına irsâl ile Mısır ve sevâhil-i Arabistân câniblerine gidib 
gelen sefîne-i İslamiyeyi izrâra ibtidâr ve bir gâile ihdâs eyleyecekleri zâhir aşikâr olduğundan … BOA, 
CH 89/4420 (29/Z /1255) This document dated 1255 is related to the Spanish plenipotentiary in 
Constantinople in 1782 so I preferred to use it in this context. 
 
204“Voces que anuncian ruptura entre esta y la Rusia de gran importancia en las relaciones hispano-
otomanas.” Bouligny, p. 232 
 
205Kemal Beydilli, “Dış Politika ve Ahlak”, p. 50 
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chairmanship of Başdefterdar Rami Mehmed Efendi, demonstrated a broader 
knowledge of Europe, a greater capacity for judicious compromise, and a more 
sophisticated application of diplomatic precedents.”206 
The Sublime Porte responded to the first letter of Juan de Bouligny presenting 
the economic and political benefits of the treaty as below:  
I am (Bouligny) honoured to respond to you that the political system of 
the Ottoman Empire is not only concerned with commercial benefits 
and political principles but also with maximum available gains, as in 
the case of any agreement signed. The High Sublime Porte is by now 
one of the most secure points in good intelligence and perfect harmony 
with all the powers of Europe. Nevertheless the very wisdom of the 
minister of this great empire is widely recognized, and it is known he 
does not lose sight of the cases that have the possibly of taking place in 
the future, this has been as such during the remote ages, and possible 
precautions have always been taken… While the friendship among the 
Emperors, my august Master, and his Catholic Majesty personally 
remains the same as before, we can strengthen this friendship further by 
means of a solemn and authentic instrument that cannot be carried out 
without an important agreement. It is stipulated that to be able to engage 
with the Ottomans it is expected not to give way and not to allow 
maritime forces or any power to pass through the Strait of Gibraltar. If 
the Authorized plenipotentiary has full authority to sign for the passage 
of this way and these conditions are met in full, we can start negotiating 
as wanted by the Spanish court. There is no other means by which this 
treaty will be signed.207 
                                                 
206Rifa'at Abou el Hac, “Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz”, p. 499 
 
207
j'ai l'honneur de vous repondre que le système politique de la Sublime Porte n'etant uniquement 
fondée sur le commerce et la base essentiel de ces principes politiques tenant d'autres vues superieures. 
toutes les fois qu'elle se trouve dans le cas de conclure quelque traitté elle part des maximes dont le bout 
ne regarde pas seulement le gain et le profit concerning du commerce mais plus tot des utilites d'un 
autre genre par preferance. grâces autres haut la Sublime Porte a l'heure qu'il est se voit dans la plus 
grande securité etant en bonne inteligence parfaite harmonie avec toutes les puissances de L'europe. est 
néanmoins de la sagesse du ministre très éclairé de ce grand empire. de ne pas perdre de vue les cas qui 
pourraient arriver à l'avenir, fut ce dans les siècles les plus éloignés et d’user des precautions possibles 
et comme par le passé l'on a vu qu'une flotte penetrant la Mediterranee aurait peu engager la Sublime 
Porte aussi d'armer pour proteger et defendre ces vastes possesions dans l'archipel, cet example la fait 
souhaiter de mettre des ormais un empechement a ce la, L'occassion de la mision de parait des plus 
favorables a remplir ce desir. certes L'amitié entre l'empereur mon auguste Maitre et sa Majeste 
Catholique personellement subsiste au meme pie qu'auparavant, mais si l'on s'avisera de cementer cette 
amitié par le moyen d'un instrument solemnel et autentique, cela ne saurait s'effectuer qu'en y passant 
un article par le quel sa M. Catholique s'engagera a ne pas donner psaage et a ne permettre aux forces 
maritimes d'aucune puissance de passer le detroit de Gibraltar autrement Sebte Bogas y pour atenter 
aux forces et possessions imperiales de la Sublime Porte si le dit plenipotenciere est authorisé ayant le 
plein pouvoir de traitter de cette façon et a ces conditions et peut y satisfaire pleinement, on pourra 
entamer cette negotiation desireé par la cour d'Espagne on ne voit pas pour le present aucun autre 
moyen. Bouligny, pp. 19-21 
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The letter above explicitly states that the conclusion of a peace and trade 
agreement was contingent on Spain’s commitment to close the Gibraltar to the 
warships of the enemies of the Ottoman Empire. This was the first article discussed by 
two sides in the negotiations. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, Gibraltar 
was under the occupation of Britain since the Succession War and Spain had no power 
to exercise control over this water channel. During the American War of Independence 
(1779-1783), Spanish attempts to recover Gibraltar had been defeated utterly. The 
Ottomans were well-informed about the affair and they expected Spain would deal a 
blow to Britain in the New World. One can sympathize with the expectation of the 
Ottoman bureaucrats, but the outcome was dispiriting.  Spain could not achieve to 
regain the control of Gibraltar. It seems reasonable that Juan de Bouligny declined to 
give assurances regarding this issue but the Ottomans would frequently express this as 
a precondition to the signing of the agreement.  
On one hand, Bouligny tried to persuade the Ottomans on the advantages of 
the proposed treaty with his numerous letters, ensuring the consolidation of amity 
between the two powers and securing mutual trade privileges. On the other hand, he 
tried to fulfil all prerequisites to convince the Ottomans to open formal negotiations. 
He was informed he had to write a formal letter to the vizier. Grand vizier since his 
approval was required in the process.  Actually, Bouligny’s interlocutor was the 
dragoman of the Sublime Porte, Nicolaki de Caraggia with whom he was in contact. 
The plenipotentiary endeavoured to convince the dragoman on the advantages of the 
treaty and had been asking him to request a private meeting with Reis Efendi for a long 
time. In their meetings, the dragoman ensured Bouligny about his good intentions in 
managing the diplomatic process since he was convinced in the benefits of an 
agreement. He promised to arrange a meeting with Reis Efendi as soon as possible.208  
In approximately four months, Bouligny achieved to meet with Reis Efendi 
who asked the Sultan for permission, as stated briefly below: 
It would be better not to respond negatively to the Spanish 
plenipotentiary concerning his proposal for an agreement with the 
Spanish court. It would be prudent to respond that the conjuncture is 
not appropriate for the agreement.  The Sublime Porte may ask the 
release of Muslim captives as in the case of Tuscany. The 
plenipotentiary many times sent letters to request a meeting with Reis 
Efendi. In order to prevent hostility of Spain, it would be required to 
                                                 
208Bouligny, p. 68 
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arrange a meeting with the plenipotentiary in the mansion of Reis 
Efendi.209   
 
On 4 September 1779 Bouligny conveyed the expectations of his court to the 
Reis Efendi in the first meeting.  The plenipotentiary recorded these in eight points in 
in his memoirs as follows: 
1. I have no doubt that the current circumstances have prevented 
you from granting me this interview earlier otherwise it would harm the 
superiority of your wisdom. 
2. Since the beginning of this era, the time of difficulties, we have 
come together with you, a minister of the Great Lord and myself 
plenipotentiary of my august master. As ministers of peace, we should 
bring this situation to an end, in the most beneficial and glorious 
manner, for the sake of both empires. 
3. The Inscription that the Sublime Porte gave to me via his primer 
Dragoman on the twentieth of the previous month was political repulse 
that was correspondence of the amity and sincerity to my August Lord. 
4. If the feelings of Sublime Porte are true and sincere, 
undoubtedly there are few reasons which may prevent the peace so it 
can not publish in these days, you can of course suspend the 
publication of the conclusion in two weeks or a month. 
5. This case is very simple in nature since the article was 
established by the treaty with Naples formed in the time of Sultan 
Mustafa. It would be better to look into the treaty. 
6. I came here with good faith that the Sublime Porte would 
correspond to my August Master with good faith, it does not matter to 
interrupt the conclusion by inadmissible conditions. The Sublime Porte 
could not show a single irruption against the Spanish forces since the 
happy time of year 1740 and the Turks have not been 
enslaved therefore. 
7. Peace is so favourable to the happiness of the public that for the 
conclusion never put any obstacle as well as the Sublime Porte has 
always followed with all other powers far from fearing the public 
adversities. We must flatter otherwise the point of political reason that 
could impede the completion of so beneficial deal because I do not 
come here to make a new peace instead to complete the first article of 
the treaty with Naples.  
                                                 
209“Şevketlü Kudretlü Kerametlü Adaletlü Velinimetim Efendim, 
Devlet-i Aliyye ebed-kıyâmlarıyla akd-i muhâdene ve musâfât ricası muhtevî İspanya kralının Der 
aliyyeye murahhas gönderdiği kimesnenin ve Sicilyâteyn elçisinin takrîrleri ricâl-i saltanat-ı seniyyeleri 
hâzır oldukları hâlde kırâ‘at olunmak mülâbesesiyle mesfûrlara külliyen ye’s cevabı verilmeyib üslûb-
ı hâkim ile şimdilik bu maddenin mevsimi olmadığını ve Toşkana dukasıyla rabıta-ı mu‘âhede 
olundukda duka-yı mezbûr bir mikdâr isâre-yi müslimîni itlâk ... Reis Efendi kullarıyla mahfîyce 
mülâkât niyâz eylediklerini ihbâr ider ricâmend oldukları mülâkât kaziyyesine müsâ‘ade gösterilmese 
kavâid-i  düvele menâfi olduğundan başka kralı mezburun iğbirâr-ı şikest-i hâtırını mûceb olacağı bedîhî 
olmağın işbu pazarertesi Reis Efendi kullarının sahilhânesinin mersumânın mülâkâtlarına ruhsat-ı 
sâmileri buyurulur ise emr u fermân şevketlü kudretlu kerametlü adaletlü veli nimetim efendim 
padişahımındır.” A.AMD.29/101, 234665 (1187-1203). The document bears no date, but it must be 
written in 1779. 
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8. I beg you to conclude the negotiations after a long suspension.210 
 
Bouligny suggested that the treaty of Naples signed with the Kingdom of the 
Two Sicilies in 1740 during the reign of Carlos III should form as a template for the 
intended treaty with Spain.211 However, the Ottomans found this suggestion baseless 
on the grounds that the first article of this treaty guaranteed the expansion of conditions 
only to the new subjects of Naples rather than Carlos III.212  Thus, for the Ottomans, 
any treaty signed with Spain was bound to be a new one, rather than a simple extension 
of e previous treaty with Naples. 
After these long explanations and subsequent promising statements from the 
Ottoman side, Bouligny became more hopeful about the acceleration of the negotiation 
process. However, he was to realize soon that nothing would change. He incessantly 
                                                 
210“1. je ne doute pas que les circonstances actuelles vous auront empeche de m'accorder plus tot cette 
entrevue car le juger autrement ce serait faire tort a la superiorite de vos lumieres. 2. puisque l'epoque 
est venue nous trouvons ensemble vous comme ministre du Grand Seigneur et moy comme 
plénipotentiaire de mon auguste maitre il est temps que comme ministres du paix nous du ministres 
toutes les difficultes et finitions cette affaire si salutaire et glorieux pour les deux empires. 3. L’escrit 
que La Sublime porte m'a donnée par son primer dragoman en datte douzieme du passe et plustot une 
repulse politique que une correspondence d'amitie a la sincerite du Roy mon auguste maitre. 4. si malgré 
ce que cet écrit indiqué, les sentiments de la Suplime porte sont vrais et sinceres comme j n'en dois point 
douter et que par des raisons quelle peut avoir reserveis la paix ne peut pas se publier dans le jour, vous 
pourions en attendant travailler a sa conclusion pour la publier dans quinze jours ou un mois. 5. cette 
affaire étant toute simple par sa nature puisque la travaill est fait soit parceque les article sont deja 
establis ou en suivant le traitte de naples celli qui fur formé du temps du sultan mustafa; son aye agreable 
de me faire passer l'ecrit de ce traitte pour le voir et y retoucher il y a quelque chose qui le merite. 6. 
venant ici comme je suis venu sous la bonne foi de la Suplime Porte que correspondrait a la bonne foy 
de mon auguste maitre il n'est pas question de interrompre la conclusion par des conditions 
inadmisibles.La Sublime Porte ne pourrait pas indiquer une seule irruption des forces de la monarchie 
Espagnole contre cet empire depuis l'heureuse époque de l'annee 40 et par consequent n'ont point fait 
des esclaves sur les Turks. 7. la paix est si favorable au bonheur public que pour la conclure il ne fait 
jamais y mettre le moindre obstacle e'est ainsi que la Sublime Porte. l'a toujours observe avec toutes les 
autres puissances bien loin de craindre l'animadversation publique on doit se flatter  du contraire ainsi 
point de raisons politiques qui puissent contrarier la finalisation d'une affaire si salutaire car je ne viens 
pas ici pour faire une paix ni un nouveau traitte.” Bouligny, pp. 41-45 
 
211The correspondence of Bouligny to Prime Minister, Conde de Floridablanca: “The articles related to 
trade would be the same as the agreement signed between Spain and The Ottoman Empire.” A.H.N., 
Legajo 4761, 10 January 1782 
 
212 The first article of the Treaty with Naples: “Devlet-i Aliyye-i ebed müddet ile Sicilyateyn kralı 
beyninde inşaallahuteala tasdiknamesi vurudundan sonra sâir dost olan Fransa ve İngiltere ve Flemenk 
ve badehu İsveç devletleri misüllü halet ile sulh ve salah akd olunmuştur. Binaenaleyh Devlet-i 
Aliyyeme tabi' memalik ve eyalat ve ulkat ve cezirelerin reaya ve ahalileri ile kral müşarunileyhe tabi' 
olan zir u bala-yı Sicilyateyn'nin hükümetleri ve mülhakatları olan arazi ve cezireleri ve kezalik 
Toskana'nın şehirleri ve kezalik ve arazi ve cezireleri ve bundan sonra vaktiyle tarafına tabi olan 
memalik ve hükümatın reayaları beyninde işbu sulh u salah meri’at olunub ve emr-i ticarete dahi sair 
düvele müsaade olunduğu üzere berren ve bahren cevaz virilüp ve emtialarının furuhtu ve ve fırtına ve 
avarız-ı saireden mutazarrır olan sefayinin tamiri ve kifaf-ı nefisleri için iktiza eden nesnenin akçeleriyle 
iştirası tarafından caiz oluna.” HAT,1428/58461,04/Ra/1153 
 
64 
 
dispatched petitions to receive any Ottomans response to his arguments and request to 
send his dragoman and his son to the Sublime Porte. Also, Bouligny prioritized to get 
the support of Cezayirli Hasan Paşa with whom he met on 31 December 1779.213 
Bouligny informed him that the Spanish court accepted to release Muslim captives. If 
the Sublime Porte rejected the offer of Spain, they would lose the chance of securing 
the goodwill of this country. During this meeting, Kaptan Hasan Paşa assured 
Bouligny he would obtain information about the developments and get involved in the 
process.214 
On 22, January 1780 Bouligny wrote a long letter offering concrete solutions, 
explanations and proposals on behalf of the Spanish court.  In this manner, he aimed 
to reorient the direction of the process and expand the scope of the negotiations. He 
began by promising that his court would release the captives. Secondly, he underlined 
the necessity of an official declaration of mutual friendship between the courts for safe 
navigation.  At that time, warships and pirates from both countries occasionally attack 
each other upon encounter in the open sea, regardless of the peace between two 
sovereigns. He subtly reminded the Porte of the necessity of exercising prudence in 
mutual relations lest one of the parties, having lost faith in other, began hostilities. This 
was apparently a veiled threat. Thirdly, Bouligny made a distinction between the 
alliance and treaty of trade and mutual friendship. For him, the alliance that the 
Sublime Porte demanded had to be arranged as a separate article. He added the 
following condition:  
My king will undertake the obligation, when he will have the control of 
Gibraltar (that is besieged at present), to intercept the naval detachments 
dispatched to attack the dominions of this Empire. The Grand Senor 
will equally undertake the obligation to ensure that all African 
Regencies, Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli and all other dependents of the 
Empire live in peace with Spain. If they violate the agreement, the 
Sublime Porte will force them to comply.  
The forth, Your Excellency clearly declared that the Sublime Porte 
desires and is in the same position in this affair: it seems that the time 
has come to conclude. I show zealously my sincerity in my mission 
since I came here... I cannot subsist in the current position, if the 
Sublime Porte did not solve it with conclusion.  I am forced to return to 
my country so we will lose substantially the unique opportunity that 
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will never present itself again, to establish friendship and to be quiet on 
the transition throughout Gibraltar.215 
 
In this letter, Bouligny disclosed the desire of the Spanish court to finish the 
conflicts with the North African Regencies. African privateers’ assaults were 
potentially detrimental for the Spanish trade route for which peace with them was all 
the more crucial. Depending on this reality, quite a few historians have assumed that 
Spain had actually wanted a treaty with North Africa more than with the Sublime 
Porte. The main objective of Spain was to make a deal with North African countries 
using the proposed treaty with the Sublime Porte as a leverage. It is really interesting 
that Reis Efendi also mentioned the same point to the Bouligny on 27 November 1780, 
as follows: “It surprised me that Spain wanted to make an agreement with us although 
the two countries are at peace. They actually want peace with Algeria.”216 
However, this was no exception for Spain. The European countries signing 
trade treaties with the Ottoman Empire in Levant also desired to sign the same treaty 
with the African countries aiming to sustain the security of the trade routes. To 
precisely understand and examine the peculiarities of the relationship between Spain 
and North African countries, we should compare the process with those of other 
European countries. Austria aiming to secure the Mediterranean trade route offered to 
sign a treaty with North African countries after the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718. At 
                                                 
215
2.entre les grandes puissances maritimes il faut des actes publics. les deux empires sont en armes, 
l'amitie secrete qui regne entre nos deux cours n'est pas publique aux sujets respectifs. les vaisseaux de 
guerre et corsaires peuvent se rencontrer et résulter des hostilites sans la volante des souverains. la 
prudence exige de prevoir touts ces inconvenients, du contraire les deux nations se regardant en Guerre 
il en resultera des hostilities. 3. pour ce qui regarde l'article d'alliance que souhaite etablir la Sublime 
Porte avec ma cour et que doit être un article separé du Traité. Que Senor Mio Catholique s'obligera des 
qu'il sera maître de gibraltar (qui est actuellement assiege) a empecher dans toute l'extention de ces cotes 
le pasage des forces maritimes qui pourront venir a ataquer les possesions de cet empire. Et que le Grand 
Senor s’obligera egalement a que toutes les Regences d’affrique notantment. Alger, tunis, tripoli, et 
toutes les autres dependences de cet Empire vivent en Paix y bonne amitie avec L’espagne s’abstinant 
d’ors en avant de toute sorte de piraterie de façon que s’ils ne s’abstienent pas et que de bonne foi ils 
n’entrent dans la vue de cette paix, doit la Sublime Porte les constraindre par la force. s’abstinant d’ors 
en avant de toute sorte de piraterie de façon que s’ils ne s’abstienent pas et que de bonne foi ils n’entrent 
dans la vue de cette paix, doit la Sublime Porte les constraindre par la force.4. Votre Excellence voit 
clairement par tout cet exposé que cette affaire s’est mis dans le meme point que la Sublime Porte l’a 
desiré: il parait que le temps de con clure est venu. j'ai procure depuis mon arrivée ici exposer avec 
ardeur à la Sublime Porte...je ne puis subsister dan la posision actuelle et que par consequent si la 
Sublime Porte ne se resoud a finir. je me verrais obligé de me rapatrier et pour lors elle perdra 
sensiblement l’unique occasion que jamais se lui presentera de s’assurer de l’ami que mieux lui convien 
et d’etre cet empire tranquile sur le pasage de Gibraltar. Bouligny, p. 72-76 
216“Fue habiendo estranado el R.E. que la España pidiese el firman cuando era regular, lo pidiesen los 
argelinos.” Bouligny, pp. 134-135 
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first, the North African rulers denied this offer yet within thirty years they accepted it. 
Tunis and Tripoli in 1729, and Algeria in 1748 signed a treaty. There was an agreement 
between France and the Ottomans in 1535 and after nearly seventy years Tunes, Tripoli 
(1604) and Algeria (1619) signed a treaty with France.217  In 1741, the dey of Tripoli 
Karamanlı Ahmed Paşa signed a treaty with Naples, which was a trade treaty based on 
seventeen articles. The Mediterranean trade of the European countries partly depended 
on this understanding reached with the North African regencies.218 It seems reasonable 
to say Spain aimed to come to terms with the North African rulers yet this was not the 
only motivation to send a plenipotentiary who would spend nearly three years to 
negotiate in spite of many obstacles.  
Bouligny first asked to his dragoman Talamas to inquire about whether Algeria 
needed the Porte’s permission in the case of an agreement between Spain and Algeria. 
Should this be the case, would the Ottomans allow Algeria to sign a treaty? The 
dragoman answered positively, but remarked that although these regencies were free 
to do so, they did not have to respect any treaty between Spain and the Sublime Porte. 
Also, after they signed any treaty with Spain would they ask the Porte to confirm? He 
answered “yes”. However, as these regencies were free and independent to do so, they 
did not have to submit any treaty signed with the Sublime Porte. After these regencies 
sign any treaty with Spain they would ask the Porte to confirm.219 The official Ottoman 
chronicler at the time, Ahmet Vasıf, states this offer as follows: 
Müluk-ı küffar miyanında kuvvet-i maliyye ve kesret-i merakib-i 
bahriyye ile şöhret-şiâr olan İspanyalu’nun sinîn-i çendinden beru 
Devlet-i Aliyye ile rabıta-ı peyvend-i dostî ve safvet vesâir düvel 
misillû bazı şurut in’ikadiyle tahsil-i sûret-i aştî ve emniyyet-i kusârâ-
yi matlabları olmaktan nâşi bundan akdem müsaade-i devlet-i ebed-
müddet ile mazhar-ı eltaf-ı şamiletü’l-eknaf ve müceddeden akd-i 
şurut-ı muahede ile çehre-i ricaları dest-nevazende-i isaf olup Cezayir-
i Garp Ocaklarının dahi işbu muahedeye idhal olunmaları tetimme-i 
matalib ve tekmile-i meariblerinden olduğuna binaen bu hususun dahi 
cilve-ger-i mecla-yi zuhûr olması babında dâmen-gîr-i ilticâ ve niyâz 
olmuşlar idi.  
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The passage above describes the Spanish intentions behind the proposal and 
the answer given to the Spanish plenipotentiary. Accordingly, the Sublime Porte could 
only invite the North Africans to be part of the treaty but it was their choice to take the 
invitation. The Sublime Porte communicated with Algeria in order to get the opinion 
of its dey who would determine the position of his own country on this issue. His 
response would reach Constantinople after a long time: “Ocaklunun bu hususda inân-
ı ihtiyarları ellerine teslim ve harb u silm hususunda muhayyer oldukları tefhim ve ol 
babda ısdâr buyurulan evâmir-i aliyye İspanyalu’ya verilmiştir.”220   
Bouligny realized that one of the essential points causing the suspension of the 
negotiation was Algeria’ refrainment from any agreement with Spain since Algerian 
corsairs had long been preying on the Spanish navigation.221 For a long time, Algeria 
did not respond to the dispatch from the Sublime Porte. As the Porte initially expected, 
it would not be possible to take further steps without the Algerian approval. Upon the 
meeting with Reis Efendi, the long delay displeased Bouligny and he decided to send 
a petition complaining: “I did not demand the Sublime Porte to force Algeria to obey 
the treaty, as I have indicated before I beg for sending a writ of amity to them.”222   
Despite the aforementioned interruptions, Bouligny continued contacting the 
Ottoman bureaucrats. He ordered Talamas to consult the issue to Huseyin Efendi who 
was accepted as a religious authority among Turks.223  Bouligny aimed to obtain the 
support of prominent men of religion that had influence higher echelons of power. 
Hüseyin Efendi did not have the opportunity to discuss the issue with the Vizier’s 
Kahya. Thus, Bouligny considered that it would be better to arrange a meeting with 
his close friends.224 On 11 September 1780 Talamas informed Bouligny about the 
results of the conversations between Huseyin Efendi and Reis Efendi’s close friends 
                                                 
220Ahmet Vasıf, Mehasin’ül-Asâr ve Hakikatü’l-Ahbâr, p. 147. The correspondence of Bouligny to 
Prime Minister, Conde de Floridablanca: “The Ottoman Empire declared that Tripoli, Algeria and 
Tunisia are independent to sign any agreement with Spain.” A.H.N., Legajo 4761, 10 January 1782 
 
221Bouligny, p. 135 
 
222“yo no he pedido un mandamiento de la Puerta Otomana para que Argel obedezxa, si solamente un 
ferman de amista, según y cómo se lo he indicado por mi oficio del 26 de Octubre”, Bouligny, p. 185 
 
223Bouligny, p. 112 Sicil-i Osmanî written by Mehmet Süreyya includes the biography of Hüseyin 
Effendi. He was hacegân and secretary (mühürdâr) of Grand Vizier, İzzet Mehmet Paşa. He was 
appointed as Başmukataacı and then Küçük Ruznameci. Mehmed Süreyya,  Sicil-i Osmanî, c.III, p. 702 
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who played an essential role in the negotiations. The explanation was that the Sublime 
Porte conducted the business not only for Spain but also for all European countries in 
this manner.  
In Ottoman bureaucracy, the ulema played an important role in negotiations 
with foreign countries. Their judgment was important for the legitimacy of any treaty 
with foreign countries. Ulema mostly evaluated the importance of any treaty regarding 
its convenience to the interests of the country. In the Ottoman Empire, religion was 
not an impediment on cultivating good international relations as opposed to the popular 
belief. Ulema approved treaties with Christian powers, infidels for the Ottomans, so 
long as they were in the interest of ‘the state and religion’. Beydilli emphasizes that 
the Ottomans gave priority to the main interests of the court rather than religious 
concerns.225 Upon the discussion on the proposed treaty, this subject was forwarded to 
Şeyhulislam Mahmud Şerif Efendi as was done in the case of the Swedish treaty in 
1761.226 He did not see any harm in starting the negotiation process with the Spanish 
plenipotentiary.227 Bouligny noted that Hüseyin Efendi said this treaty was suitable 
according to him if it did not matter for the Sublime Porte.228 The Sublime Porte would 
continue to act in its own interest. 
Even though the Sublime Porte accelerated the process and the issue was 
discussed in the Imperial Council. Nevertheless, took up the matter and discussed it 
thoroughly. It informed Bouligny to submit a new petition that reiterated all issues. In 
practise, that went to restarting the process all over. In June 1781 The Sublime Porte 
wanted Bouligny to summarize his objectives in this treaty whereas the plenipotentiary 
expected a meeting in which the concrete answers would be provided. He considered 
this a waste of time because the letter dated 13 May 1779 and the letter 9 June 1781 
included the same content.229 Bouligny said it would be better to have a meeting with 
Reis Efendi but he was ready to present the offer in any case. One may wonder about 
the intentions of the Ottoman government in asking for a new letter of intent after 
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nearly two years. It seems reasonable to assume that the rapid succession of high 
functionaries in the palace cost disruption in the negotiation process.230 Also this gives 
a hint as to the intentions of the Ottoman government aiming to act with a concrete 
plan.  
The second meeting with Reis Efendi was on 14 July 1781 twenty months after 
the first one. Bouligny and his dragoman were welcomed by the dragoman of The 
Sublime Porte at the entrance of the pavilion. Upon the greeting ceremony, Reis 
Efendi, Beylikçi Efendi, Mouradgea d’Ohsson and the dragomans were ready to speak. 
The meeting began with an explanation of Reis Efendi regarding the procrastination 
of the negotiation process. He expressed his goodwill about the negotiation and 
underlined the necessity of upholding clauses of the treaty in future. Bouligny replied 
that the interests of two great powers would be ensured by the peace and trade 
agreement possessing the power to consolidate current friendship between the two 
countries. Subsequent results could be seen in the case of the agreement. The question 
asked by Reis Efendi crystalized the divergence views of both sides. This question was 
“Will Spain have the right to aid Russia after the treaty signed as was the case with 
Denmark and the others?”  Bouligny tried to assure Reis Efendi that Spain no doubt 
promised not to support Russia against the Sublime Porte. The advantages of the 
friendship of Spain would be seen after the treaty was signed. The meeting ended at 
3:00 P.M., but this discussion would last long.231 
Actually, Bouligny noticed that the Sublime Porte offered a defensive alliance 
in the apprehension of any cooperation between Spain and Russia.232 He argued any 
changes to be made in the content of the treaty with Naples on the grounds that it also 
included the articles on cooperation and friendship between the two countries. 
According to Bouligny, it seemed curious to add a new article to the ultimate treaty.  
Ottoman bureaucrats did not accept any oral declaration of friendship. They rather 
preferred to include an article on the issue of neutrality. Accordingly, should one side 
be at war, the other would declare neutrality. Bouligny reacted against this proposal 
                                                 
230Abdurrezzak Bahir Efendi was discharged on October, 12, 1780 and Süleyman Feyzi Efendi was 
appointed.  
 
231Bouligny, p. 215 
 
232“Talamas rastrea del Zaid Ibraim, que las miras son de hazer una Alianza defensiva Vea. y que recelo 
de la P.O es de la Rusia y España.” Bouligny, p. 225 
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on the ground that he could not accept any article different from those of the treaty of 
Naples.233 
The Ottoman bureaucrats were convened to discuss this topic and they 
approved of the proposed article that defined the conditions of neutrality. Accordingly, 
Spain would be neutral so long as the Sublime Porte did not fight two countries: France 
and Naples. The Ottomans too would declare neutrality in Spain’s wars on any Muslim 
monarch but two: the Sultan of Morocco and the Imam of Yemen. The minutes of the 
meeting explains these exceptions by referring to the principle of reciprocity rather 
than any particular attachment to these two Muslim rulers.234 
This stipulation was delivered to Bouligny as a secret article that guaranteed 
that Spain would not aid any enemy of the Sublime Porte even if it was a Spanish ally. 
The ultimatum dated 25 July 1782 ensured that the Sublime Porte would also comply 
with this stipulation. Bouligny offered to add this statement to the eighteenth article of 
the treaty of Naples instead of arranging it as an additional article. According to the 
article the Sublime Porte could not aid the Algerians. Bouligny considered that under 
these circumstances, Algerians would be left unaided which would be beneficial for 
Spain.235     
The neutrality issue was under discussion until September when Reis Efendi 
came along with a new stipulation to the dismay of Bouligny. The Ottomans now 
demanded that should one of the allies come under attack, the other send a detachment 
of ten well-armed warships against its enemy. This proposal was the final straw for the 
Spanish side. Bouligny got angry about the expansion of the dimension of the treaty 
of Naples as seen in his response: “I will not take into consideration this. I will not 
even inform my court about it until the treaty is signed on the basis of the treaty with 
Naples.”236 
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234 “…bî-taraflık şartında Fransa ve küçük İspanyadan mâ‘adâ düvelden biri ile Devlet-i ‘aliyye 
beyninde muhâseme vuku‘unda İspanya kralı bî-taraf olub husûm-u saltanat-ı seniyyeye mu‘âvenet 
eylemeye ibâresini tahrîr eyledik de Devlet-i ebed-kıyâm cânibinden dahi Fas Sultanı ve Yemen 
İmamından gayri mulûk-ı İslâmiyyeden birisiyle İspanyalının muharebesi vakı‘  olduk da Devlet-i kavî-
şevket dahi İspanyalının husûmuna i‘ânet eylemeye kelâmını tasrihden murâd iki cânibde istisnâ 
kaziyyesinin musâvât bulunmak ....” A.DVN. DVE. (11)177/10 1195 
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While this discussion continued, the response of Algeria caused further 
distress. Mouradgea d’Ohsson informed Bouligny that the Algerian dey rejected the 
idea of a treaty with Spain and that he even had detained nine Spanish rutters.237 Now 
that no ambiguity remained regarding the position of Algiers, negotiations focused on 
other matters with increasing tension. The conference dated 14 January 1782 resulted 
in a compromise between Bouligny and the dragoman of the Sublime Porte concerning 
five articles: neutrality, the Regencies, the captives, the corsairs, and conformity with 
the treaty of Naples in articles relating to commerce.238    
The third meeting with Reis Efendi was centred on the matter of friendship. 
The Ottoman side tried hard to include an article to secure an alliance, but the Spanish 
plenipotentiary resisted adamantly and, instead, offered to express a mere gesture of 
mutual and ostensible goodwill. After the meeting, Bouligny considered that the 
negotiation process would come to conclusion soon. He was informed that the 
Ottoman bureaucrats would discuss the issue and communicate with him the result in 
five days.239 Reis Efendi assured Bouligny that the Sublime Porte would put the 
finishing touches to the agreement draft and that the final version would satisfy both 
sides. 
On 13 September 1782 the Sublime Porte decided to sign the treaty with the 
Spanish plenipotentiary the following day at 12:30 P.M. This pleasing news excited 
Bouligny who had been striving for the agreement for nearly three years. He noted the 
whole ceremony in detail as follows:   
I left from Hospicio of Tierra Santa with my son accompanying me as 
my secretary, my dragoman Talamas, two major servants, two lackeys 
and two chadors at 11.30 am. We reached to the Tophane pier and we 
embarked to a boat with rowing four pairs of rowers. We entered to the 
Canal (the Golden Horn) and disembarked at Constantinople at 12.15 
pm on the jetty of the bureaucrats where I waited nearly an hour for the 
horses sent by the Sublime Porte to the minister and his entourage. 
The custom of this court was to keep foreign members waiting there. I 
was told that Vizier had visited the new Mufti, yet the real reason for 
the delay was the fire in the city. 
Finally Reis Efendi sent three horses for each of us, me, my son and my 
dragoman. Everything was glorious. Six cavalries (çavuş) accompanied 
us. 
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The march began under the guidance of six cavalries followed by my 
dragoman, then me and my son. The servants were on foot by the 
horses. In this manner we reached to Vizier’s palace that was the 
Sublime Porte…I moved forward with my whole entourage on the foot 
to the grand staircase. Jescheritalcho (Teşrifatçı) Efendi and the 
dragoman greeted us and I was taken to a large saloon where I had to 
wait for the Vizier’s coming to address the audience. We did not wait 
more than fifteen minutes. It was announced that it was time to enter 
the saloon. 
The Grand Vizier is with much pomp sitting in the corner of its rich 
sopha. The Reis Efendi was on foot in his right side, and various officers 
of the court of the Vizier, Kahya Bey could not attend to the ceremony 
because of his illness. 
To present myself to the Vizier, I showed him my reverence, one from 
half distance and another getting close to him, they brought me a stool 
to sit, but before, I had made the following speech on foot: 
It was already expected from the beginning of the process that the peace 
and trade agreement between Ottoman and Spain would be successfully 
reached. My August Sovereign had conserved the sentiment of 
friendship and cooperation since the treaty of Naples signed during his 
sovereign in Naples. Likewise, the Ottoman Empire also corresponded 
with sincerity and friendship. 
This epoch is so happy for both sides, and so glorious for the 
plenipotentiaries of both precious courts. I was honoured by the 
Sublime Porte to establish diplomatically negotiation with this 
distinguished Empire.  
I concluded my speech and handed over the letter of agreement to the 
Vizier, then I sit. 
Reis Efendi presented valuable gifts, then refreshments and sweets were 
served. We left grandiosely with our furs and embarked on ship. It was 
16.00 pm. when we arrived to Hospicio.240 
                                                 
240“El día 14 de Noviembre de 1782 Salí del Ospicio de Tierra Santa a las 11 horas y media de la 
mañana, acompañado de mi hijo haziendo las funciones de Secretario, de mi Interprete Talamas, dos 
Criados Mayores, dos Lacayos y dos Choadares. Llegué al Embarcadero de Topjana, y me embarqué 
en un barco a quatro pares de remos. Pasé el Canal y desembarcamos en Constantinopla a las 12h. ¼ en 
la escala de los Ministros allí estube esperando cerca de una hora los caballos que la P.O embia para el 
ministro y sequito. 
Tiene por costumbre este Ministerio el hazer esperar siempre allí a los Ministros estrangeros, y después 
satisface con una esc (falta hoja) a mí se me dió la de que habiendo ido el Vizir a visitar el nuebo Muftí, 
la marcha se habia retardado motibo de estar el transito embarazado por el desastre del incendio. 
Llegaron al fin los caballos que el Reys Efendy mandó uno para mí, otro para mi hijo y otro para mi 
Interprete, todos ricamente enfantizados, y seis chaux a caballo para acompañarme. 
La Marcha la abrió los seis chaux seguía mi Ynterprete, después Yo y enseguida mi hijo. Los criados a 
pie al lado de los caballos. Así que llegamos al Palacio del Vizir que es la P.Othomana ----portal se 
quedaron los seis chauz formados en dicha y yo con todo mi sequito proseguí mi marcha hasta el pie de 
la grande escalera. Salió luego Jescheritalcho Efendi (introductor de Embaxador)  y el intérprete de la 
P., y me llevaron a una grande sala, en donde me tubieno compañia esperando que el Vizir pasan a la 
de audiencia; no pasó un quarto de hora que vino el aviso, y pasé a ella, acompañado del dicho 
introductor y del intérprete  de la P., mi hijo  seguía con el halavo, enbuelto con una rica tela de oro, 
después mi interpreto y criados mayores. 
El gran vizir esta con mucha pompa sentado en el angulo de su rico sopha. El Reys Efendy en pie a su 
lado derecho, y diferentes oficiales de la Corte del Vizir no asistió el Kiaya Bey por estar indispuesto. 
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
 
 
For Spain the eighteenth century began with a change of dynasty, under the 
will of Carlos II, the grandson of Louis XIV of France who ascended the Spanish 
throne as Felipe V. The advent of a Bourbon monarchy in Spain was a milestone. After 
the War of Succession lasting nearly fifteen years, Spain lost the control of Gibraltar. 
Spanish trading capacity was imperilled by the British control in the heart of the 
Mediterranean. Thus, Spain worked on new strategies to compensate for this 
devastating loss in the XVIII century.  
Though neither the ongoing reform projects pursued by primarily Felipe (1700-
1746) then Fernando VI (1746-59) can be ignored, the reign of Carlos III (1759-1788) 
was regarded as a milestone and the most prosperous and illustrated one for the modern 
history of Spain. The government took direct action to improve the administrative 
apparatus, education, agriculture and trade to strengthen the state by all means. In the 
ministry of Floridablanca, it was considered that a more extensive and organized 
administration system would facilitate to attain its aims in the international platform. 
Spain pursued a strategy intending to conclude alliances particularly after the Seven 
Year War with states such as Russia, Prussia, Portugal, France, North Africa, and the 
Ottoman Empire in order to counterbalance the naval supremacy of Great Britain. 
Bouligny made every effort to reach a fruitful conclusion in this tedious process, since 
this agreement was so important on several counts. First and foremost it might be seen 
as a consequence of Spain’s endeavours to surmount its political isolation since the 
                                                 
Al presentarme ante el Vizir le hize mi reverencia, otra a media distancia y otra al llegar cerca de su 
persona, me pusieron el taburete para sentarme, pero antes de tomar asiento le hize arenga del tener 
siguiente: 
“La Providencia habia reservado a V.A la felizidad de Cooperar al éxito Glorioso de unir la Potencia de 
España en la Potencia Othomana por un tratado solemne de Paz y Amistad. 
Señor mi augusto soberano, desde que entrajo la Paz con este Imperio como Rey de las dos Sicilies ha 
conservado siempre los mismos sentimientos de afecto y de amistad: fiel observador de sus empeños 
no duda hallan de parte de este Ymperio las mismas sinceras disposiciones al Corresponderle 
Es la época tan feliz para la una y la otra Potencia, y tan Gloriosa para los Plenipotenciarios de las dos 
Cortes es tanto más preciosa para mi quanto me facilita en el mismo acto el honor de felizitar al E.A 
sobre su elevación a la premier dignidad de este Imperio: elevación debida al mento distinguido, a las  
virtudes a las Luzes y a las altas prendas que adornan la persona de V.E.A El Cielo se digne bendecir e 
Ylustrar el Ministro de V.A  a cuyo favor y benevolencia tomo la liberta de recomendarme con toda 
confianza” 
Concluida tome el tratado de manos de mi hijo y lo pasé a la del Reys Efendi quien lo puso en manos 
del G.Vizir y tomé asiento. Bouligny, p. 300 
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succession wars during which Spain had to face off against various powers in Europe. 
In the eighteenth century, Spain sought to multiply its allies by forging positive 
diplomatic relations and fostering economic cooperation with other powers such as 
Russia, Portugal and Ottoman Empire, and it looked for gaining same privileges from 
Ottoman Empire as others did, and wanted to be represented on the equal footing with 
other European powers. That’s why Bouligny used very frequently the following 
phrase; “como otras naciones” or “like other nations”, in his diplomatic 
correspondences with Ottoman counterparts. The year, Spanish plenipotentiary was 
sent to Constantinople, in 1779, while American War of Independence was continuing 
in full-scale against Britain, Gibraltar was besieged by Spain. Gibraltar was defended 
efficiently until the American Independence War.  
The sixteenth century was the era of manifest belligerence between the two 
countries. Throughout the XVI-XVIII centuries the two antagonists, The Ottoman 
Empire and Spain viewed each other with suspicion and refrained from establishing 
diplomatic relations at large, except sporadic and circumstantial approximation. In the 
XVIII. century, this tendency began to change. Spanish historian, Ortiz assesses that 
during this century, the mentality of “Holy War” was outmoded, and the ostensible 
disappearance of religious hostility facilitated the compromise with Muslims. In 
secondary sources, this period is viewed as “normalization” in a positive sense; i.e., 
“normalization of the relationship between Spain and the Islamic potentials.” 
Another factor increased the inclination of Spain to cooperate was European 
equilibrium. There was a change in the international situation. European countries 
intensified their relationships by sending permanent ambassadors. Historians evaluate 
the case generally in a similar vein: “The system of Europe has changed: commerce 
enters all, or almost all, treaties as “raison d’état” wrote the Abbot Coyer, in the mid-
1700s, Bougainville observed that “the balance of trade has become the balance of 
power.” Spain similarly conducted the policy based on the ideology “mas mercado 
mas Estado” (more market more stronger state.)  
The 18th century witnessed long-lasting wars between the Ottomans and Russia 
and the defeats made the crisis deeper particularly in the last quarter of the century. 
Spain thought the moment was opportune to intervene once more in the Crimean 
imbroglio to attempt to secure some concessions from the Ottoman Empire. From the 
perspective of Spain there was no doubt that Russia triumphed over the Ottoman 
Empire and that the Turkish Sultan was forced to establish an alliance with European 
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states. As Attard remarks, “after The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, other winds blowing 
in the Turkish capital, Floridablanca wanted to use them to eliminate the inherent and 
permanent hostility.”241 Spain timed the negotiations on trade concessions the 
Ottomans were debilitated by the political struggles and Russian threats. In 1779, Juan 
de Bouligny was deployed as an extraordinary envoy to Constantinople. 
His diary examined in this study is a witness to the acts and deeds of the 
Spanish plenipotentiary. These notes allow us to trace his activities and the negotiation 
process. Bouligny noted down everything, from the day of his arrival to the time the 
treaty was signed; his settlement, and his contacts with the other ambassadors, the 
letters sent, and the presents given all are recorded in his diary. 
For the most part, Reisülküttap had the highest position among the officials 
with whom foreign representatives could negotiate. Bouligny directed his petitions to 
the dragoman of Reis Effendi. First petition declaring the intention of the 
plenipotentiary was addressed on May, 13th 1779. Bouligny made reference 
particularly to the first article of the agreement signed between the King of the Two 
Sicilies and the Sublime Porte in 1740, aiming to ensure its fulfillment. This article 
confirms and guarantees the expansion of the implication of the treaty for the newly 
conquered regions and their subjects by the King of Two Sicilies and the Ottoman 
Empire. Bouligny indicates that the king of the Two Sicilies, Carlos III ascended to 
the throne of Spain so that the agreement would involve the subjects of Spain. 
However, this claim was not taken into consideration in the Ottoman side. The 
Ottoman procrastination in the reception and the recognition of the envoy, frequent 
changes in the Ottoman bureaucrats and long debates on the articles even on some 
seemingly minor terms and concepts in the agreement disillusioned Juan de Bouligny. 
He is often critical of the daunting procedure and continuous delays in the negotiations. 
Protracted negotiations and haggling over the articles took more than two years. When 
we compare the negotiation duration with the other negotiations this was not a 
discrimination against Spain. Swedish and Polish envoys strove nearly three years.  
Bouligny made every effort to reach a fruitful conclusion in this tedious 
process, since this agreement was so important on several counts. First and foremost 
it might be seen as a consequence of Spain’s endeavours to surmount its political 
isolation since the succession wars during which Spain had to face off against various 
                                                 
241 V. P. Atard, pp. 393-399 
 
76 
 
powers in Europe. In the eighteenth century, Spain sought to multiply its allies by 
forging positive diplomatic relations and fostering economic cooperation with other 
powers such as Russia, Portugal and Ottoman Empire, and it looked for gaining same 
privileges from Ottoman Empire as others did, and wanted to be represented on the 
equal footing with other European powers. That’s why Bouligny used very frequently 
the following phrase; “como otras naciones” or “like other nations”, in his diplomatic 
correspondences with Ottoman counterparts. He, in accordance with the above-
mentioned policy of Spain, stayed in Constantinople for three years to reach an 
agreement with the Ottoman, and became successful in this purpose after his adamant 
efforts. 
During the negotiations, Ottoman bureaucrats scrutinized each article which 
would take place in the agreement meticulously. On some occasions, long debates over 
the various concepts prolonged the process and caused Bouligny to complain about the 
slowness of the process. He went further to accuse the Ottoman bureaucrats of 
dragging their feet deliberately to procrastinate the process, and he saw their treatments 
exclusively for Spain. However, when compared to the other agreement processes 
between the Ottomans and the European countries, the duration in which the Ottoman-
Spanish agreement was procured would seem rather normal in the contrast to 
Bouligny’s claims. 
Here it should be noted that the Ottomans gave special emphasis on the 
reciprocity principle during the negotiations. In the neutrality article of the agreement 
it was stipulated that Spain would perpetuate its alliance, in any case, with France and 
Napoli in conformity with the Familia Pacta. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire 
would provide any assistance to Morocco and Yemen upon their demands from the 
Ottomans. Spain did not rise any objection to this article, because this article implied 
that the Ottomans would not intervene in the relations between Spain and the other 
North African polities like Algeria, Tripoli and Tunis. It has much more significance 
for Spain to secure neutrality of the Ottomans in the case of a war between Spain and 
the aforementioned polities. 
Bouligny succeeded to broker an agreement with the Ottoman Empire, after his 
adamant efforts. This trade agreement was akin to the agreement, which was signed in 
1740, between Napoli and the Ottoman Empire242. At the same time, Bouligny 
                                                 
242 The only difference between the two agreements was the neutrality article in the Peace and Trade 
Agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Spain. 
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involved in a very broad network of international diplomacy during his stay in Istanbul. 
On some occasions he cooperated with other diplomatic missionaries who resided in 
Istanbul such as ambassadors of Napoli and Sweden, while sometimes he preferred to 
act very secretly. Apart from his endeavours for reaching an agreement with Ottomans, 
he contacted Russian ambassador to negotiate over the trade in the Black Sea.  
One of the most important issues which caused delays in the process was the 
Spanish demand from Sublime Porte to force the deys of such Algeria, Tunis and 
Tripoli to accede to the agreement. However, the Porte declined this demand on the 
account that those policies were autonomous in establishing their diplomatic relations. 
Nevertheless, it promised to send fermans to the mentioned countries to encourage 
them to comply with the stipulations of the agreement. One can say that Spain, with 
this demand, sought to secure its trade in the Mediterranean from the pirate attacks. 
Because these African countries were main incubators for the pirates of the 
Mediterranean. Without securing its ships from the pirate assaults, the agreement 
reached between the two states would turn out to be fruitless. 
Menendez Pidal asserts that the treaty represented psychological turn in the 
relations of the two powers, rather than its practicality in the real life. After all, the 
treaty could not bring about an immediate improvement in the relations in the short 
run. Pidal might have come to this conclusion by taking into the account the economic 
stagnation in the Levant after the Revolution Wars and the polarized political 
atmosphere in Europe after the French Revolution. After the revolution Ottoman 
Empire and Spain took stand against each other to support different camps which came 
to being as a consequence of the French Revolution. As seen in the claim of Pidal, the 
positions of the two states in this economic and political situation cause some 
historians to claim that the treaty bore poor results if not it was a futile and abortive 
attempt. However, one can say that altthough various adverse political and economic 
factors hindered the two states from yielding fruitful results after the treaty was signed, 
it should not lead us to overlook the favourable results of the treaty in the long term. 
This treaty’s psychological outcomes ushered the further political and economic 
cooperation despite the intervening negative factors. In this regard the new Spanish 
consuls sent to the various Ottoman port cities such as İzmir, Oran, and Athens should 
be seen as the positive consequence of the mentioned favourable psychological 
atmosphere after the treaty was signed. 
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HAT, 1429/58516, 26/N/1196243 
HAT,  1429/58515, 07/l/1196 
HAT,  1429/58525, 06/L/1196 
Evvelki madde Devlet-i Aliyye-i ebed-müddet ile İspanya kralı beyninde İnşaallah-u 
Teala tasdiknamesi vurûdundan sonra sâir dost olan Fransa ve İngiltere ve Felemenk 
ve ba’dehu İsveç dükalıkları misillü hâlet ile sulh u salâh akd olunmuştur binâenaleyh 
Devlet-i Aliyyeye tâbi‘ memâlik ve eyâlât ve ülkât ve cezirelerin re‘âyâ ve ahâlîleri ile 
kral-ı müşarun ileyhe tâbi‘ olan hükûmetler ve mülhekâtları olan arâzî ve cezîreleri ve 
şehirleri ve kastelleri ve bundan sonra vaktiyle tarafına tâbi‘ olacak memâlik ve 
hükûmâtın re‘âyâları beyninde işbu sulh u salâha murâ‘at olunub ve emr-i ticârete dahi 
sâir düvele müsa‘ade olunduğu üzere berren ve bahren cevaz verilib ve emti‘alarının 
furuhtu ve furuşuna ve avarız-ı saireden mutazarrır olan sefâyinin tamiri ve kifâf-ı 
nefsleri için iktizâ iden nesnenin akçeleriyle iştirâsı tarefeynden câiz ola  
-İKİNCİ  MADDE: Devlet-i Aliyyenin bi’l-cümle iskele ve gümrüklerinden kral-ı 
müşarun ileyhin sefâyininden ve re‘ayalarından gümrük resmi yüzde üç vesâir dost 
olan düvel taraflarından verilen rüsûmatı edâ olunub mukâbilinde Devlet-i Aliyyenin 
sefâyini ve re‘âyâsı dahi anlara tâbi‘ olan yerlere vardıklarında bu kıyas üzere sâir dost 
olan düvel misüllü rüsûmatlarını edâ ideler.  
-ÜÇÜNCÜ MADDE: Devlet-i Aliyyeden Kral-ı müşrârun ileyhin ikâmet edecek 
vekîli vesâtatıyla Devlet-i Aliyyenin münâsib olan bi’l-cümle iskele ve sevâhillerinde 
konsolosları ikâmet ettirilip azl ü nasblarında vekîl-i mûma-ileyhe rütbesine göre 
evâmir-i aliyye ve berevât ihsan olunmasında ve konsolosların ve tercümânân ve 
etbâ‘larının husûslarında sâir dost olan düvel elçileri ve tercümânân ve etbâ‘larına olan 
müsâ‘ade misüllü mu‘âmele oluna 
-DÖRDÜNCÜ MADDE: Re‘âyâlarının mezhebi husûsunda ve Kuds-ü şerif vesâir 
yerlere varan seyyahları için sâir dost olan düvele mur‘râat olunduğu üzere müsâ‘ade 
oluna ve memâlik-i mahrûsanın herhangi mahallinde tüccar ve re‘âyâlarından ve 
bayrağı altında olanlardan biri vefat ider ise muhallefâtı hükkâm ve zâbitân 
taraflarından müsâdere olunmayıp ve bu gûne muhallefât mal-i gaibtir deyu vaz‘-ı yed 
ve istishâb olunmaksızın vekiline veya konsoloslarına vasiyeti üzere ashâbına 
verilmek için teslim oluna ve eğer bilâ-vasiyet vefat ider ise muhallefâtı vekiline ve 
konsoloslarına yahud vefat ettiği mahalde olan şerîklerine teslim oluna ve vefat 
eylediği mahalde konsolos ve şerîkleri bulunmadığı hâlde ol mahallin kâdısı şer‘-i şerîf  
mucebince muhallefâtını defter eyleyüb bir emîn mahalle vaz u hıfz idüb resm-i kısmet 
talep olunmaksızın der-i devlette mukîm olan vekili tarafında ta‘yin olunan âdeme biâa 
bahâne def‘ ü teslim eyleye ve  Devlet-i Aliyyenin re‘âyâsına ve tüccârına dahi anların 
taraflarından kezâlik mu‘âmele oluna.  
-BEŞİNCİ MADDE: Konsolos ve tercümânları ile da‘vâ zuhur eder ise dört bin 
akçeden ziyade da‘vâ olunduğu hâlde da‘vâları sâir mahalde istimâ‘ ve fasl olunmayıp 
Asitâne-i saâdete havâle oluna ve kezâlik Devlet-i Aliyye re‘âyasıyla kral-ı müşarûn  
ileyhin tüccâr ve sair re‘âyaları ve himayesi elinde olanlar bey‘ ü şirâ ve ticaret 
hususları ile vesâir bahâne ile da‘vâ ve kâdîya vardıklarında tercümânlarından biri 
bulunmadıkça da‘vâları istimâ‘ ve fasl olunmaya ve borçları ve kefâletleri 
ma‘mûlünbih senedât ve defter olunmadıkça da‘vâ olunan deyn için hilâf-ı şer‘-i şerîf 
müdâhale olunmaya ve tüccârı beyninde da‘vâ zuhûr eyledikde bu makûle olan 
da‘vâları konsolosları ve tercümânları vesâtatlarıyla şürût ve kâideleri üzere görülmesi 
câiz ola ve bu mu‘âmele hîn-i iktizâda anların memleketlerinde bulunan Devlet-i 
Aliyyenin tüccâr ve re‘âyâsı haklarında dahi böylece mer‘i tutula .  
                                                 
243 Tabakoğlu, pp. 106-114 
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-ALTINCI MADDE: Devlet-i Aliyyenin hükkâm ve zâbitânı kral-ı müşarun ileyhe 
tâbi‘olanlardan her kim olursa olsun bir ferdi bilâ vech-i te‘aadi ve tahkîr ve habs 
itmeyeler ve re‘âyâlarından bir kimesne ahz olundukta vekîli ve konsolosu tarafından 
taleb olunur ise teslîm olunup töhmetlerine göre te’dib oluna.  
-YEDİNCİ MADDE: Devlet-i Aliyyenin re‘âyâ ve tüccârı emîn ve müsterîh olmak 
için taraf-ı Devlet-i Aliyyeden kral-ı müşarûn ileyhin kürsî-i memleketi olan 
Alicante’de ikamet etmek üzere şehbender ta‘yîn olunması câiz ola bu vecihle işlerini 
ru’yet idüb Devlet-i Aliyye   cânibinden müsâ‘ade olunan serbestiyyet bunların 
hakkında dahi cârî ola 
-SEKİZİNCİ MADDE: Fenn-i mellahi’de mâhir olanlardan tarafeyn limânlarında 
fırtında tazyik olunan sefâyine i‘anet oluna ve şikest olan sefâyin derûnlarında bulunan 
emti‘a ve sâir eşyâları bulundukları üzere sahiblerine teslim olunmak için akreb olan 
konsolosa red oluna. 
-DOKUZUNCU MADDE: Tarafeynin sefâyin-i askeri ve cephane naklinde ve sâir 
hizmette istihdâm olunmak üzere cebr olunmaya  
-ONUNCU MADDE:  Devlet-i Aliyyenin sefâyini memâlik-i mahrûsadan dostluk 
üzere olup kral-ı müşarûn ileyhin memleketine giden sâir devletin sefâyini misüllü 
mu‘tad olan lazartadan sonra kabul olunalar 
-ONBİRİNCİ MADDE: Devlet-i Aliyyenin cenk-sefayini rûy-i deryada Kral-ı 
müşarûn ileyhin cenk sefînelerine müsadife eyledikte bayrağını dikip ve karşudan top 
ile selamlayıp dostluk izhar eyledikte Devlet-i Aliyyenin cenk sefineleri dahi layık 
olan vecihle dostâne mu‘amele edip ve kezalik tarafeyn tüccar sefâyini dahi 
birbirlerine bayraklarını açıp dostâne mu‘amele idecekler ve iş bu tarafeynin cenk 
sefineleri birbirlerinin tüccar sefayinine müsadife eyledikte sebillerin tahliye ve iktizâ 
iden mu‘âvanet ile i‘ânet olunub ve cenk sefâyini iktiza eden filükacılardan mâ‘âdâ 
filüka ile tüccâr sefînesine iki nefer âdem irsâl ve tâcir sefînesinin senedini ve yol 
kağıdını görüp ma‘mûlünbih olduğunu bildikde bila tehir kendi sefînelerine avdet 
ideler ve sefînelerin bayrak ve senedâtları ma‘lûm olmak için senedâtların birer 
memhûr sûreti ve bayrakların dahi resimleri tarafeynden verile.  
-ON İKİNCİ MADDE: Kral-ı müşarûn ileyhin re‘âyâsından ve ana müte‘allik 
olanlardan biri İslama gelüp ve geldiğini konsolosundan veyahud tercümânlarından 
birisinin müvâcehesinden mukırr olur ise bu sûrette borcunu vermek ve kendi ve 
eşyasından mâ‘adâ sâirlerin emti‘alarından yedinde bulunan eşya dahi ba‘de’s-sübût 
ashâbına verilmek üzere vekiline ve konsoloslarına teslîm oluna  
-ON ÜÇÜNCÜ MADDE: Kral-ı müşarûn ileyhe tâbi‘ olup himâyesinde ve bayrağı 
altında olan re‘âyâ ve tüccâr tâifesi mâdem ki Devlet-i Aliyye düşmanlarından olan 
korsan tâifesi ile îsâl-i mazarrata sâ‘i ve mezbûrlara askeri yazılmış olmayalar ol 
makûlelerin emval ve eşyalarına taarruz ve kendülerine te‘addî olunmayub eşyâlarıyla 
tahliye-i sebîl olunalar ve Kral-ı müşarûn ileyhin bayrağı ve “patente” tâbir olunan yol 
kağıdı ile olan sefayînden biri Devlet-i Aliyyenin korsanları tarafından istirkâk 
olundukta sefîne-i merkûme ve donanmada olan tüccâr ve re‘âyâ ve eşyalardan mâ‘adâ 
devleteyn düşmanlarından ahz olunan tarafeyn sefayîni ve içinde olan tüccâr ve 
re‘âyâsı mukarrer olan dostluk istihkâkı için mümkün mertebe tahsîl ve tarafeyne 
verilmeğe sa‘y oluna  
-ON DÖRDÜNCÜ MADDE: Bu iki devlet beyninde bulunan tarafeynin üserâsı bu 
hususa me‘mur olanların ma‘rifetiyle münâsib ve mu‘tedil behâ ile itlâk yahud 
mübâdele olunalar ve itlâk ve yahud mübâdele oluncaya değin sahiblerinden lütf ile 
mu‘âmele olunmak üzere tenbîh olunalar   
-ON BEŞİNCİ MADDE: Kral-ı müşarûn ileyhin re‘âyâlarından biri gümrükten eşya 
kaçırmış bulunur ise dost olan düvelin re‘âyâsından ziyade bir vecihle te’dib olunmaya 
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ve tüccârları her ne mezhebden diler ise simsâr alup istihdâm ideler ve tüccârları 
husûsunda hilâf mu‘tâd bir kimesne cebren müdâhale eylemeye ve müdahale idenlerin 
muhkem haklarından geline Devlet-i Aliyyenin iskele, limân ve sedd’ül-bahrine ve 
sâir yerlerine gelen sefayînleri dost olan düvelin sefayini misüllü yoklama olunalar  
-ON ALTINCI MADDE: Devlet-i Aliyyenin sefayîni Kral-ı müşarûn ileyhin hükümeti 
dâhilinde olan sevâhilde sefîne seçildiği ve sefayîndan dahi kara göründüğü mahalle 
değin düşmanı tarafından takîb ve te‘addî olunmasına anların taraflarından cevâz 
verilmemek ve kezâlik Devlet-i Aliyyenin sefayini dahi minvâl-i muharrer üzere anlar 
ile dost olan sefayîne hadd-ı merkûm dâhilinde taarruz itmemek husûsları kendileriyle 
dost bulunanlara taraflarından ihbâr olunub rızâ-dâde oldukları halde keyfiyet der-i 
Devlet-i Aliyyeye tahrîren ifade ve minvâl-i muharrer üzere karâr dâde ola.  
-ON YEDİNCİ MADDE:  Devlet-i Aliyyenin re‘âyâsından ve husûsan Ülgünlü ve 
Arnavutluk’ta olan korsan makûlesinden ve sâir bu yolda yürüyenlerden bir ferd bi’l-
cümle Kral-ı müşarûn ileyhin sefayîni ile husumet etmemek husûsu ve iskelelerine ve 
memleketlerine vardıklarında dostâne kabul ve sâir dost olan düvele mu‘tâd olan bi’l-
cümle i‘ânetler bunların haklarında dahi icrâ olunmak haline emr u tenbih  oluna ve 
zikr olunan tevaifin kral-ı müşarun ileyhin taht-ı hükümetinde olan arazi ahalisi ile 
serbestiyyet ve kendi halleri üzere ticaret için varup gelmeleri caiz ola iş bu akd olunan 
mevada  muhalefet eden varsa tedib ve tarafeyne bu megulelerden olan fil-cümle zarar 
ve ziyan ve sair dost olan düvele müsaade olunduğu üzere tazmin ettirile ve Devlet-i 
Aliyyenin emr u fermanına muhalefet ve onların reayalarına teaddi ider olur ise yani 
korsanlık muamelesini eyler ise o meguleye deryanın açığında musadaka olunduğu 
halde akd olunan mevada halel gelmeksizin hakkından gelinmesi caiz ola ve kezalik 
Devlet-i Aliyye sefayini dahi bu vecih üzere hareket eylemek caiz ola Devlet-i Aliyye-
i ebed kıyam ile İspanya devleti beyninde rabıta pezirihüsn hıtam olan işbu müsalaha-
i mütemeyyine Cezayir Garp ve Tunus ve Trablus ocaklarına ihbar olunup zikr olunan 
ocakların müsalaha hususunda iradeleri kendi yedlerinde olmaktan naşi onlar dahi zikr 
olunan İspanya devlet-i ile başkaca akd-i müsalaha eylediklerinde Devlet-i Aliyye bu 
mahfuz ve müsalahaları makbul olacağını müşir ve tekiden dostluğu tavsiye birle 
müsalahaya terğibi havi o emr-i şerife İspanya elçisi tarafından istida olunduk da her 
bir ocağa başka başka üç kıta evamir-i aliyye isdar ve teslimi caiz ola. 
-ON SEKİZİNCİ MADDE: Devlet-i Aliyyenin iskele ve limanlarında ve kezâlik Kral-
ı müşarûn ileyhin taht-ı hükümetinde olan iskele ve limanlarda tarafeyn düşmanlarına 
cenk sefâyini techîz olunmasına cevâz verilmeye ve düşman bayrağı ile gelen 
sefâyinden tarafeyn sefâyinine te‘addi olunmasına cevâz verilmediğinden mâ‘adâ 
cânibeynin sefâyinine her vecihle mu‘âvenet olunup tarafeyn sefîneleri limanlardan 
çıktıklarında yirmidört saat mürûrundan sonra zikr olunan cenk sefâyininin ihracına 
cevâz verile velâkin düşmanın hilesiyle bir sefîne istirkâk olunub ve istirkâk olunan 
sefineye i‘ânet olunmasını mümkün olmadığı halde bulunan devletin limanlarında bu 
makûle avârız zuhûru töhmet add olunmaya tarafeynin re‘âyâ ve tüccar sefâyini 
düşman bayrağı ve düşmandan yol kağıdı almağa cevâz verilmeye ve bu makûller ahz 
olunduk da sefîne zâbiti ibreten lil-gayr sefînesinin direğine salb olunub ve sefinesi ve 
etbâ‘ını ve eşyası ahz edenin esîr ve ganimeti oluna ve tarafeynin re‘âyâsına ve 
memleketlerinde süknâsı karâr-dâde olanlardan mâ‘adâsına yol kağıdı ve bayrak 
verilmesine cevâz verilmeye  
-ON DOKUZUNCU MADDE: Kral-ı müşarûn ileyh tarafından ta‘yîn olunan vükelâ 
ve konsoloslardan bayrağı altında olanlar ticarete müte‘allik eşyalar için gümrüklerini 
verdiklerinde sâir dost olan düvelden tahsîl olunan konsolota resmi alınmasına cevâz 
verile ve re‘âyâlarından bir kimesneye barut ve top ve silah vesâir memnâ‘attan 
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olanlardan mâa‘dâ ticarete müte‘allik olan eşyayı sefayîne tahmîl eylemeye 
mümâna‘ât olunmaya  
-YİRMİNCİ MADDE: Kral-ı müşarûn-ileyh re‘âyâsına ve taht-ı himâyesinde olan 
kimesnelere ticarete müte‘allik bey‘ü şirâlarında sâir dost olan düvel misillü mu‘âmele 
oluna ve ale’l-ıtlak câri olan sikkeden gayri sikke teklifi ile te‘addî olunmayalar ve 
getirdükleri sikkeden hilâf mu‘tâd bir türlü resm talep olunmaya 
-YİRMİ BİRİNCİ MADDE: Azîmet üzere olan sefîne hudûs eden da‘vâ bahanesiyle 
alıkonulmayup da‘vâ ve nizâ‘ı konsolos vesâtıyla bilâ te’hir fasl oluna müte’ehhil ve 
mücerred olan re‘âyâlarından cizye ve tekâlif-i sâire talep olunmaya ve re‘âyâlarından 
birinin üzerine şer‘-i şerîf mucebince  mademki katl ü cerh keyfiyetleri sabit olmaya 
kendi halinde oldukça te‘addî olunmaya ve işbu musarrah olan maddelerde ve 
bunlardan hâriç tasrîh olunmayan husûslarda sâir dost olan düvele mu‘âmele olunduğu 
vecih üzere müsâ‘ade oluna ve devleteyne fâideli ve lâzım ad olunan sâir mevâd-ı 
nâfi‘anın dahi iş bu akd olunan şerâite derci tarafeyn münâsib görülür ise anlar dâhi 
îrâd ve müzâkere ve tertîbden sonra zamm ve derc olunmak câiz ola.  
İspanya murahhasının bî-taraflık maddesine dâir İspanya lisânı üzere kendi imza ve 
mührüyle mümzi ve memhûr takdim eylediği sened ile me’an Talamas nâm tercümanı 
imzasıyla mümzî verdiği taliyâni tercümesinin tercümesidir.  
İspanya devlet-i ile Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye beyninde 21 maade ve bir hatime 
üzerine teberrüken ve temenniyen mün‘akid olan müsâlaha-yı müeyyide şerâtından 
başka işbu madde dâhi asıl ahidnâmede mestûr ve münderic misüllü mer‘i her 
düstur’ul-‘amel tutulmak üzere mu‘âhede  ve karâr-dâde kılınmıştır ki Devlet-i 
Aliyye-i Osmaniyyenin muktezâ-yı ittihâd-ı diniyye üzere mülûk-ı İslamiyyeden Fas 
padişahı ve Arabistan’a … olan Yemen imamından gayri düvelden bisiriyle İspanya 
devleti beyninde  muhâseme vuku‘ında Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye kat‘an ve 
katiyyen bir bahane ve illet ile hiçbir vakitte İspanya devletinin hasmı olanlara sırrî ve 
cehrî i‘ânet ve müzâheret eylemeyüp kâmilen bî-taraf ola ve kezâlik musâvâten Kral-
ı müşarûn ileyhin hâlât-ı lâzime-yi uhud ve muvâsıkı üzere France ve Sicilyateyn 
devletlerinden mâ‘adâ düvelden birisine Devlet-i Aliyye beyninde muhâseme 
vuku‘ında İspanya devleti kat‘an ve kat‘iyyen bir bahane ve illet ile hiçbir vakitte 
Devlet-i seniyyenin hasmı olanlara sırrî ve cehrî i‘ânet ve müzâheret eylemeyüp 
kâmilen bî-taraf ola işbu madde dâhi asıl ahidnâmede derc olunmuş gibi aynıyla mer‘i 
ve mu‘teber olmak için tasdiknâme ile me‘ân bir vakitte tasdîk oluna binaenaleyh 
İspanya kralının murahhası olan Civan De Polini İspanya lisanı üzere muharrer iş bu 
senedi kendi yedimiz ile imza ve mührümüz ile temhir ve devletlü saadetlü vezir-i 
a‘zam el-Hac Seyyid Mehmed Paşa hazretlerinin mümzi ve mühürleriyle memhûr-ı 
mazmûn-ı mezkûreyi hâvî lisân-ı Türkî üzere olan başka sened ile mübâdele 
etmişizdir.  
Fi Constantiniyye-i mahmiye Milâd-ı İsanın 1782 senesi Eylülünün ondördününcü 
gününde tahrîr olunmuştur. 
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Appendix B: The Spanish Archival Documents 
A.H.N. Estado 4761, ( 4 January, 1782 ) 
 
 
The Emperador wanted to know that Spain would prevent the transition of her 
enemies through the Strait of Gibraltar 
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A.H.N. Legajo 4761, (10 January 1782) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Ottoman Empire declared that Tripoli, Algeria and Tunesia were independent to 
sign any agreement with Spain.
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A.H.N. Legajo 4755, (10 March 1785  
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is stated that that the Ottoman Empire sent a letter aiming to see the intention of 
the Algeria to sign a treaty with Spain but it was expected that the response would be 
negative 
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Appendix C: The Ottoman Archival Documents  
BOA, HAT, 1428/58461, 04/Ra/1153: Osmanlı Sicilyâteyn Anlaşması 
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BOA, A.E. III. Ahmed 224/21617 
, 
 
Sen ki vezirim Devlet-i Aliyye ile İspanya devleti dostluk murâd ettiklerini 
Rakofçizade ve Frence elçisi haber vermişler bu husus ber huş mülâhaza olunub 
Devlet-i Aliyye’ye hayırlı ise mezkûrlar İspanya’ya yazıb elçileri gelmek üzere 
mektup gönderilsin. 
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BOA, A.E. I. Abdülhamid 366/25619 
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Şevketlü Kerametlü Mehabetlü Devletlü Velî Nimetim Efendim 
Devlet-i Aliyyeleriyle bu def‘a akd-ı, rabıta-ı dostî ve müvâlât eden İspanya devletinin 
Âsitâne-i aliyyelerinde mûkîmde Civan Polini nâm murahhası tercümânı kapuya 
gönderib musâlaha-yı mezkûrenin in‘ikâdından izhâr-ı kemâl-i teşekkürle kelâma 
ibtidâr edib Devlet-i Aliyye ile akd-ı musâlâha iden düvel-i sâire in‘ikâd-ı sulhlarından 
sonra işin içinde bulunan ricâl Devlet-i seniyyeye ba‘zen hediye ve ba‘zen hediye-
behâ olarak şükrânelik verile gelmek de’b dirîn olmak mülâbesesiyle murahhas-ı 
mersûm dahi gâin-i kadîmeye ri‘âyete bunu teklîf ve dostâne hüsn ü kabûl ile kabûlünü 
rica eder deyub kendi yazısıyla deftergûne bir kıta kağıd ibrâz itmekle nazar olunduk 
da cânib-i çâkerâneme bir kıt‘a mücevherçiçek ile Kethüdâ-yı çâkeri kullarına yirmi 
bin ve Reis’ül-küttâb Efendi kullarına kezâlik yirmi bin Beylikçi Efendi kullarına on 
bin ve Divân-ı hümayûnları tercümânı kullarına yedibinbeşyüz kuruş verecekleri derc 
olunmak husûs-ı mezbûrun ber vech-i muharrer mevâd-ı mesbûkadan olduğu her ne 
kadar derkâr ve hatta ‘ahd-i garîbde musâlâha olunan Rusyalunun dahi akîb-i akd-i 
sulhda vech-i meşrûh üzre hediye verdikleri bedîdâr ise dahi zamân-ı kerâmet 
nişandâverânelerinde bu misüllü maddelerden mal‘ûm-ı hümayûnları olmaksızın bir 
akçe bir habbe ahzına kimesnenin zehresi olmadığı ve gerek kulları ve gerek mûma 
ileyhim bendeleri sâye-i ‘inâyetlerinde her ne kadar bu misüllü şeyden müstağni iseler 
dahi müsâleme-i mezkûre İspanya devletinin irâdesine mümâşât olunmayarak 
herhâlde dilhâh-ı Devlet-i seniyyeleri üzere nizâm bulmuşken bu vecihle arz-ı 
‘ubûdiyyet eylemek dahi Devlet-i Aliyyeye bir gûne şânı mûceb idiği mal‘ûm-ı 
mülûkâneleri bulunduk da ne vecihle emr u irâde-i daverâneleri erzân buyurulur ise 
emr u fermân şevketlü kerâmetlü mehâbetlü kudretlü velî nimetim padişahım 
hazretlerinindir. 
Benim vezirim, 
Elbette her devletin musâlaha hayriyyeleri görüldük de hediyeler verildiyse mesbûk 
olduğından buna kat‘ân bir mâni‘ yoktur ber mûceb defter cümlesi 
alınsınhimmetu’llah-ı teâlâ hayırlu işlerden eylesun. 
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BOA, A.AMD. 29/101, 234665, (1187-1203)  
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Şevketlü Kudretlü Kerametlü Adaletlü Velinimetim Efendim, 
Devlet-i Aliyye ebed-kıyâmlarıyla akd-i muhâdene ve musâfât ricası muhtevî İspanya 
kralının Der aliyyeye murahhas gönderdiği kimesnenin ve Sicilyâteyn elçisinin 
takrîrleri ricâl-i saltanat-ı seniyyeleri hâzır oldukları hâlde kırâ‘at olunmak 
mülâbesesiyle mesfûrlara külliyen ye’s cevabı verilmeyib üslûb-ı hâkim ile şimdilik 
bu maddenin mevsimi olmadığını ve Toşkana dukasıyla rabıta-ı mu‘âhede olundukda 
duka-yı mezbûr bir mikdâr isâre-yi müslimîni itlâk ve dergâh-ı mu‘adelet-penâha 
hediye olarak irsâl etmiş olduğuna binâen İspanya kralı dahi ibtidâ‘i emirde birkaç yüz 
nefer İslam esirlerini der mu‘âdete gönderib ol-vakte dek vağfirce müddet dahi güzâr 
edeceği aşikâr olmakdan nâşî temhîr-i esâs-ı dostîye karâr verilmek mümkün olacağı 
müş‘îr bir takrîr i‘tâ olunmasını ashâb-ı şûra çâkerleri istisvâb etmeleriyle hülâsa-yı 
meşveret huzûr-ı dâverânelerine ba‘del-arz iktizâ eden takrîr murahhas-ı mezkûr ve 
elçi-yi merkûma tercümânları vesâtıyla ib‘âs olunmuşdu mersumân tercümânlarını 
tekrar kapuya gönderib bu husûsa dâir bazı keyfiyâtın şifâhen müzâkeresi için Reis 
Efendi kullarıyla mahfîyce mülâkât niyâz eylediklerini ihbâr ider ricâmend oldukları 
mülâkât kaziyyesine müsâ‘ade gösterilmese kavâid-i düvele menâfi olduğundan başka 
kralı mezburun iğbirâr-ı şikest-i hâtırını mûceb olacağı bedîhî olmağın işbu pazarertesi 
Reis Efendi kullarının sahilhânesinin mersumânın mülâkâtlarına ruhsat-ı sâmileri 
buyurulur ise emr u fermân şevketlü kudretlu kerametlü adaletlü veli nimetim efendim 
padişahımındır. 
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BOA, CH 89/4420 (29/Z /1255) 
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Yâ Müfettihü’l-ebvâb iftah lenâ hayrel bâb! 
Büyük İspanya kralı tarafından Devlet-i Aliyyeye akd-i musâlaha için Dersaadete ib‘âs 
olunan Civan Polini nâm murahhas üç seneye bâliğ derbâr-ı adâlet-karârda ikâmet 
eylediği ve bu husûs için birkaç def‘a recâlar Devlet-i ebed-müddet akd-i meclîs-i şûra 
birle her birinde mesfûrun ye’s ile i‘âdesi bir türlü câiz olmadığına binâen hakimâne 
müdâfa‘a ve imrâr-ı evkâta sa‘i olmasını enseb idiğüni beyân eyledikleri ve murahhas-
ı mersûm bir türlü mücâb olmayıb ya budur ki sulh imkânda olmayacağını bana kat‘î 
cevâb verirsiz yahûd Ragıp Paşa sadâretinde tesvîr  olunduğu üzere küçük İspanya 
şurûtu gibi ‘ahd-i muhâdene râbıta-pezîr olur kelâmında ısrâr ve defa‘ât ile kapuya 
takârîr-i ‘adîde tisyâr edib mersûm me’yûsen gittiği takdirde lâ-muhâle bu zül ve 
hakâreti İspanyolu mütehammil olmayub Moskovlu ve Nemçeli ile aleyhimize râbıta 
ittifâk edecekleri ve bundan fazla Malta ve Ceneviz korsanlarına i‘ânet ve beş on kıta 
sefîne terfîk ve Akdeniz sularına irsâl ile Mısır ve sevâhil-i Arabistân câniblerine gidib 
gelen sefîne-i İslamiyeyi izrâra ibtidâr ve bir gâile ihdâs eyleyecekleri zâhir aşikâr 
olduğundan bu iki mahzûr-ı kaviye mübtenî selefim Süleyman Feyzi efendi kulları bâ-
ruhsatnâme-i hümâyûn İspanya murahhası ile mukâlemeye me’mûr kılındığı ve 
İspanya kralı Moskov ve Nemçeli ile bir vakitte Devlet-i Aliyye ‘aleyhine ‘akd ittifâk 
eyleyecek bir şurût-ı nâfî temhîr olunduğu sûrette hemen vech-i münâsibi ile 
musâlahaya nizâm verilmek mustahsen görüldüğü ve selefim çâkerleri murahhası ile 
birkaç meclis-i mukâlemât ve bir vakitte İspanyalu Devlet-i kavî şevketin husûmuna 
mu‘âvenet eyleyeceğine dâir bir şart kaleme alınıb ba‘dehu İspanya devleti düvel-i 
aherâneden birine muîn olmaya ibaresi yerine düvel-i nasârâdan birisine i‘ânet 
eylemeye ta‘biri şart-ı mezkûra derc olunmak iktizâ eylediğini murahhasa îrâd ve 
mesfûr bu şartı kabulden imtinâ‘ ve bundan gayrı bir iki maddede dahi tevâfuk 
bulunamadığından bilâhare sûret-i ba-hurriren evsâ-yı ni‘âm efendilerimize ba‘del-
‘arz Devlet-i ebed-kıyâm zât-ı musâlahayı kabul eyledi şu düvel-i nasâra ta‘biriyle 
münâzı‘–ı fihâ olan bir kaç maddesi kaldı murahhas bunlara mümâşât ve düvel-i nasâra 
‘ibâresini veya ona mümâsil bir ‘ibâreyi kabul ider ise mübâdelesinde hâzır ve 
âmâdeyim deyu selefim bendeleri tarafından murahhas-ı mezbûra bir kıt‘a takrîr 
verildiği muhât-ı ‘ilm-i ‘âliler 
İspanya murahhası mesfûr bununla mülzem olmayub çâkerleri hizmet-i riyâsete 
me’mur olalı bid-defa‘ât kâh münâzı‘-ı fiha olan mevâdın sûretini mütâlebe ve kâh 
mülâkât istid‘âsıyla tercümânını irsâl ve kulları dahi ittifâk-ı arâ ile kendisine selefimin 
verdiği takrîrde muharrer mevâdı kabul idecek ise ber-memhûr kağıdıyla ifâde eylesun 
ben dahi efendilerimize istizân ve‘ahz icâzet ile mülâkât idelim ve illâ ‘abes 
görüşülmede ne fâide vardır merâmını kaleme alsın görelim demiştim birkaç gün evvel 
münazı‘-fiha olan mevâd-ı merkûmeyi mütercimân bir kağıda yazıp testîr eylemiş 
manzur-ı sâmîden buyrulmakda müdde‘âsı ne idüği zahire çıkâr. 
 
Kaldık ki İsveç devleti Devlet-i ‘aliyye ebed-kıyâmın karz devleti olub ‘ale’l-husûs 
Moskovludan hüsn-i külli ol-vücuh dağdâr ve ellerinden gelse Rusyalunun 
izmihlâllerine bâ‘is olacak halâtâ makdûrlarını bezl ider makûleden olduklarına binâen 
Moskov keferesinin Devlet-i ebed-müddet bu galebesini gördükçe sine-çâk ve teessüf 
oldukları vaz‘ u reftârlarına zâhirdir İsveç kralı büyük İspanya kralının Devlet-i ebed-
müddet ile ‘akd-i sulha murahhas gönderdiğini istimâ‘ ve el altından kendi 
maslahatgüzârına ne işler isen işle Devlet-i aliyyeyi İspanyalu ile ‘akd-i sulha tergîb 
eyle. Zira İspanyalu Âsitane-i Devlet-i âşiyâneden sulh ümidini kat‘ eylediği halde 
beher hâl Moskovlu ile ‘akd ittifâk ider. Septe Boğazı ellerinde ve bî-nihâye sefâyine 
mâlik böyle bir devleti Moskovlu kendulere müttefik ittikleri halde iş pek müşkil olur 
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dimiş olmağla İsveç maslahatgüzârı kendü tercümânı Muradcayı tercümânlık 
bahânesiyle murahhasın ma‘iyyetine terfîk itmişdi.  
İsveç maslahatgüzârı mersûm işlerin bu vecihle ‘ukde-i eşkâle düştüğünü mu‘âyene 
ve kendu tarafından tafsil-i macerayı hâvî bir kıt‘a takrîr tahrîr ve memhûren kullarına 
göndermiş mazmûnu mütâla‘a buyrulduk da ma‘lûm olur ve maslahatgüzâr-ı mersûm 
lisânen gönderdiği haberde  dahi benim devletimin hândân-ı saltanat-ı seniyyeye ne 
derecelerde hayırhâh olduğunu ta‘rîfi ‘abes kâbilindendir zirâ şu Moskovlu’nun bize 
ettikleri gadr ve bu kadar memâlikimizi istilâları ‘âlemlere zâhirdir Devletim dâima 
Devlet-i ‘aliyyenin nusret ve zaferini hulûs-ı bâl ile hakdan temennî ider ki kenduye 
dahi nafi‘dir İspanya kralı mülük-ı nasâra miyânelerinde Fransa misüllü bir hanedân 
ve sâhib-i miknet kraldır Husûsen yüzelli kıt‘a kalyona mâlik ve Sebte Boğazı yed-i 
tasarruflarında olmağla murahhas üç yıldır Der-‘aliyyede sulh için ikâmet ve hatta 
‘akd-i mükâleme olmuşiken elfâz-ı cüz‘iyye nizâ‘iyle me’yusan…  
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A.DVN. DVE. (11) 177/10 1195 
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İş bu mâh-ı Şa‘bân-ı mu‘azzamın on ikinci selâse  günü Kethüdâ Bey ve Defterdâr 
Efendi ve Reis Efendi ve Çavuşbaşı Ağa ve Resmi Ahmed Efendi ve Kethüdâ-yı sâbık 
Hacı Mustafa Efendi ve Fahr(?) Emini sabık El-Hâc Mustafa Efendi ve hala Defter 
Emini Efendi Ahmed Efendi ve Tersane-i Amire Emini Halil Mehmed Efendi kulları 
bir yere gelüp cümle muvâcehelerinde Der ‘aliyyede mukîm İspanya murahhası Civan 
Polini’nin şimdiye dek gönderdiği ve tercümânına tahrîr eylediği tekârir ve tezâkiri 
tercümeleri bundan akdemce nihâyetü’l-nihâye olarak taraf-ı Devlet-i ‘aliyyeden 
murahhas-ı mersûma i‘tâ olunan takrîr ile mevâd-ı hamse kağıdı ve müsâlaha-yı 
matlûbeyi murahhasın merâmı üzere red ve kabul şıklarında bir mahzûr var mıdır yok 
mudur beyân kılınmasını mutazammın kaleme alınan usûl feth ve kıra’at olundukda 
mecmu‘ı kelâma ibtidâr idib İspanya murahhası îrâd eylediği mevâd varakasında 
mestûr bî-taraflık şartında Fransa ve küçük İspanyadan mâ‘adâ düvelden biri ile 
Devlet-i ‘aliyye beyninde muhâseme vuku‘unda İspanya kralı bî-taraf olub husûm-u 
saltanat-ı seniyyeye mu‘âvenet eylemeye ibâresini tahrîr eyledik de Devlet-i ebed-
kıyâm cânibinden dahi Fas Sultanı ve Yemen İmamından gayri mulûk-ı İslâmiyyeden 
birisiyle İspanyalının muharebesi vakı‘  olduk da Devlet-i kavî-şevket dahi 
İspanyalının husûmuna i‘ânet eylemeye kelâmını tasrihden murâd iki cânibde istisnâ 
kaziyyesinin musâvât bulunmak ve bir vakitte İspanyalı Fas Sultanı ve İmam-ı Yemen 
keşver ve memâliklerine itale-yi pây-ı tecâvüz idüb memâlik-i mezkûrede sâkin 
zümre-yi muvahhidin Devlet-i ebed-kıyâmdan istiğâse eyledikleri sûrette iğâse ne 
meşru‘aya destrest hâsıl olmakla sulh-ı mezkûr şerî‘at-i beyzâya tatbîk olunmak 
mülâhazası idüğü ta‘riften müstağnidir murahhasın iş bu kağıdında kendileri Fransa 
ve Küçük İspanyayı istisnâ yani her ne zaman bu iki tâife Devlet-i ‘aliyye ‘aleyhine 
‘adâvet iderler ise İspanya kralı onlara muayyen olmak ve Devlet-i seniyyenin istisnâ 
ideceği Fas Sultanı ve Yemen İmamından sukûn olunub İspanyalu Sultan ve İmam 
müşarûn ileyhüma ile cenk ve derkâr eylediği takrîrde onlar istiğâse iderler ise dahi 
Devlet-i ‘aliyye kendilerine iğâse ve imdâddan el çekmek husûsu serâhaten matlûb 
olduğuna binâen bu vecihle şurût-ı ‘akdi meşrû‘ mudur değil midir ibtidâ istiftâ ve 
iftâya mevkûftur ve be-tahsîs Devlet-i ebed’iyyül-istimrâr İspanyalu ile tesâvî 
derecesinden sukût eylemek mahzûru dahi mukarrerdir.  
Cezayir ve Tunus ve Trablus Garb Ocaklarına İspanyalu ile Devlet-i ‘aliyyenin ‘akd-i 
sulh eylediği ihbârıyla iktifâya kâni‘ olduğunu murahhas-ı mesfûr ibtidâ geldiği 
esnada irâd edib sonra Reis’ül-küttâb sâbık Süleyman Feyzi Efendi ile vuku‘ bulan 
mukâlemelerinde ocaklar kaziyyesinde der-miyân ettiği sûret şimdi...   
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